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Abstract 
 
The rise of China as a major player global politics over the past few decades has 
generated substantial debate among scholars and practitioners of international 
relations. Many have raised questions and concerns as to what China’s long term 
intentions are, whether it would cooperate or challenge the existing global order, and 
how countries should respond, react and relate to it.  
Given the limitations posed by mainstream international relations theories in 
explaining China’s behavior, this dissertation seeks to delve into the study of China’s 
international politics and foreign policy actions by examining the Chinese political 
worldview concerning its preferred world order and the norms and rules that it seeks 
to promote.  To do so, this thesis introduces the notion of “Chinese exceptionalism” as 
a framework or lens through which to better account for China’s international politics 
and foreign policy. In this thesis, I will argue that the Chinese political worldview (i.e. 
how it sees itself and how it sees the world) perceives China itself as being 
exceptional, that is, it is good and different, and that this has influenced Beijing’s 
approach to the practice of international politics. Such an exceptionalism mindset, I 
argue, provides us with a better understanding and a more comprehensive 
interpretation to China’s international relations as compared to mainstream IR 
theories. As this dissertation will highlight, China perceives the existing international 
order as ripe for change and that it ought to play a more influential role whilst having 
its interests acknowledged by others. Hence the central question in this dissertation is 
what is the Chinese worldview concerning global order and what are the norms and 
principles that China seeks to promote seeing itself as an exceptional power? 
Furthermore, how does Chinese exceptionalism influence Chinese international 
relations debates concerning its role in the global system and its preferred world order? 
The following study provides a systematic analysis to flesh out China’s political 
worldview and how its conceptions of exceptionalism are being reflected in its 
international practices and global politics. Drawing upon interviews conducted with 
international relations scholars (particularly those based in East Asia), senior 
policymakers both from and outside China, Chinese primary sources, and participatory 
insights gleaned from extended fieldwork working together with Chinese IR specialists 
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based at a Singapore-based defense think-tank, this dissertation explores China’s 
worldview and its exceptionalism thinking in five different areas. They are, namely, (I) 
Chinese theories of international relations, (II) Chinese national identity, (III) China’s 
national image, (IV) China’s global outreach as shown by the Belt and Road Initiative, 
and finally, (V) in China’s relations with its neighbors. Through locating Chinese 
exceptionalism discourse within these five areas, this dissertation seeks to unravel 
what Chinese exceptionalism entails, and how it it frames Beijing’s worldview towards 
international politics. 
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Chapter 1  
 
Chinese Political Worldview and International Global Order 
 
Introduction 
The rise of China as a major player global politics over the past few decades has 
generated substantial debate among scholars and practitioners of international 
relations. Indeed, Beijing’s economic footprints, growing military presence and political 
influence are being felt all over the world, thus raising questions and concerns as to 
what its long term intentions are, whether it would cooperate or challenge the existing 
global order, and consequently how countries should respond, react and relate to it.  
 Following Xi Jinping’s assumption of China’s top leadership office in November 
2012, China’s international prominence has been even more conspicuous, with many 
suggesting that it was now moving away from a strategy of lying low (taoguang 
yanghui 韬光养晦 ) to a more active, even assertive, stance in its international 
relations.1 Linked to this is the frequent emphasis among Chinese leaders over the 
                                                   
1 The term “tao guang yang hui” is sometimes also translated as “hide brightness, 
nourish obscurity.” The scholarly literature on this is vast and will not be exhaustively 
enumerated here as it will be alluded to throughout the course of the dissertation. 
Some selected articles that I have consulted include, Zheng, Yongnian, and Gore, 
Lance. China Entering the Xi Jinping Era. London: Routledge, 2015; Poh, Angela, 
and Mingjiang Li. "A China in Transition: The Rhetoric and Substance of Chinese 
Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping." Asian Security 13, no. 2 (2017): 84-97; Chen, 
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last decade that China’s rise would be a peaceful one, and that it would not be a 
hegemonic power.2 According to Buzan, this rhetoric of ‘peaceful rise’ represents an 
articulation of Chinese grand strategy, an “indigenous and original idea deeply 
embedded in China’s reform and opening up, and effectively constituting the core 
concept for a grand strategy. While not without its ambiguities and contradictions, 
‘peaceful rise’ represents a potentially workable program, and a distinctive way of 
marking China’s return to great power standing in international society.”3 The key 
question, as Buzan puts it, is whether China “seeks a stable and harmonious regional 
and global environment as a desirable end in itself, or merely as an instrumental goal 
to underpin its own development and rise…was peaceful rise just a transitional 
strategy, to be abandoned now that China is strong, or is it a long-term strategy?”4 
Buzan suggests the likelihood that China’s ascension would be characterized by “cold 
                                                   
Dingding., and Jianwei Wang. "Lying Low No More?: China’s New Thinking on the 
Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy." China: An International Journal 9, no. 2 (2011): 195-
216.   
2 Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, ‘China’s 
peaceful development’, Beijing, September 2011, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-09/06/c_131102329.htm  
(retrieved December 7, 2015).   
3 Buzan, Barry. “The logic and contradictions of 'peaceful rise/development' as 
China's grand strategy.“ The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no.4 (2014): 
381- 420, see 384.  
4 Ibid., 401.  
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peaceful rise”, one which would be “high in confrontations, alienating neighbours, and 
reinforcing the US position in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean.”5 In other words, 
China is unlikely to conform to the present international system but seek to find ways 
to refashion it to its advantage while also ensuring that it does not end up getting 
embroiled in costly conflict that would affect its internal development and slowing down 
its economic growth.  
How do all these discussions about China relate to the broader conversation 
on international order and global politics? According to Robert Gilpin, any change in 
the international system would inevitably also reflect the “new distribution of power 
and the interests of its new dominant members.” 6  While this by itself does not 
necessarily lead to war and hot conflict, yet there is a sufficient body of evidence7 to 
suggest that China’s rise would nonetheless pose a credible challenge to the present 
                                                   
5 Ibid., 419.  
6  Gilpin, Robert G. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981, p.9.  
7 See Ikenberry, G. John, Wang, Jisi, Zhu, Feng, eds. America, China, and the 
Struggle for World Order : Ideas, Traditions, Historical Legacies, and Global Visions. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015; Sutter, Robert G. China's Rise in Asia : 
Promises and Perils. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005.   
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international system, not least as a result of Chinese ideas concerning how the 
international order ought to be structured to reflect Chinese interests.8  
What changes then would we expect to see in the existing international order 
to account for China’s interests and preference, and more specifically, how would 
China intend to go about pursuing its objectives, and what are its ultimate goals? This 
is a topic of deeply divisive debate among international relations (IR) scholars. Realist 
scholars argue that given the structure of the international system, China would not 
rise peacefully but that it will “attempt to dominate Asia the way the United States 
dominates the Western Hemisphere.” 9  Such a line of thinking assumes the 
international system as universal, whereby all countries perceive the world alike, and 
                                                   
8 Kupchan, Charles A. Unpacking hegemony: the social foundations of hierarchical 
order, in G. John Ikenberry, ed., Power, Order and Change in World Politics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 19-61.  
9 Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, updated edition. NY: W.W. 
Norton & Company, Inc., 2014, esp pp.360-413 (Can China Rise Peacefully?).  
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that China’s interests are fundamentally at odds with Western interests, 10  particularly 
in the Asia-Pacific region where they are being contested.11  
Constructivist scholars who take seriously Chinese culture and ideas 
(particularly Confucianism) also question the extent to which whether Chinese culture 
is inherently peaceful and is able to constrain Chinese actions. Those who are wary 
of Chinese intentions argue that Confucian culture (which is frequently touted as being 
antimilitary) acts to mask the Chinese practice of realpolitik and expansive grand 
strategy, which is ultimately power-seeking. 12  Others perceive China’s history – 
shaded by Confucian culture - as largely peaceful (before Western interference) and 
that the rise of China will herald an international order that is not Western dominated, 
but instead one that sees China at the apex of the system.13 Such an interpretation is 
also favorably disposed towards the tributary system in which China “stood at the top 
                                                   
10 For purposes of this thesis, I will define the West in its broadest sense, one which 
places a strong commitment to liberal institutions, the rule of law and the adherence 
to high standards of individual human rights. For a scholarly discussion, see Kurth, 
James. “Western Civilization, Our Tradition”, The Intercollegiate Review, Fall 
2003/Spring 2004, 5-13.  
11 Friedberg, Aaron L.  A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, And The Struggle 
For Mastery in Asia. New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2011.  
12 Wang, Yuan-Kang. Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power 
Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. 
13 Kang, David C. East Asia before the West : Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.  
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of the hierarchy” and other neighboring countries seek to develop stable relations with 
it through assiduously copying “Chinese institutional and discursive practices.” 14 
Western IR scholarship is seen as arising from the European experience during the 
seventeenth century following the peace of Westphalia, and thus should not be applied 
to non-European/Western states or entities which do not share the same worldviews 
that order the Western experience.15  
Liberal institutionalism sees China as taking advantage of the existing global 
institutions and argue that its rise, is in part due to the present Western-led 
international order, one that is “open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep 
political foundations.”16 Unlike previous hegemonic powers, the present international 
system has been liberal thus encouraging the entrance of other major powers and 
accommodating their presence. It is further observed that while the U.S. “unipolar 
moment” would eventually end, the international order would likely to continue. Such 
an arrangement is premised upon the role of international institutions as being able to, 
“in various ways bind states together, constrain state actions and create complicated 
and demanding political processes that participating states can overcome worries 
                                                   
14 Kang, David C. East Asia before the West : Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute, 
p.2.  
15 Acharya, Amitav, and Buzan, Barry. Non-Western International Relations Theory: 
Perspectives on and beyond Asia. London: Routledge, 2010. 
16 Ikenberry, G. John. “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the 
Liberal System Survive?” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008.  
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about the arbitrary and untoward exercise of power.”17 Under these arrangements, 
China’s rise would not necessarily lead to an unraveling of the international system, 
and there exist a number of available measures – bilateral and multilateral - that could 
help to ameliorate some of the worst case conflict scenarios that are feared.18  
Not surprisingly, all three groups are able to muster empirical support for their 
positions. For instance, China’s seeming intransigence on its territorial claims in the 
South China Sea with ASEAN and the East Sea with Japan respectively lend support 
to Mearsheimer’s claim that a rising China would necessarily want to dominate Asia; 
Martin Jacques assertion that China would “rule the world” is founded upon the 
strength of the Chinese economy, which is predicted to become the world’s largest 
within the next few decades.19 Similarly, the idea that international institutions could 
possibly constrain, even shape states’ behavior view is premised upon the fact that 
China views the international system in the same manner that other Western nations 
                                                   
17 Ikenberry, G. John. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Building 
of Order after Major Wars. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001, p.35. 
18 Liff, Adam, P. and G. John Ikenberry, “Racing toward Tragedy?: China’s Rise, 
Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma.” International 
Security, 2014, Vol.39(2), pp.52-91.  
19 Jacques, Martin. When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and 
the Birth of a New Global Order, London: Penguin Books, 2012, pp.1-6. Given the 
slowdown of the Chinese economy in 2015 and signs that the American economy 
may be on the upturn, it remains to be seen if China would overtake the West within 
the stipulated timeframe (by 2050).  
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do, and more importantly, share the same goals and objectives as the others. This 
may not be the case, as a number of Chinese scholars have noted in recent years.20    
Clearly, none of the above schools of thought are adequate, in and of 
themselves, to account for the complex dimensions of interactions between China and 
the rest of the world. While realist logic predicts the certainty of conflict and war 
between the current hegemon and a rising power, Chinese leaders have frequently 
vowed to avoid that outcome and the increased frequency of Sino-American 
interactions the past few years have gone some way to ameliorate the inevitability of 
that outcome.21 Likewise liberalism, with its emphasis on the construction of global 
norms (that could limit China’s ambitions) assumes that Chinese elites have 
thoroughly “bought in” to the established global order and are willing to concede what 
they perceive to be national interests to the broader “good” of international society. 
Yet, domestic interests and in the case of China, the paramount goal of maintaining 
Communist rule, constraint Chinese leaders in their decision-making, particularly in 
                                                   
20 Yan, Xuetong. "International Leadership and Norm Evolution." Chinese Journal of 
International Politics 4, no. 3 (2011): 233-64; Qin, Yaqing. "Continuity through 
Change: Background Knowledge and China’s International Strategy." The Chinese 
Journal of International Politics 7, no. 3 (2014): 285-314. 
21 The recent trade war between China and the United States may yet sway the 
pendulum back to the realist logic of the certainty of conflict. As of writing however, 
the trade war has not led to actual hot conflict.   
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areas where its international status are being challenged. 22  While constructivist 
arguments provide useful insights into how ideas and norms have contributed to 
Chinese thinking about international politics, the polarized conclusions they hold about 
China’s behavior (benign or aggressive) suggest considerable ambiguity as to whether 
ideational elements are sufficient in and of themselves to account for China’s political 
behavior.  
 
The Argument 
Chinese political worldview and Chinese exceptionalism 
Given the limitations posed by mainstream international relations theories in 
explaining China’s behavior, this dissertation seeks to examine China’s political 
worldview and its vision concerning international order and Chinese preferences on 
the rules and norms underlining international relations. 23  To do so, this thesis 
introduces the notion of “Chinese exceptionalism” as a framework or lens through 
which to better account for China’s international politics and foreign policy. In this 
thesis, I will argue that the Chinese political worldview (i.e. how it sees itself and how 
                                                   
22 Deng, Yong. China's Struggle for Status : The Realignment of International 
Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.  
23 In this dissertation, I define the term “worldview” (or “weltanschauung”) as the 
fundamental cognitive orientation of an individual or society encompassing the whole 
of the individual’s or society’s knowledge and point of view. It involves both the 
perception of (self-identity or self-view) and also that of seeing the outside world.  
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it sees the world) is that it perceives itself as being exceptional, that is, it is good and 
different, and that such a perception has influenced its approach to the practice of 
international politics. Such an exceptionalism mindset – I argue – provides us with a 
better understanding and a more comprehensive interpretation to China’s international 
relations as compared to mainstream IR theories.24  
In studying the Chinese worldview and its claims to exceptionalism, I am not 
suggesting that there exists only one worldview, Chinese identity or voice. Far from it. 
Nevertheless, given strict state (party) controls about what the “official” narrative of 
China might be, it seems appropriate to examine what such narratives might be and 
more importantly, to uncover from these narratives about the way China’s top leaders 
and key opinion makers attempt to tell the story of China to themselves and to the 
world. By taking seriously material, ideational and structural factors, this thesis seeks 
to locate the key driver behind China’s international politics as the sense of 
exceptionalism within the Chinese Communist Party. By looking at the views of its top 
leaders and key opinion makers in their speeches and writings, I argue that highly 
pervasive within the Chinese worldview is a deep sense of exceptionalism and that 
such exceptionalism dynamics have shaped the manner in which China seeks to relate 
with the world. To be sure, Chinese exceptionalism is not only the factor contributing 
                                                   
24	  To be sure, Chinese exceptionalism is not the only way China seeks to distinguish 
itself from other major powers. For instance, the adjective “Chinese characteristics” 
is often used by Chinese leaders and policy makers differentiate the Chinese 
worldview from others. However, this dissertation will emphasize the importance of 
Chinese exceptionalism to China’s political worldview.	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to the Chinese worldview concerning global order nor does it provide an exhaustive 
explanation to accounting for China’s political behavior.  Indeed, other factors such as 
political ideology, threat perception and historical experiences have also deeply 
shaded Chinese thinking on international relations. However I argue none of these 
factors have had a more profound effect on China’s political worldview than Chinese 
exceptionalism. This is especially so in the 21st century whereby China seeks not only 
parity with other major powers, but also to surpass them (particularly the United 
States). By seeing itself as good and different, China not only seeks to emphasize its 
own brand of distinctive practices towards international politics, but also to differentiate 
its practices as being superior to those of the West which they challenge. To this end, 
China perceives the existing international order as ripe for change and that it ought to 
play a more influential role whilst having its interests acknowledged by others.  
To clarify, I am not suggesting in my thesis that I believe China is indeed 
exceptional in the manner of which it conducts its international relations and foreign 
policy. On the contrary, as I will argue in the course of my dissertation, China has 
acted in a very un-exceptional way in various affairs of international politics. But if that 
is the case, is claiming exceptionalism merely a strategy for Chinese leaders and 
policy makers to utilize in order to promote Beijing’s own interests? Such an argument 
in my view is also overly simplistic for it assumes that the pursuit of national interests 
is devoid of any ideational basis. Instead my view is that Chinese exceptionalism 
constitutes an important element in China’s worldview (although it is not the only factor 
as I have highlighted earlier) in framing the manner Chinese leaders and opinion-
makers think about the world. This does not mean everything that China does can be 
explained by Chinese exceptionalism. Indeed my objective in this thesis is not to build 
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a new IR theory to explain China’s international relations, but rather to use Chinese 
exceptionalism as a theme to comprehend China’s political worldview and the extent 
to which these views concerning China’s global ambitions are indicative of the thought-
forms and ideas permeating Chinese society at large. Indeed as observed by Deng 
Yong, China’s international relations are best considered in terms of “interaction 
between domestic and international politics, between China and other great powers, 
and between China’s rise and evolution of the world order at large.”25 In other words 
China’s view of itself and its view of the world are closely intertwined. Instead of 
isolating one aspect of China’s great-power ascent (for instance, its military growth or 
economic might) and use it to explain China’s international relations, the study of the 
Chinese worldview hopes to incorporate a more holistic explanation whereby Chinese 
interests are seen to be interwoven with other political, social and cultural factors which 
are subsequently played out in Chinese domestic politics and China’s international 
relations.  
As a branch of Chinese political thought, Chinese exceptionalism （zhongguo 
liwai lun, 中国例外伦) has also been the subject of Chinese scholarly analysis.26 
                                                   
25 Deng, Yong. China's Struggle for Status : The Realignment of International 
Relations, p.15. 
26 See Cheng, Li. “Zhongguo qianjing lekuanlun he zhongguo jueqi liwailun” [China 
future optimism and Chinese rise and exceptionalism]. Meiguobulujinsixuehui 
yuehan sangdun zhongguo zhongxin [Brookings Institute, John Thornton Centre], 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2011/7/china-
li/05_china_li_chinese.PDF (retrieved 25 April 2016); Kang, Xiaoguang. “Zhongguo 
	   25	  
According to Chinese sociologist Kang Xiaoguang, Chinese exceptionalism is 
manifested in two ways: one, in China’s success of large scale institutional change, 
and its growing international status, and two, in successfully preserving the power of 
the Communist Party, and greater stability in its political situation.27  Kang further 
observes that in China’s case, the government (or the Party) wields a position of 
absolute dominance (juedui zhudao diwei 绝对主导地位) over society.28 While Kang 
is careful to clarify that social behavior is not insignificant, nonetheless for one to 
“understand the motives and behavior of China’s performance”, there is a need to 
“understand the Chinese government’s way of motivation and behavior.”29 Similarly in 
a study of China’s foreign policy, Feng Zhang noted that  Chinese exceptionalism 
represents an “essential part of the worldview of the Chinese government and many 
                                                   
teshulun – dui Zhongguo dalu 25 nian gaige jingyan de fansi” [Chinese 
exceptionalism: Reflections on 25 years of reform in mainland China], April 4, 2004, 
http://www.aisixiang.com/data/2860.html  (retrieved 16 December 2015). Kang uses 
the terms “zhongguo teshulun” to describe Chinese exceptionalism. Defining “teshu” 
(特殊) as “special” can be problematic given the negative connotations in Chinese 
language over the term (i.e. special means mentally challenged), hence the 
preferred term, “zhongguo liwai lun.”  
27 Kang, Xiaoguang. “Zhongguo teshulun – dui Zhongguo dalu 25 nian gaige jingyan 
de fansi”, 2004.  
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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intellectuals [and] it can become an important source for policy ideas.”30 Chris Alden 
and Daniel Large espouse Chinese exceptionalism as a theoretical framework in their 
discussion of China-Africa relations, terming it as a “normative modality of 
engagement that seeks to structure relations” that is geared towards ensuring ‘mutual 
benefit’ and ‘win-win’ outcomes at continental and bilateral levels.31 This is seen to be 
on fairer terms as opposed to presumably Western-African relations which is 
perceived as being conducted on terms favorable to the former.  
This notion of Chinese exceptionalism (how China sees itself and the wider 
world) has historical antecedents, going as far back to the era of late imperial China, 
as one study shows, where it was used as a “cultural strategy to confront and 
appropriate the hegemonic representation of modern democratic power and 
Occidental civilization that was articulated on the basis of Tocqueville’s exceptionalist 
image of America and imposed by Western imperialism.”32 What is different today is 
that China, unlike its imperial past, is far better connected to the outside world than 
before, its global reach going structurally much deeper than in the past, with wide-
                                                   
30 Zhang, Feng. "The Rise of Chinese Exceptionalism in International Relations." 
European Journal of International Relations, 19, no. 2 (2013): 305-28, see 307.  
31 Alden, Chris, and Daniel Large. "China's Exceptionalism and the Challenges of 
Delivering Difference in Africa." Journal of Contemporary China 20, no. 68 (2011): 
21-38.  
32 Chen, Hon-Fai. "Reflexive Exceptionalism." Journal of Classical Sociology 9, no. 1 
(2009): 79-95. 
	   27	  
ranging implications. 33 As such, Chinese exceptionalism represents not just a cultural 
strategy to cope with external hegemonic imposition of foreign ideas, but also, I argue, 
a means for Chinese elites to actively espouse their worldviews and to promote China 
on the international stage.  Chinese exceptionalism discourse possesses both 
defensive and offensive elements. As a defensive strategy, it allows Chinese leaders 
to defend Chinese actions on its own terms rather than being compelled to respond to 
universal rules which it sees as being Western-centric; as an offensive strategy, it 
legitimizes Chinese actions by emphasizing the positive aspects of China’s worldview. 
Indeed, the use of “Sino-speak” discourse whereby the past – and China’s history - is 
frequently alluded to in order to express how Chinese elites see China’s future.34 As 
observed, “[While] the discourse of Chinese exceptionalism is hardly unique; as 
articulations of American exceptionalism show, part of being a great power is 
celebrating the moral value of your new world order.”35 Upon what basis then, are we 
able to evaluate the moral value of China’s purported world order? To what extent 
does a Chinese world order offer an alternative that is in some ways unique, in that 
there is something about China – be it its history or its current positions in the global 
                                                   
33 McNally, Christopher A. "Sino-Capitalism: China's Reemergence and the 
International Political Economy." World Politics 64, no. 4 (2012): 741-76; Ajami, Riad 
A. "China’s Economic Arrival and Global Reach." Journal of Asia-Pacific Business 
15, no. 3 (2014): 193-96.  
34 Callahan, William A. "Sino-speak: Chinese Exceptionalism and the Politics of 
History." The Journal of Asian Studies 71, no. 1 (2012): 33-55. 
35 Ibid., 50.  
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order (or both) - that mark it out as utterly different from others? Or is such a world 
order simply synonymous with a Sino-centric worldview, whereby China’s growing 
power enables it to coerce other nations to accept its view of the international system? 
These questions will be discussed in the course of the dissertation.   
 
 
 
Exceptionalism and the Chinese World Order 
From the above, we see that Chinese exceptionalism discourse has gradually 
gained traction in scholarly circles both within and outside China as a mode of political 
inquiry into Chinese international relations behavior. Skeptics of such an approach 
may pose the question: do not all countries – with few exceptions – consider 
themselves exceptional in some sense? If that is the case, how would the concept of 
Chinese exceptionalism proffer us with new insights into Chinese political behavior? 
To answer this question, we need to first revisit the literature of exceptionalism as 
applied in the domain of international relations.  Given the prominence of the United 
States in global affairs, much of existing scholarly literature on exceptionalism allude 
to the American experience. 36 Notwithstanding the challenges to the United States in 
the 21st century, one might view American exceptionalism as an “interwoven bundle 
                                                   
36 Madsen, Deborah. American Exceptionalism. Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 1998. Tomes, Robert R. "American Exceptionalism in the Twenty-First 
Century." Survival 56, no. 1 (2014): 27-50. Brooks, Stephen. American 
Exceptionalism in the Age of Obama. New York: Routledge, 2012.  
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of ideas that together represent an American creed or ideology” that continue to wield 
substantial traction among the American public and within political culture, shaping 
how Americans think about US power and influence.37 American exceptionalism, as 
one study puts it, was not due to “wealth, military force, or the capacity to influence 
events far from its shores” but instead was due to the “features of the human condition 
that arose…that became associated with the idea of America (emphasis mine).”38 
What were these features? According to Stephanson, these features had their roots 
in religious sources, and in America’s case, in  biblical notions of what it means to be 
God’s people in a promised land whereby Providential destiny was being manifested.39 
As pointed out, “visions of the United States as a sacred place providentially selected 
for divine purposes found a counterpart in the secular idea of the new nation of liberty 
as a privileged ‘stage’ for the exhibition of a new world order, a great ‘experiment’ for 
the benefit of humankind as a whole.”40 Alexis de Tocqueville, in his Democracy in 
America suggests that Christianity has exerted a deep and profound impact among 
Americans, particularly in how the notion of freedom is being understood.41 To be 
certain, exceptionalism, as applied to the American experience, is frequently used as 
                                                   
37 Tomes, Robert R. "American Exceptionalism in the Twenty-First Century”, 46.  
38 Brooks, Stephen. American Exceptionalism in the Age of Obama, p.3.  
39 Stephanson, Anders. Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of 
Right. New York: Hill and Wang, 1996.  
40 Ibid., p.5.  
41 Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America (translated by Harvey Mansfield). 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000, see p.43.  
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a point of critique, as Stephen Walt sharply puts it, “by focusing on their supposedly 
exceptional qualities, Americans blind themselves to the ways that they are a lot like 
everyone else.”42 Be that as it may, there exist important differences between political 
regimes, their respective systems of governance and the outcomes (or consequences) 
of these systems. As Brooks put it, “unless we are prepared to argue that all belief 
systems and institutional arrangements are equally likely to produce desirable 
outcomes in terms of affluence, population health, human dignity, and life satisfaction, 
then we must acknowledge that some are better than others.”43  
What then, can be said for Chinese exceptionalism? Following from the earlier 
discussion of exceptionalism literature, I argue that Chinese exceptionalism – in the 
broadest sense – is associated with the idea of China. To paraphrase Tomes, Chinese 
exceptionalism can be defined as an interwoven bundle of ideas that together 
represent a Chinese creed or ideology that continue to wield substantial traction 
among the Chinese public and within political culture, shaping how Chinese think 
about China’s power and influence. In one sense, Chinese exceptionalism rhetoric is 
frequently espoused to emphasize that China is different from others and that it is 
destined to be the center of the world (zhongguo). For instance, the idea of ‘tianxia’ 
(or ‘all-under-heaven’) promulgated by Chinese philosopher Zhao Tingyang (whose 
thought we will consider in the next chapter) features prominently in how Chinese 
scholars understand the China’s place in the world. More crucially, this difference is 
                                                   
42 Walt, Stephen. "The Myth of American Exceptionalism.” Foreign Policy, no. 189 
(2011): 72-75. 
43 Brooks, Stephen. American Exceptionalism in the Age of Obama, p.3.  
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often emphasized as a unique Chinese contribution to global politics and seeks to call 
into question the normative rules which govern present day international politics. 
According to Callahan, Zhao’s attempt – as an instance - to present the Under-Heaven 
system as “the solution to the world’s problems [renders a] new interpretation of 
Confucianism’s hierarchical system that values order over freedom, ethics over law, 
and elite governance over democracy and human rights.”44 Thus Zhao’s desire to 
transcend the historical limits of Chinese tradition is done with the goal, as Callahan 
puts it, of “rethink[ing] China” in order to “rethink the world.”45  
 This rethinking of China, I argue, takes place today through attempts of 
presenting China as an exceptional power, one which would not emulate the West but 
instead utilize the cultural and ideological repository of its own tradition and history in 
order to distinguish itself from the West.46 But more so, Chinese exceptionalism serves 
to justify Communist party rule in a country that despite its global reach and presence, 
remains a “partial power” insofar its influence is concerned. 47 In other words, the 
promotion of a Chinese world order (whether Tianxia or not) and the preservation of 
                                                   
44 Callahan, William A. China Dreams : 20 Visions of the Future. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013, p.56.  
45 Ibid. 
46 See Callahan, William A. "History, Tradition and the China Dream: Socialist 
Modernization in the World of Great Harmony." Journal of Contemporary China, 
Vol.24, no.96 (2015): 983-1001, for a critique of modern Chinese political ideology.  
47 Shambaugh, David. China Goes Global: The Partial Power. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013.  
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China’s domestic order are intertwined vis-à-vis a single institution - the Chinese 
Communist Party. The CCP would be unable to articulate what an international order 
would be like if it could not achieve its domestic objectives; likewise, in order to achieve 
its domestic objectives, it would have to ensure that the international order is favorably 
disposed to itself. One way to do so is for Beijing to present itself as an exceptional 
power, that it is both different and good; different from the West (by being “inherently 
peaceful”), and that its goodness is derived from claiming some form of moral 
superiority from being the most virtuous, including being the number one in what it 
does.48 Given China’s pursuit of national rejuvenation and international status, a moral 
(or ethical) basis is needed so as to avoid criticism that China is pursuing growth at all 
costs. Hence, Chinese exceptionalism provides a conduit of discourse for the Chinese 
government to achieve its objectives of casting itself as a morally upright nation. This 
is done in two ways: one, by promoting a positive image of China which is peace-
seeking, non-hegemonic, and hence, different, and two, to preserve the identity of 
“Chinese-ness” which is desirable or good against what it sees as subversive values 
(such as rule of law, liberal democracy and civil society) that could possibly undermine 
the Communist Party hold on power. 
 
The Chinese worldview and global political order 
 Hence, the central question of my study is what is the Chinese worldview 
concerning global order and what are the norms and principles that China seeks to 
promote seeing itself as an exceptional power? Furthermore, how does Chinese 
                                                   
48 Callahan, China Dreams, p.156.  
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exceptionalism influence Chinese international relations debates concerning its role in 
the global system? To what extent can China lay claim to be different and good (i.e. 
exceptional) in its international relations, and if so, how successful has China been in 
utilizing such a strategy to boost its international image as well as preserving Chinese 
identity in the 21st century?  
 To answer this question, I will argue the following: one, ideas have 
consequences; two, interests influence choices; and three, relations (not necessary 
defined by power) affect conduct.49 While this places the study in the constructivist 
camp as far as taking Chinese ideas and culture seriously is concerned, it does not 
mean that one should take lightly the importance of the international system in both 
framing and possibly limiting China’s choices of actions. Nor does it minimize the 
importance that power dynamics (informed by a realist worldview) plays in Chinese 
international relations. Indeed, the importance of political power features prominently 
within Chinese elite politics, and frequently manifests itself in China’s foreign policy.50 
Yet on the other hand, it can be argued that China’s international politics also entails 
                                                   
49 Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics. UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999, see 92-135 and 313-366.  
50 Lampton, David M. Following the Leader : Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi 
Jinping, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014; Zhang, Jian. "The Domestic 
Sources of China’s More Assertive Foreign Policy." International Politics 51, no. 3 
(2014): 390-397.   
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much more than the pursuit of wealth and power; symbolic issues such of Beijing’s 
search for respect, status and national pride also drive its foreign policy.51  
Hence, what I try to do in my study is to locate the “recombination of processes”, 
as Katzenstein puts it, as a result of China’s increased engagement with the world and 
how these interactions have subsequently influenced China’s international relations. 
52  Chinese exceptionalism involves, then, an interplay of forces (ideational and 
material) that is aimed not just to legitimize Communist Party governance within China, 
but also to celebrate China (and the Party’s) standing in the world, and with that, the 
possibility of changing the global order. Furthermore, there is a deep and ambivalent 
tension between the structure of the international system (which is largely Western-
dominated) and Chinese thinking about what the international system ought to be like 
(less Western-dominated, with the introduction of more Chinese indigenous ideas). In 
addition, China wants to be like the West (in terms of scientific knowledge and 
technological know-how), without emulating the values of the West. Is this possible? 
Is China able to achieve the former and not – to some extent – appropriating the values 
of the latter? As highlighted earlier, many Chinese scholars seem to draw a distinction 
between China and the West in their articulation of Chinese identity, are such 
                                                   
51 Deng, Yong. China's Struggle for Status : The Realignment of International 
Relations, 2008; Gries, Peter Hays. China's New Nationalism : Pride, Politics, and 
Diplomacy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.  
52 Katzenstein, Peter J. ‘China’s rise: rupture, return, or recombination?’ in Peter J. 
Katzenstein, ed., Sinicization and the Rise of China: Civilizational processes beyond 
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differences “real” or imagined? Likewise, ideas and material structure are not 
inherently opposed, but interact with each other in a creative/dialectical manner in 
which one influence, and in turn, is being influenced by the other.  
In analyzing what a Chinese worldview might mean, and whether Chinese 
exceptionalism has been successful (or not) in helping the Chinese government to 
achieving its objectives, one needs to first examine the climate of ideas pervading 
Chinese society and how these ideas are consequently incarnated in Chinese politics. 
In this respect, Chinese society – not least because of its opening up – is far more 
ideologically diverse and multi-faceted than what a straight-forward rendering of 
Confucian values or Marxist ideas might suggest. As Richard Madsen reminds in his 
study of a Chinese village, the Chinese Communists’ official obsession with Confucius 
ideas could only provide “vague hints about how that official obsession might affect 
the beliefs of ordinary Chinese citizens.”53 Likewise Callahan, in his study of Chinese 
public intellectuals, surmised that China’s civil society contains a “broad spectrum of 
activity that ranges from promoting the fundamentalism of the China model to more 
cosmopolitan views of China and the world.”54 While Chinese elites may work to 
project a particular Chinese worldview, how such a worldview is interpreted, 
internalized and acted upon, both within and outside China, remains open to debate.  
 
 
                                                   
53 Madsen, Richard. Morality and Power in a Chinese Village. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984, p.ix.  
54 Callahan, China Dreams, p.39.  
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Research Design 
My research will focus on analyzing how popular notions of the Chinese worldview 
concerning global order influence China’s international relations, in particular those 
informed by Chinese exceptionalism influence China’s international relations. In 
examining the discourse of various key actors and opinion leaders in China and 
consequently the worldview they bring into their works (speeches, writings), the 
dissertation seeks to narrate how Chinese exceptionalism is being understood and 
fleshed out in Chinese political practices and international relations. Instead of trying 
to get at the bottom of what the “real China” is or debating whether China’s rise would 
be a peaceful or non-peaceful, I ask the more basic question, that is, “what is going 
on here” and what does it tell us about how the Chinese worldview, that is, how it views 
itself and the outside world. 
In my research, I contend that China’s assertiveness on its interests is due to 
its seeing itself as exceptional and more importantly, that it is “different” and “good” as 
compared to other major powers, particularly the United States. I also expect to find a 
certain sense of pride and “Chinese entitlement” concerning Chinese interests and the 
manner in which it relates with other states, especially those within its periphery. In 
relating to world order, China – as an exceptional power – would want to challenge 
and modify the present Western-led international order to suit its preferences and 
prescriptions concerning the rules and norms of the global system.55 This may be 
through the establishment of initiatives such as the security-related Xiangshan Forum, 
                                                   
55 Christensen, Thomas J. The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising 
Power. New York: Norton, 2015.  
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the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. 
To what extent are these initiatives able to provide China with the opportunity, not just 
to express its preferences concerning global norms, but more crucially also to promote 
what it sees the global system, and its norms, as they ought to be?  
Critics of exceptionalism would argue that “exceptionalism” is mostly rhetoric, 
and most nation states tend to think that way about themselves. The question “how 
exceptional is China” would be also asked, especially among realist scholars, who 
generally view the pursuit of power as applicable to all nation-states without exception. 
Given this, it would be necessary to demonstrate empirically that Chinese state 
behavior is due not only to material interests, but is also due to a deeper commitment 
to certain ideational factors that is part of the Chinese exceptionalism mindset. In other 
words, as the argument go, does Chinese thinking of international relations and global 
order contain a sense of exceptionalism within them, and if so, to what extent do these 
ideas influence the manner in which China pursues its international relations?  
I use in-depth interviews and discourse analysis of both primary and secondary 
sources to accomplish my empirical research and test my claims. Areas of 
convergence in these sources are useful for illustrating exceptionalism ideas and how 
they relate to Chinese actions. Using in-depth interviews is most appropriate in order 
to provide depth and a nuanced understanding of my subjects’ perspective. In-depth 
interviews allow the following advantages: (I) to pursue questions that are difficult to 
locate in documentary sources or everyday interactions, and to explore such questions 
in intricate detail; (II) they permit an exceptional degree of flexibility, control, and detail 
in the pursuit of participants’ understandings; (III) to recover and analyze the agency 
of individuals; and (IV) to map the conceptual world of participants in ways that 
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illuminate both coherence and inconsistency.56 These sources are mostly members of 
the Chinese academic community. As recounted to me, Chinese government officials 
frequently toe the official line in their interviews, whereas the Chinese academics are 
more inclined to speak their mind, and hence represent a richer source of information 
and ideas.57  
Discourse analysis will be used to uncover other themes of Chinese worldview, 
global order and exceptionalism prevalent in Chinese sources. These sources will 
include speeches made by top Chinese government leaders, Chinese scholars and 
citizen intellectuals whose voices illuminate China’s socio-political landscape. To take 
their comments at face-value would be naïve, but to be overly cynical and to dismiss 
these voices as either government propaganda or the voice of a minority anti-
government movement would to jumping to an equally simplistic conclusion. As 
observed, a discourse maintains a degree of regularity in social relations and produces 
preconditions for action as well as constraints and frames how actors think about the 
                                                   
56 Soss, Joe, “Talking Our Way to Meaningful Explanations: A Practice-Centered 
View of Interviewing for Interpretive Research” in Yanow, Dvora., and Schwartz-
Shea, Peregrine. Interpretation and Method : Empirical Research Methods and the 
Interpretive Turn. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2006,  pp.127-150. 
57 Interview with Singaporean diplomat formerly based in Beijing, March 31, 2016, 
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world. 58  Furthermore as identity and policy are constituted through a process of 
narrative adjustment and stand in a constitutive, rather than a casual relationship, 
hence the need to examine how individuals in China relate to their external 
environment and consequently, how they think and act about issues in specific ways. 
59 Given that Chinese society is far from monolithic, there may be varying levels of 
beliefs (some stronger, some weaker) about Chinese views of global order and 
exceptionalism among my research subjects and hence, to uncover the extent to 
which these different levels of Chinese global order, identity and exceptionalism 
interrelate with each other in China’s international relations.  In this aspect, my fluency 
in Chinese culture and language will provide me with some measure of cultural 
competence to make sense of the differences in meanings and representations 
embedded within the Chinese worldview concerning  its brand of exceptionalism.  
The lack of a quantitative aspect to my methodology may raise questions 
concerning the replicability and whether such an approach is sufficiently scientifically 
rigorous. Yet, as observed, recent work on the nature of the self has generally 
destabilized the concept of the individual as having a “fixed, immutable, identity”, but 
                                                   
58 See Neumann, Iver B. “Discourse Analysis” in Audie Klotz & Deepa Prakash, 
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instead the individual might be thought of as having a “narrative identity.”60 These 
stories then become the basis of truth-claims made by the individual and vividly shape 
the manner the individual comprehends the world. This is not to suggest that scientific 
precision – using quantifiable indicators – do not matter; where possible, I will use 
quantitative analysis (surveys), but at the same time, analyze these findings in 
reference to narratives, a “person-centered strategy”, so as to better make sense of 
what these findings mean to the situated individual. 61  In their study of the leadership 
patterns of Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, He and Feng highlight the importance of leaders’ 
belief systems in understanding the nature and policy of states in the international 
system. As noted, “leaders’ beliefs moreover dictate the policy behaviours of states, 
as the different policy choices of states are the means whereby leaders achieve their 
strategic goals within the international system. “62 Given this, it would be necessary to 
understand the moral environment in which Chinese leaders inhabit and whereby they 
receive their cues concerning how they should act. As the Cambridge philosopher 
Simon Blackburn puts it: 
[Our moral environment] determines what we find acceptable or unacceptable, 
admirable or contemptible.  It determines our conception of when things are 
                                                   
60 Elliott, Jane. Using Narrative in Social Research Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches. London: SAGE Publications, 2005, p.1.  
61 Ibid., p.91.  
62 He, Kai, and Huiyun Feng. "Xi Jinping’s Operational Code Beliefs and China’s 
Foreign Policy." Chinese Journal of International Politics 6, no. 3 (2013): 209-231, 
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going well and when they are going badly. It determines our conception of what 
is due to us, and what is due from us, as we relate to others. It shapes our 
emotional responses, determining what is a cause of pride or shame, or anger 
or gratitude, or what can be forgiven and what cannot.63 
Seen this way, one might argue that Chinese views of global order and Chinese 
exceptionalism are both closely linked to the Chinese moral environment. How then 
do Chinese scholars understand their moral environment (both within and out of 
China) and consequently, what are the key operating ideas and belief systems that 
shape the way Chinese scholars think about the world? How are these ideas then 
being fleshed out and translated in the field of Chinese international relations? Indeed 
as will be seen in my dissertation (especially in Chapters 2,3 and 4), this issue of 
morality is an important element to how China’s international relations is being 
conducted. Chinese leaders and scholars seek to project China as a “good” power 
and that its international relations practices are also justified as being morally 
acceptable. This is being contrasted with the practices of the West which are 
frequently touted to be morally questionable thus allowing China to legitimately claim 
it being superior to the West.   
Finally in my research, there is a need to be sensitive in the application of 
methodology towards Chinese sources and to take into account the different context 
and conditions that Chinese politics are enmeshed within, including a developing 
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economy, an authoritarian polity, and an Asian culture.64  Furthermore, given the 
political sensitivity of some aspects of my research (particularly those that touch upon 
the Communist Party), I would have to be careful to ensure that personal safety, both 
of myself and my subjects is not compromised. As noted, “researchers who strive to 
gain access to data that are considered to be “internal” (neibu内部), or related to state 
secrets, may put themselves at odds with the Chinese state…carrying out interviews, 
conducting surveys, and working with officials to gain access to archival sources may 
also put one’s subjects and colleagues in harm’s way.”65 One way is to speak to 
Chinese scholars outside of China, either via institutional affiliation (i.e. a visiting 
Chinese scholar) or through academic events (i.e. conferences) where they are likely 
to be more candid and forthcoming in their views. Another way is to use a “site-based 
method”, such as ethnography and participant observation, which is especially 
valuable given the need to probe thoughts and motivations of these scholars. As 
pointed out, a site-intensive approach allows to examine aspects of human behavior 
that are subtle (i.e. relationships, networks, identities, styles, beliefs, or modes of 
action), and hidden, sensitive, or otherwise kept behind barriers that require building 
trust, waiting to observe unguarded moments, or otherwise unlocking access.66 To do 
                                                   
64 Carlson, Allen. Gallagher, Mary, E. Lieberthal, K. and Manion, M. Contemporary 
Chinese Politics : New Sources, Methods, and Field Strategies. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010, p.4.  
65 Carlson et al. Contemporary Chinese Politics : New Sources, Methods, and Field 
Strategies, p.8.  
66 Ibid., p.150.  
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so, I spent extended time in Chinese institutions so as to locate myself within a 
community of Chinese scholars, so as to interact with them in more informal settings 
whereby they feel less compelled by the need to “defend China” against external 
criticism.   
 
Dissertation Overview 
The rest of this dissertation is divided into seven chapters, outlined as follows. Chapter 
2 looks at the study of the discipline of international relations in China and how 
Chinese international relations scholars purport to explain China’s political worldview 
in the conduct of international politics within an exceptionalist framework. I will 
examine the ideas promulgated by four Chinese scholars, whose engagement of 
international relations through the use of so-called Chinese indigenous ideas 
underscore the bulk of present debates over Chinese IR theory. These ideas are being 
underscored by a powerful conviction that existing international relations paradigms 
are mostly derived from Western culture and history and thus ought not to be applied 
to the analysis of Chinese international relations. Instead, there is a need to take into 
account elements of Chinese traditional culture and experiences of China’s history. By 
privileging a Sino-centric perspective towards international relations, while at the same 
time rejecting the tenets proffered by mainstream international relations theory (which 
are criticized as Western), these scholars demonstrate the existence of Chinese 
exceptionalism thinking as applied to the conceptualization of Chinese political thought 
and the Chinese worldview.  
In Chapter 3, I explore how the Chinese worldview, and particularly Chinese 
exceptionalism, shape understandings of Chinese national identity. To do so, I use a 
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sociological structure that builds on the concept of “liquid modernity” and seek to 
explicate how this is being played out in Chinese society. More importantly, the chapter 
seeks to understand how the issue concerning Chinese national identity is intertwined 
with the practice of China’s international relations. How is this national identity being 
constructed to present China as a virtuous or “better” nation than the West? I also look 
at the relationship between the individual and the state and how the negotiation of 
national identity and individual identity is being played out in practice. To what extent 
are they co-constitutive or in conflict with each other, and how does this in turn affect 
the amount of “social capital” that is necessary for the proper function of Chinese 
society? I will also probe the extent to which Chinese nationalism is able to proffer the 
Party leadership with the required social capital with which to create a shared sense 
of meaning and cohesiveness (ningjuli 凝聚力) within Chinese society. Through a 
discussion of the above, I raise the question as to whether the Chinese government 
and the political system it establishes is able to contend with the forces of modernity 
and the dilemmas it would face in the coming years.   
Chapter 4 focuses the study on China’s view of itself  (i.e. its national image) 
and how such a view is being presented to the outside world. More specifically I will 
attempt to relate how the projection of China’s national image is done with the goal of 
telling China’s story of itself as being an exceptional power. Through an examination 
of the speeches made by President Xi Jinping, I will examine which political narratives 
and which national images Chinese leaders seek to project to the outside world. I will 
study the extent to which such images have been successful in presenting China as 
an exceptional power, to its domestic constituents and to the wider world.  
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Chapter 5 looks at the high profile Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) introduced by 
President Xi Jinping as an example to see how the Chinese worldview concerning 
regional/international order might be like. By studying the discourse around the BRI, it 
seeks to uncover themes that purport to present China as an exceptional power and 
what they tell us about Beijing’s political worldview vis-à-vis the West. In addition, a 
study of the BRI will also provide us with important clues as to how China – in its quest 
for global greatness – seeks to challenge the existing international system in place, 
and the associated set of ideas it purports to promulgate within its own theatres of 
influence. Given that China is frequently criticized by Western countries for being a 
global free-rider, these initiatives – to a certain extent – ameliorate China of such 
criticisms while at the same time compel China to stake a claim to regional, if not, 
international responsibility. But if Chinese foreign policy is an extension of its domestic 
politics, then such a project likewise cannot be divorced from the internal prerogatives 
of the CCP. In this chapter I will discuss the importance of economic statecraft to 
China’s global diplomacy and public image, in particular the extent to which economics 
is being understood as a form of Chinese soft power so as to procure political influence 
and presenting itself as an exceptional power. I will also analyze both official and 
unofficial sources proffered by Chinese international relations scholars on the Belt and 
Road Initiative and to examine how it is being understood within the broader worldview 
characterizing China’s foreign policy and international relations.  
Chapters 6 and 7 shift the focus of the Chinese worldview of itself to its relations 
with its neighbors and the extent to which Beijing’s international behavior is being 
accepted, or obtained buy-in from countries in Southeast Asia. In other words, how do 
China’s neighbors interpret and understand the Chinese worldview and China’s 
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political actions? In chapter 6, I will focus on two key countries: Vietnam and Indonesia. 
Given Vietnam’s geographical proximity, historical ties and ideological links with 
China, it is highly sensitive to Chinese actions within its periphery and will thus provide 
highly contextualized insights into China’s regional diplomacy. Indonesia, being one 
of the region’s major players, is influential in ASEAN’s decision-making process and 
its views of China would be taken seriously, especially by Chinese leaders.  Through 
a series of in-depth interviews with policy-makers from these countries, many of whom 
are well acquainted with political-security matters, I explain the complexities of how 
China is being perceived by its neighbors and the degree to which China’s political 
worldview and ideas concerning global order are being accepted by others.   
In chapter 7, I focus on Singapore, a city-state with a sizeable ethnic Chinese 
population, and the scholarly discourse emanating from its elite regarding China. This 
is important to our study of China’s political worldview, and its claims to be an 
exceptional power. If a Chinese global order is said to be good and different (from the 
West), then one would expect this to be reflected in Singapore’s perspective towards 
China, particularly if Beijing is being associated with a benevolent form of global 
leadership. Furthermore, given Singapore’s ethnic majority Chinese population, 
Singapore would represent a good platform from which to test and validate Chinese 
exceptionalism claims.  To what extent are Singapore ethnic Chinese are able to 
identify with China’s political worldview and its claims to exceptionalism? In this 
chapter, I will examine the ideas promulgated by three Singaporean public 
intellectuals, whose reading and appraisal of China’s international relations represent 
existing school of views in Singapore towards Beijing. I will argue that at the crux of 
Singapore’s perspective(s) towards China is a contestation over ideational, material 
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and structural factors that are linked with China’s international relations, and the extent 
to which China is perceived as being exceptional, that is, being different and good.  
In Chapter 8, I sum up my findings and highlight the implications of my study to 
understanding the future of China’s international relations and its view of the global 
political order. From my study, I show that three key themes are highly pervasive in 
the Chinese worldview: (I) the Chinese Communist Party continues to wield significant 
authorship over the master narrative to China’s political worldview; (II) much of China’s 
international politics and its claims to exceptionalism is defined in opposition to an 
imagined West (and the United States) that is seen to be attempting to contain China’s 
rise; and (III) China perceives the international  system and its associated rules as 
being outdated and thus it wants to seek a greater voice in rewriting these rules to 
promote its interests. From the above, I argue that for China’s worldview to be 
accepted by others, it would have to demonstrate in its international relations affinity 
with the West and appreciation of ideological differences without having to constantly 
present itself as non-Western and to actualize the positive expression of what it stands 
for (not just what it is against). Notwithstanding its claims to exceptionalism and being 
good and different from the West, I argue the Chinese worldview at present remains 
highly particularistic (or Sino-centric) and that it presents limited claims to universality, 
thus rendering its view of political order questionable and potentially difficult to 
actualize in practice.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Chinese political worldview and a ‘different’ kind of international relations theory 
 
In my introduction, I suggested the need to examine China’s political worldview and 
how it views its place in the existing global order as a crucial starting point with which 
to understand its international relations. I also proposed the notion of Chinese 
exceptionalism – the idea that China sees itself as being good and different – as being 
fundamental to how it sees itself and also influencing its relations with the international 
community. In this chapter, I will examine how China’s worldview, and its claims to 
exceptionalism, are being reflected in the practice of international relations (IR) in 
China, and how IR – as an academic discipline – is being understood among Chinese 
scholars within an exceptionalist framework. Why is this important? For one, the study 
of international relations in China is not a neutral activity that is pursued for purely 
academic endeavor and for the generation of new forms of inquiry.67 It is however, 
highly politicized and subjected to broader political objectives, in particular the 
preservation of Communist party rule (discussed below). As such, we might surmise 
that the study of IR in China reflects not only the thinking of Chinese IR scholars about 
international affairs, but also to some extent incorporates features of Chinese political 
                                                   
67 This is also being confirmed by the author’s interviews with Chinese IR scholars, 
both inside and outside of China, many of whom highlighted the emphasis given by 
the Chinese government in their domestic priorities.    
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culture and its political life, insofar as these are being embedded within scholarly 
perception and practice of international politics.  
 Given this, I argue that China’s prominence in international relations has 
emboldened Chinese IR scholars in recent years in suggesting a “Chinese way” of 
thinking about international relations, and to take into account traditional Chinese 
ideas and incorporating them into mainstream IR scholarship, which is seen to be 
privileging a Western-centric reading of international affairs. Indeed, as I will show in 
this chapter, within the Chinese political worldview, there is a deep sense of superiority 
and difference vis-à-vis the West and that the discipline of international relations ought 
to reflect these attributes. In a study of the development of Chinese IR theory, Qin 
Yaqing, also the president of the China Foreign Affairs University, observes that efforts 
to develop Chinese IR theory have gathered momentum since the start of the twenty-
first century given China’s economic strength and international influence.68 While 
these concepts have yet to obtain universal traction and are still largely in an 
embryonic stage, the ability to theorize, as Qin puts it, “is a sign of intellectual 
maturity,” 69  and Chinese scholars are increasingly using Chinese indigenous 
resources in attempting to articulate what they view as a unique Chinese contribution 
to the wider IR discipline.  
 In the following, I will examine the ideas promulgated by four Chinese scholars, 
whose engagement of international relations theory through the use of so-called 
                                                   
68Qin, Yaqing. "Development of International Relations Theory in 
China." International Studies 46, no. 1-2 (2009): 185-201. 
69 Ibid., 198.  
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Chinese indigenous ideas provide a useful vantage point of comparison with existing 
mainstream IR theories: Yan Xuetong, Qin Yaqing, Zhao Tingyang and Zhang Feng. 
Three of them, Yan, Qin and Zhao are well known for their theorizing work on Chinese 
international politics as we shall see. In the case of Zhang, notwithstanding being 
much younger, he represents a new generation of Chinese IR scholars70 who have 
undergone substantial IR training in the West and are thus seen as scholarly 
interlocutors who are able to explain China to Western audiences using a combination 
of Chinese and Western thought forms.71 In the case of Zhao – in spite of his academic 
background in philosophy – his ideas concerning “Tianxia” (all-under-heaven) have 
received substantial attention both within and outside China for its relevance to 
Chinese IR thinking.72 To clarify, these four scholars – and their ideas – do not exhaust 
                                                   
70	  By the term ‘Chinese’, I refer to those who are born in the PRC, and thus exclude 
scholars who are ethnically Chinese but are of non PRC-descent. Whether they are 
based inside or outside of China is less relevant to my selection. 	  
71 Being the youngest of all three, Zhang’s views can be said to possibly represent 
an evolution of Chinese IR theories over the years.  I will analyze in this chapter the 
ideas in his published book. See, Zhang, Feng. Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy 
and International Institutions in East Asian History. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2015. The fact that Zhang also talks about Chinese exceptionalism in his 
writings also made him and his scholarly ideas a natural point of reference and 
choice of selection in my analysis of Chinese international relations thought.  
72 Zhao, Tingyang. Tianxia Tixi – Shijie Zhidu Zhexue Daolun [Tianxia System – An 
Introduction to the Philosophy of World Institutions]. Nanjing: Jiangsu Education 
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the permutations of scholarly debates that characterize the study of international 
relations thinking in China. To analyse in great detail the expansive variety of 
international relations thinking in China is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Instead what I hope to do in this chapter is to examine the theoretical paradigms 
offered by these four scholars in their study of international relations and consequently 
what they tell us about the Chinese worldview and claims to exceptionalism. As I will 
later show, what these four have in common is a strong belief that existing IR 
paradigms derived from Western experiences are insufficient to account for Chinese 
international relations and the Chinese political worldview. More than that, these ideas 
also seek to challenge the universal insights claimed by Western IR paradigms while 
attempting to emphasize even universalizing the insights proffered by Chinese IR 
thought. To understand Chinese thinking about international relations, they argue for 
the need to take into account traditional Chinese culture and experiences gathered 
from Chinese history. In addition, they also contest the universal validity of Western 
                                                   
Press, 2005; Callahan, William A., and Barabantseva, Elena. China Orders the 
World : Normative Soft Power and Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, 2011.   
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IR theories in explaining state behaviour, in particular the importance of power, and 
attempt to conceptualize China’s approach to international relations with reference to 
other considerations, such as patterns of relationality, emotional affectivity and moral 
conduct. While these scholars do not aim to entirely supplant Western IR theories with 
Chinese alternatives, their arguments – to a large extent – call into question the 
relevance of Western thinking and worldview, and consequently, seek to relativize the 
conclusions arrived at.  
 
 This chapter will proceed as follows. I will first provide a brief overview of the 
development of international relations theory in China, and in particular on scholarly 
discussions emerging from China in the 2000s, a period which China’s global rise 
become more pronounced, and where debate over Chinese IR insights became more 
prevalent. I will then go on to analyse in turn the ideas put forth by the four named 
scholars, whose ideas represent different conceptualizations of Chinese IR thought. 
In the process, I will attempt to draw similarities and differences between these ideas 
and existing IR schools of thought (realism, liberalism and constructivism) and to 
examine the extent to which Chinese traditional ideas can be said to be unique or 
distinct. I argue that while it is possible to incorporate Chinese traditional ideas into 
our understanding of Chinese state behaviour, China’s political system and political 
culture imposes limits to the degree these ideas can be properly termed as an IR 
theory, and that it lacks generalizability. 
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IR theory with Chinese characteristics 
The importance of articulating a Chinese approach to international relations theory can 
be said to be motivated in part by the need to establish and present Chinese national 
interests to the international community. In a study of the relationship between China’s 
global ascendancy and its international relations, Hung-jen Wang identifies three main 
features of Chinese IR scholarship as “identity, appropriation, and adaptation.”73 In the 
first phase of scholarship, the identities of Chinese IR scholars are being shaped by 
their China’s political systems, cultural values and historical experiences. Such work 
began in the late 80s and early 90s following China’s re-integration into the 
international system. Following that, Chinese scholars began to appropriate Western 
IR theories and applied them with the Chinese principle of ti-yong (“substance-
function”) – that is, combining Chinese concerns with the learning of foreign 
knowledge. The third feature saw Chinese scholars adapt concepts of Western IR 
scholarship (such as “balance of power” and “nation-state) to analyse events in China. 
To this end, Wang observed that “repeated cycles of learning and appropriation may 
ultimately relativize the universal values of those and other concepts found in Western 
IR theories so as to transform their original Western meanings.”74 
 
 Similarly, Qin Yaqing in his survey of the development of international relations 
theory in China argued that the development of IR as an academic discipline in China 
                                                   
73 Wang, Hung-Jen. The Rise of China and Chinese International Relations 
Scholarship. Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2013, p.2.  
74 Ibid., p.4.  
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has moved from pre-theory to a theory-learning (or theory-deepening) stage. The 
“theory-innovation phase”, whereby “scholars will seek to explain reality and 
understand social phenomena from a distinctly Chinese perspective” has yet to 
materialize, although Chinese scholars have increasingly emphasized the need to 
incorporate Chinese traditional thinking in responding to global issues. One central 
feature of this theory-deepening stage is a fascination with constructivism (following 
Alexander Wendt) and the saliency of constructivist ideas towards Chinese IR. In 
addition, given the debate on China’s peaceful rise, the issue of Chinese identity 
became a central concern among Chinese scholars. Hence, constructivist ideas 
dovetailed well with the Chinese philosophy of I Ching (Change) which advocated that 
identity and behaviour are changeable.75 This constructivist turn in Chinese IR theory, 
I argue, reflects a broader debate about what it means to be Chinese in the twenty-
first century, and the role and contribution of China to the rest of the world. 
 
 Beyond the quest for scholarly enquiry, the emergence of Chinese perspectives 
to the study of international relations can also be said to be a reaction to the 2008-09 
U.S. financial crisis, which had consequently called into question the ongoing 
legitimacy of a Western-led international system. As such, the possibility for non-
Western alternatives, and in China’s case, for Chinese thinking to take root and 
permeate the structure of the international order became more pronounced.76 Indeed, 
                                                   
75 Qin, Yaqing. "Development of International Relations Theory in China”, 191.  
76 This was a central point made by many Chinese scholars whom I interviewed 
during my fieldwork in Beijing between 18 May and 15 June 2017; see also, Zhong, 
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China has in the past decade elected to embark on its own high level initiatives that 
highlight Chinese leadership and the spread of Chinese global influence. For instance, 
the Xiangshan Forum, a security dialogue held every fall in Beijing since 2014 (and 
held once every two years from 2006-2012) is being widely seen as a move to rival 
the annual Asia Security Forum (or Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore) and to 
allow China to voice and frame discussions over global security matters. Indeed, it is 
observed that China has downgraded its participation at the Asia Security Forum due 
to unhappiness over how maritime disputes are being discussed at a multilateral 
platform (as opposed to its preference for bilateral approaches).77 Economic initiatives 
such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road 
                                                   
Feiteng. Fazhanxing anquan: zhongguo jueqi yu zhixu chonggou [Developmental 
security: China’s rise and the reconstruction of order]. Beijing: China Academy of 
Social Sciences Press, 2017; Zheng, Yongnian and Lim, Wen Xin. “The Changing 
Geopolitical Landscape, China and the World Order in the 21st Century.” China: An 
International Journal, Vol. 15, no.1 (2017): 4-23; Sun, Jianguo. “Sunjianguo: Wei 
yinlingshijie hepingfazhan hezuogongying gongxian zhongguo zhihui” [Sunjianguo: 
To lead the peaceful development of the world and win-win cooperation and the 
contribution of China’s wisdom], http://www.71.cn/2016/0418/884939.shtml (retrieved 
March 26, 2019).  
77 Tiezzi, Shannon. “Why is China downgrading participation in the Shangri-La 
Dialogue?” The Diplomat, June 2, 2017, http://thediplomat.com/2017/06/why-is-
china-downgrading-participation-in-the-shangri-la-dialogue/ (retrieved January 13, 
2019).  
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Initiative (BRI) - which we will discuss in greater detail in chapter 7 - have also been 
touted as Chinese responses to Western-led economic systems.78  
 
 From the above, we see that the study of Chinese IR should be viewed within 
a larger framework of perceived Chinese self-identity, and in this case, seen to be in 
tension, if not in opposition, to Western conception of self, society and statehood (this 
issue of identity will be further discussed in the next chapter). Why is this so? One 
reason, according to Robert Cox, lies in the difference in how the past and future is 
being understood by the Chinese, as opposed to Western thinking. While Western 
thinkers are wont to read change as a “movement towards an ultimate preordained 
unity of thought and organized life” (i.e. the inevitable triumph of liberal democracy), 
in the Chinese mentality, the meaning of change has been a “movement to and fro, 
rise and fall, alternation in a cyclical pattern with a continuing moral injunction to 
                                                   
78 Zhang, Jingwei. “AIIB: Integrating New and Old Orders." Beijing Review, no.28, 
July 14, 2016. 
http://www.bjreview.com/Business/201607/t20160711_800061996.html (retrieved 
February 13, 2019); Huang, Yiping. "Understanding China's Belt & Road Initiative: 
Motivation, Framework and Assessment." China Economic Review 40 (2016): 314-
21; Hu, Richard W. "China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ Strategy." China Report 53, no. 2 
(2017): 107-24; Ferdinand, Peter. "Westward Ho—the China Dream and ‘one Belt, 
One Road’: Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping." International Affairs 92, no. 4 
(2016): 941-57. 
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achieve some degree of harmony among conflicting forces.”79 Likewise Fei Xiaotong 
has also explicated on organizational patterns that are deeply entrenched in Chinese 
society that stand in contrast with those derived in the West.80 While the merits and 
limitations of these arguments are beyond the scope of my thesis to discuss, any 
analysis of Chinese IR must necessarily include some aspects of Chinese self-identity 
and its relevance to the study of international relations.  
 
 In my subsequent discussion, I will examine the thinking of four Chinese IR 
scholars and to uncover aspects of Chinese self-identity within their theoretical 
framework. I will attempt to critically assess these elements of self-identity with respect 
to the three mainstream schools of IR (realism, liberalism and constructivism) and to 
highlight differences and similarities between these existing schools and those 
                                                   
79 Cox, Robert, W. “Historicity and international relations”, in Yongnian Zheng, ed., 
China and International Relations: The Chinese view and the contribution of Wang 
Gungwu. New York: Routledge, 2010, pp.3-17, see 6-7. Interestingly under CCP rule 
and influenced by Marxist thinking, the mindset has been to adopt a almost 
teleological view of history as one of continuous progress and forward movement 
accompanied by “scientific development”. This suggests a break from traditional 
Chinese thinking as described by Cox in the worldview of Chinese political elites. 
Whether the vast majority of Chinese citizens subscribe to such a view of history 
remains to be seen.  
80 Fei, Xiaotong. From the Soil: the Foundations of Chinese. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1992. 
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conceptualized by Chinese IR scholars. This is not to say that other factors, such as 
the structure of international system, material capabilities or ideology are not relevant. 
However, I argue that these factors matter less insofar as the study of Chinese self-
identity is concerned as much of this is a matter of perception. According to Deng 
Yong, China’s objective during the late 90s and early 2000s was to “join the club (of 
powerful nations)”, today, China’s intentions are to “form a club of its own” and 
consequently to author its own terms of reference, instead of acquiescing to the status 
quo.81 To this end, the arguments made below reflect an attempt by Chinese IR 
scholars to distinguish Chinese ideas concerning international relations from existing 
paradigms.  
 
Yan Xuetong: A Chinese realist confronts realism 
Due to Yan’s scholarly prominence both within and outside China, a number of critical 
assessments of his political ideas have been undertaken, following the publication of 
his 2011 book, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, which provided an 
account of Chinese political thought and its implications for contemporary Chinese 
international relations.82 Yan identifies himself outright as a realist scholar, noting that 
                                                   
81 Personal interview, 14 July 2017, Singapore. 
82 Yan, Xuetong. Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2011; for a critical appraisal of Qin’s thinking, see 
Cunningham-Cross, Linsay, and William A. Callahan. "Ancient Chinese Power, 
Modern Chinese Thought" Chinese Journal of International Politics 4, no. 4 (2011): 
349-74.  
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“realist logic is clear, simple, and easy to understand…[unlike] dialectic method…by 
which any form of explanation is possible.”83 A central theme in Yan’s overall analysis 
is the need to incorporate morality into the practice of international politics. In his 2016 
book The Transition of World Power: Political Leadership and Strategic Competition, 
Yan proposes a framework of moral realism (daoyi xianshizhuyi 道义现实主义) as a 
foundational premise for the conduct of international politics. 84 Yan prefaces his study 
by rejecting the claim made by John Mearsheimer that countries with a moralistic 
approach are more dangerous in international affairs, instead he argues that a proper 
understanding of morality is necessary: states ought not to confuse their own moral 
concepts with universal moral standards. Yan adds that the concepts of moral realism 
that he puts forth are not restricted to China only, but universally applicable. Yan also 
tells us that the Confucian concept of “welcoming without exception, but not to teach” 
（laierbuju buwangjiaozhi来而不拒,不往教之) is sharply contrasted with the Christian 
tradition of “asking others to convert” (curen guiyi促人皈依), and that China adopts a 
non-confrontational foreign policy. This is in contrast to the U.S in which Yan argues, 
                                                   
83 For further explication on Yan’s realist approach, see Yan, Xuetong. Ancient 
Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, pp.240-241.  
84 Yan, Xuetong. Shijie quanli de zhuanyi: Zhengzhi lingdao yu zhanlue jingzhen 
[The Transition of World Power: Political Leadership and Strategic Competition]. 
Beijing: Peking University Press, 2015. As this chapter is not meant to be a full 
analysis of the book, I limit my observations to chapters one (pp. 3-23), five (pp.103-
123), and nine (pp.214-238) in which Yan expounds on his study of moral realism, 
and its relevance to the practice of international relations.  
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that in the process of implementing its own moral standards have resulted in countless 
conflicts.85 In addition, Yan contends that in Western thinking, power and “elements of 
power” are often used interchangeably and thus confused whereas the Chinese 
language distinguishes clearly between might/power (quanli 权 力 ) and 
capability/strength (shili 实力).86 Yan also emphasizes that the ability of a country to 
sustain its leading role in the international system is premised upon its preservation of 
its moral foundations, in addition to having a strategic reputation (zhanlue xinyu战略
信誉).  
 Yan also seeks to distinguish moral realism from Chinese theories of 
international relations, arguing that a universal theory of international relations is not 
confined to national boundaries. Yan proposes that the goal of moral realism is to 
achieve a universal theory and that moral realism best explains the transition of world 
power between a leading power and a rising power.87 Yan also argues that moral 
realism is a scientific method of inquiry and thus ought to be viewed as logical, 
verifiable and having predictive properties.88 In this respect, moral realism – as an IR 
theory – in accounting for patterns of behavior in Chinese history, can also be applied 
to contemporary international relations given its foundations in human nature which is 
unchanging.89 Yan further contends that moral realism – due to its emphasis on moral 
                                                   
85 Shijie quanli de zhuanyi: Zhengzhi lingdao yu zhanlue jingzhen, p.7.  
86 Ibid., p.8 
87 Ibid., p.105.  
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid., p.113.  
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leadership - coheres well with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) tenets and is thus 
being accepted. Yan also notes that moral realism does not mean that leading 
countries ought to practice self-constraint (ziwo yueshu 自我约束) on purely moral 
considerations, but include other factors such as their own strategic interests (zhanlue 
liyi战略利益).90  
 Yan concludes his analysis by proposing for the need to establish China’s 
credentials as a “humane authority” (wangquan 王权) as opposed to a hegemonic 
power (baquan霸权). Yan criticizes the present U.S.- led international system as a 
hegemonic one and argues that a humane authority would be superior to the existing 
arrangement.91 Furthermore, the litmus test of whether China is able to fulfil its role of 
a humane authority is whether other countries view China as a model for emulation. 
In this respect, Yan perceives the intensification of anti-corruption efforts since 2013 
by the Chinese government as a positive force for attracting others to follow.92 On the 
relationship between China and the U.S., Yan argues that the strategic competition 
between both countries was not just about material capabilities but also involve the 
values that both countries hold. Hence for China to achieve national rejuvenation, it 
would not only have to provide the world with a set of values, but these values would 
have to be of a higher standard than those promoted by the U.S. To this end, Yan 
contends that values like fairness (gongping 公平), righteousness（zhengyi 正义）
and civilization(wenming 文明) were more important than equality (pingdeng 平等), 
                                                   
90 Ibid., pp.126-127.  
91 Ibid., p.216. 
92 Ibid., p.217 
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democracy （minzu民主）and freedom（ziyou自由). Yan adds that it was natural for 
countries to emulate those who are more powerful, richer and prosperous and in the 
process of doing so, also subconsciously absorb the values upon which these 
successes were built upon. This will consequently result in new international norms 
and global order.93   
 Given the above brief summary of Yan’s arguments, how should we approach 
the ideas of moral realism, and to what extent does Yan’s exposition reflect a unique 
Chinese way of perceiving and ordering the international system. To be certain, the 
issue of morality is not solely particular to Chinese IR thinking, many Western IR 
thinkers -  realist scholars or otherwise – have long debated the relationship between 
morality and power politics.94 The difference however, lies in how IR theory relates to 
practical realities. In the case of Western IR scholarship, theory is seen viewed as 
descriptive (what is), whereas Chinese IR theory purports also to be propagative (what 
ought to be).95 While the saying that “theory is always for someone and for some 
purpose” can be applied equally to both Western and Chinese IR theories, Chinese IR 
                                                   
93 Ibid., pp.217-218.  
94 Williams, Michael C. "Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans 
Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power 
Politics." International Organization 58, no. 4 (2004): 633-65; Lebow, Richard 
Ned. The Tragic Vision of Politics : Ethics, Interests, and Orders. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003.  
95 It should be said that critical IR scholarship also seeks to differentiate between 
what is normative from what is materialist.  
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scholars operate under a domestic environment that is far more restrictive and 
inhibitive of academic freedom than is the case in the West. 96 Hence scholarly writing 
are not purely academic exercises for the pursuit and dissemination of knowledge, but 
also reflect individual and institutional positions vis-à-vis the Chinese government, and 
in some cases, function as political gambles to be “on the right side of those in 
power.”97 In the case of Yan, he makes clear that he sees his role as both a scholar 
and a policy advisor, and consequently to be able to contribute to China’s success on 
the global stage.98 By mixing together both his scholarly and patriotic positions, it is 
difficult to take Yan’s arguments on moral realism as having sufficiently universal reach.  
Rather it can be said that Yan’s prescriptions are largely framed with only China’s 
national interests at heart, and are not framed with the interests of other states in mind, 
notwithstanding the rhetoric of China’s inclusive diplomacy.99  
                                                   
96 See, Cox, Robert.  “Social Forces, States, and World Order: Beyond International 
Relations Theory”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 10, No.2 (1981): 
126-155, see 128. In China, academic think-tanks are usually required to provide 
policy positions that support political objectives and have less autonomy to conduct 
purely academic research.  
97 This was being recounted to me by a Chinese IR scholar during a personal 
interview in Beijing, June 13, 2017.  
98 See Yan, Xuetong. Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, Appendix 
2, pp.229-251.  
99 For a scholarly analysis of how Chinese diplomatic talk and Chinese diplomacy 
actions are frequently incompatible, see Lai, Christina. "Acting one way and talking 
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 Relating to Chinese exceptionalism, Yan’s moral realism position becomes 
more problematic. This is because for Yan to remain faithful to his moral realism, he 
would have to criticize the Chinese government at some point. However nowhere in 
his writings does Yan express explicit criticism of the Chinese Communist Party, it is 
as if the CCP faithfully and perfectly lives up to Yan’s standards of what morality should 
entail. This is clearly not possible. By claiming a privileged position (via moral realism) 
with which to criticize the West, Yan does not acknowledge his own starting position 
and political biasedness. This calls into question the extent to which Yan’s views can 
be said to be unique from others, or is this simply a rehash of realist tenets taken from 
existing international relations paradigms.  
 Finally, Yan’s formulation of moral realism is also highly contentious: by 
conceiving moral realism in a law-like manner, Yan does not leave room for any debate 
as to the role of morality in international politics. Indeed, Yan writes of moral realism 
as if it is an established scientific law (like the law of gravity) that states and statesmen 
ought to follow. In the Transition of World Power, Yan frequently prefaces his 
arguments by the phrase “moral realism contends” (daode xianshizhuyi renwei道义现
实主义认为), thus essentially taking moral realism as unproblematic and as a given 
fact (or law). To this end, one might pose the question: can one be always moral in 
the pursuit of one’s interests? As it were, a true realist (in a Machiavellian manner) 
would privilege interests over morality, the latter acting as a support only where it is 
                                                   
another: China's coercive economic diplomacy in East Asia and beyond." The Pacific 
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expedient to do so.  Yan is thus unclear as to where he stands on this matter. Does 
he perceive morality as necessary to the exercise of power politics and consistent with 
realist principles, or does he treat morality as being ultimately subjected to political 
objectives, therein seen as useful but not necessary. Indeed, the possibility that 
morality is used as an instrumental veil for political goals is not factored into Yan’s 
analysis. Given Yan’s reputation as a realist scholar, the absence of a critical 
perspective towards the issue of morality somewhat undermines the strength of Yan’s 
arguments and challenging the validity of his conclusions.   
 
Qin Yaqing and Feng Zhang: From constructivism to relationality 
Unlike Yan who identifies himself with a realist approach to international relations, Qin 
and Zhang refrain from identifying themselves out-rightly as constructivist scholars, 
notwithstanding the emphasis on ideational elements in their line of thought. Instead, 
both scholars propose that in order to understand contemporary Chinese international 
politics, a relational paradigm is needed.100 To be certain, this relational paradigm is 
neither new nor a unique Chinese contribution, rather it is located within a wider 
epistemological and methodological debate in IR that seeks to problematize the notion 
of how states ought to be understood. Instead of perceiving states as a “substance” 
                                                   
100 While Qin’s arguments are largely limited to the formulation of theoretical 
concepts, Feng’s writing – which is closely based on his doctorate thesis – includes 
historical illustrations and empirical evidence to back his theoretical paradigm. For 
the purpose of this chapter I will combine both Qin’s and Feng’s insights under the 
broader theme of relationality scholarship.  
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or an autonomous entity, this line of scholarship seeks to advance the position that 
states are best conceived as processes and that relations possess ontological 
significance.101 Not surprisingly, both Qin and Zhang also attempt to build upon the 
insights made by Western scholars such as Alexander Wendt as well as Jackson and 
Nexon in their respective analysis, whereby social identities and social relations are 
being privileged in the analysis of state behavior.102 
 
In his 2009 article “Relationality and processual construction: bringing Chinese 
ideas into international relations theory” which was published by the Social Sciences 
in China journal,  Qin makes the central claim that relations possess ontological 
quality, and are not merely peripheral to the conduct of international politics.103 In Qin’s 
                                                   
101 Ashley, Richard. “Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy 
Problematique.” Millennium 17 (1988): 227-62; Campbell, David. Writing Security : 
United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1998.  
102 Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999; Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus, and Daniel H Nexon. "Relations 
Before States: Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics." European 
Journal of International Relations 5, no. 3 (1999): 291-332. 
103 Qin, Yaqing. "Relationality and Processual Construction: Bringing Chinese Ideas 
into International Relations Theory." Social Sciences in China 30, no. 4 (2009): 5-20. 
Qin’s work is further elaborated in the most recent book, Qin, Yaqing. A Relational 
Theory of World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. For 
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view, the biggest weakness of mainstream Western IR theory is the focus on the 
systemic (state) level but fails to sufficiently account for social interactive processes 
as well as social relations that are involved. To be fair, such a line of critique is not 
unwarranted as constructivist IR scholars over the years have attempted to articulate 
a variety of ways to bring into sharper focus and to emphasize the social aspect of 
human existence. In this view, structures are not a given, but are “constantly produced, 
reproduced, and altered by discursive practices of agents.”104 Where Qin attempts to 
distinguish his ideas from mainstream constructivist scholars are his assumptions 
concerning relationality, and which – in his view – are uniquely borne out within 
Chinese socio-cultural experience. They are: (I) relationality has ontological 
significance, (II) relations define identity, and (III) relations generate power. 105  
 
In arguing for the ontological significance of relationality, Qin maintains that one 
of the basic features of Chinese society is its relational orientation, and that relations 
are the most significant content of social life and social activity. According to Qin, “the 
political philosophy of Confucianism starts with relations and defines social classes 
                                                   
purposes of this dissertation, I will engage with his 2009 work which sketches most 
of his major ideas which his latter work is based upon.  
104 See for instance, Guzzini, Stefano. and Leander, Anna. Constructivism and 
International Relations Alexander Wendt and His Critics. New York: Routledge, 
2006, p.3.  
105 Qin, Yaqing. “Relationality and Processual Construction: Bringing Chinese Ideas 
into International Relations Theory”, p.14.   
	   68	  
and political order in terms of relationships. Social and political stability first and 
foremost relies on the management of relations.”106 In addition, Qin also posits a sharp 
cleavage between Western and Chinese ways of thinking, the former is inclined to 
thinking in a “logic of causation” (i.e. If A>B, and B>C, then A>C) while in the Chinese 
way of thinking, “relationality is to be found in the relational web as a whole...things or 
variables change along with the change of their relations; individuals in the web are 
subject to change in the relational web as a whole; and similarly the interaction among 
individuals can have an impact on the web.”107  
 
The idea of “relational identity” is also posited by Qin as a way of thinking about 
individual human beings. Qin argues that social actors “exist only in social relations 
[r]ather than being independent and discrete natural units” and that “individuals per se 
have no identities.”108 Qin also postulates that within Chinese thought, one’s identity 
can be “multifold, interactive, and changeable along with practice” hence “truth” and 
“falsehood” are not mutually exclusive categories, that is, something is either true or 
false and cannot be both true or false. In Qin’s words, “there is truth in falsehood and 
falsehood in truth, and true can become false and vice versa.” Qin would go on to 
suggest that relationship processes would ultimately influence the behavior of 
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individual actors and that changes in one’s relational web would also lead to “identity-
reshaping” and “behavior-transforming of an actor in relations.”109  
 
 Qin’s last assumption concerns the use of power, and which the study of IR is 
most intimately concerned with. According to Qin, “relations generate power”, in that 
for power to be exercised, a relational platform would be required. For instance, Qin 
argues that the China possesses greater influential power than the United States in 
determining the outcome of the North Korean nuclear issue, as it springs from the 
“relational web it is in, and from the operation and coordination of the web involving all 
the parties involved in the crisis.”110 Also, relations can enlarge power or constrain the 
exercise of power. To illustrate this, Qin contends that in China’s patriarchal society, 
“a father’s power over his son was absolute and supreme” by virtue of the power that 
a patriarchal society accords towards father-son relations. Paralleling this, according 
to Qin, is China’s relations with ASEAN states (where China wields considerably more 
power than each of the respective states). Nevertheless, Qin argues that China has 
constrained itself in its exercise of coercive powers and in some cases, was restrained 
in maintaining and development these relations. Consequently, Qin argues that 
relations in and of themselves are power and that these relational webs ought to be 
viewed as important power resources.111  
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 Likewise, Zhang Feng in his book Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and 
International Institutions in East Asian History proposes relationalism as a structural 
theory of grand strategy between China and its neighbours, namely, Korea, Japan and 
Mongolia.112 According to Zhang, three relational structural components are to be 
found in historical East Asian states’ system: the ordering principles of expressive and 
instrumental rationalities, differentiation of roles in a sovereign-subordinate and father-
son hierarchy, and the distribution of ties measured in terms of actor degree 
centrality.113   
 
 Borrowing from Confucian ideas, Zhang postulates the concepts of both an 
expressive principle (qingganxing yuanze 情感性原则) and instrumental principle
（gongjuxing yuanze工具性原则), both of which he argues contribute to how relational 
networks function. While the expressive principle embodies humanized affection 
(renqing 人情) between two actors, the instrumental principle reflects a relational 
interaction to obtain resources for the purpose of utility.114  In Zhang’s mind, the 
instrumental principle is a dominant paradigm framing states’ relations and that the 
ultimate goal is to maximize utility. As such, the relationship between states becomes 
                                                   
112 Zhang, Feng. Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and International Institutions in 
East Asian History. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015.  
113 Ibid., pp.21-22. 
114 For further discussion, see Hwang, Kwang‐Kuo. "Chinese Relationalism: 
Theoretical Construction and Methodological Considerations." Journal for the Theory 
of Social Behaviour 30, no. 2 (2000): 155-78. 
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a means to an end, a way to attain other goals. As Zhang puts it, “the relationship itself 
is not valued. It does not involve the affection or obligation that actors may attach to 
each other, and it may not last beyond the moment of mutual expediency.”115 On the 
other hand, expressive rationality places emphasis on the self-other relationship, 
whereby social actions can involve “commitment, empathy, affection, mutual support, 
and human obligation among actors and are thus more than instrumental calculation.” 
In Zhang’s view, “expressive rationality is the psychological, emotional, and ethical 
foundations of the Confucian paradigm of relational social life based on reciprocal 
respect, affection, and obligation.”116  Unlike the instrumental principle, an expressive 
principle takes the relationship as the end of social social interaction, not a means to 
an end. 
 
 Zhang also puts forth the argument that role and status relationships factor 
heavily in social life, and that role ethics is central to Confucian thought.117 From this 
principle, Zhang argues that different role relationships would necessarily lead to 
different ethical principles of action. In China’s case, the Chinese emperor is viewed 
as the “sovereign and father of the known world”, thus implying a “distinct set of 
reciprocal obligations and implicit rights…between China and other polities.”118 Zhang 
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argues that under such an arrangement, a “logic of hierarchy” and a “logic of 
differentiation” frames the manner of China’s relations with other states whereby the 
intimate is being favored. As put, “simultaneously integrating and differentiating, the 
intimacy-distance principle assigns foreign entities differential places in China’s 
international network according to their cultural affinity.”119  
 
 Similarly, the distribution of ties, as Zhang elucidates, allows actors with greater 
centrality to possess greater social power, easily accessing resources and information 
from other actors and to also shape the flow of information among relevant actors, 
including altering common understandings of relative capabilities, interests, and 
norms. 120  In this respect, Zhang suggests that unlike substantialist theories of 
international relations, which focuses on the categorical attributes of actors as 
variables (e.g. material capabilities), relationalism trains its focus on “relational 
patterns as structure, and thus sees the distribution of ties as a central structural 
component.” Zhang further fine grains his analysis by distinguishing relationality from 
constructivism by claiming that constructivism is not fully relational. In his view, identity 
is being composed “as a series of identifications developed and changed through 
relational actions” instead of being a “cohesive, prosocial self” that constructivist 
scholars like Alexander Wendt make out to be.121  
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Relationalism meets power politics  
If we take the above arguments by Qin and Zhang as reflective of the thinking among 
Chinese IR scholars who subscribe to relationalism, then what kind of behavior are we 
to expect from China in its international relations? Based on relational scholarship, the 
conclusion is that other states will accept China’s hierarchy over them over them and 
will willingly submit themselves as vassal states to China. But that begs the more 
fundamental question: upon what basis will these states do so? Is it on the basis of 
China’s superior conduct and thus being held as a model for emulation, or is it due to 
China’s coercive behavior? Zhang’ contention is that China’s practice of humane 
authority will necessarily lead other states to reciprocate naturally. As put, “if the 
Confucian role differentiation of a sovereign-subordinate and father-son hierarchy is a 
potent structural force, and if other actors genuinely follow Confucian expressive 
rationality, one may posit that they will accept their subordinate roles vis-à-vis China, 
identify themselves as China’s hierarchically differentiated outer vassals and fulfill their 
obligations of loyalty and integrity towards China.”122 This is evidently not the case in 
reality as China’s problematic relations with its neighbors in the past decade (2008-
2018) have demonstrated.123 According to Zhang, one reason why tensions have 
been exacerbated was due to China not sufficiently playing its role as a humane 
                                                   
122 Zhang, Feng. Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and International Institutions in 
East Asian History, p.36.  
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authority (as expected by Chinese relationalism) but instead acting in a realpolitik 
manner in its international conduct.124 
 
 But this line of argument poses several problems: one, it assumes Chinese 
moral standards as being normative and universally applicable; two, it fails to 
sufficiently take into account the structural constraints of the existing international 
system; and three, it is premised on a highly optimistic view of human nature which 
runs contrary to many of the core assumptions behind IR scholarship. Given that the 
first two points have been previously discussed at length by other scholars,125 I will 
focus my attention on the third point, which I argue also represents the biggest flaw in 
relational scholarship.  
 
In a classical study into the relationship between individuals and society, the 
American political theorist Reinhold Niebuhr posits a sharp cleavage between the 
ideals of the individual (“moral man”) and society (“immoral society”).126  While a 
                                                   
124 Email interview, February 29, 2016.  
125 For further discussion into Chinese norms and practices in international relations, 
see Wang, Hung-Jen. "Being Uniquely Universal: Building Chinese International 
Relations Theory." Journal of Contemporary China 22, no. 81 (2013): 518-34; Clark, 
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number of critical responses towards Niebuhr’s work have been undertaken, 127 
nevertheless the core of Niebuhr’s observations - I argue - remain eminently valid to 
the study of relational scholarship, particularly his pessimistic assumptions concerning 
human nature and the extent to which self-interest pervades political life. For instance, 
Niebuhr perceives conflict, not cooperation as the natural consequences of human 
egoism. As he puts it, “[T]here are definite limits in the capacity of ordinary mortals 
which makes it impossible for them to grant to others what they claim for themselves.” 
Hence, politics become an arena where “conscience and power meet, where the 
ethical and coercive factors of human life will interpenetrate and work out their 
tentative and uneasy compromises.”128 In addition, by attributing the root source of 
conflict to human nature (given his belief in the Judeo-Christian doctrine of original 
sin), Niebuhr is highly skeptical of collective efforts, particularly if they are undertaken 
by political actors, in resolving these same conflicts. Indeed, he expresses wariness 
towards group behavior. As observed, the “hypocrisy of man’s group behavior” 
expresses itself in the fact that human beings are unable “to conform its collective life 
to its individual ideals.”129 In Niebuhr’s view, group solidarity – far from being a benign 
force for good – in fact accentuates the egoism inherent in individuals, resulting in far 
more devastating and dangerous outcomes as opposed to actions taken individually.  
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Seen from this vantage point, one might argue that the blind spot of relational 
scholarship lies in its optimistic view of human nature and that it ignores the coercive 
character of social life as played out in international politics. For instance, a core strand 
of Qin’s relational scholarship lies in the assumption that Chinese leaders are wont to 
use power resources in a proper manner, and that abuses of power are best checked, 
not through an external system of checks and balance, but by arrogation of power to 
a centralized authority (be it in the form of a strongman leader or a collective group of 
top decision-makers). For instance, the establishment of the National Security 
Commission of the Communist Party of China is said to be not only for more effective 
coordination of China’s security policies, but also as a means of centralizing party 
control and strengthening President Xi Jinping’s grip on the Chinese state 
apparatus.130 Hence, relational scholarship provides a strong theoretical justification 
for political control. As Qin puts it, “the political philosophy of Confucianism starts with 
relations and defines social classes and political order in terms of relationships. Social 
and political stability first and foremost relies on the management of relations. Social 
norms are mostly the norms of relation-management and social harmony is 
characterized by the domination of morality and mediation of disagreements.”131 To 
this end, we might argue that relationality scholarship is ultimately premised upon a 
                                                   
130 See You, Ji. "China’s National Security Commission: Theory, Evolution and 
Operations." Journal of Contemporary China 25, issue 98 (2015): 178-196.  
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socially conservative approach to politics whereby the maintenance of relations is 
primary and social disruption is frowned upon, regardless of the consequences that 
are resulted. Furthermore, one might also locate the seeds of corruption within such a 
system of rule: in the absence of external checks or scrutiny (which may require 
disrupting familial relationships), there exists the propensity for internal decay which if 
unchecked can result in devastating consequences. Indeed, a glance at China’s 
history suggests that this insistence on social and political stability at all costs can 
result in catastrophic consequences if individuals are not given sufficient rein to 
express their own personal misgivings. A case in point can be seen in Yang Jisheng’s 
work Tombstone: the great Chinese famine, a study of the ill-fated Great Leap Forward 
policies enacted by Chairman Mao between 1958-1962 in which more 36 million 
Chinese died. 132  Notwithstanding Chairman Mao’s erroneous judgments in the 
matter, it was evident that the Chinese political structure was equally culpable. As 
Yang wrote: 
In the face of a rigid political system, individual power was all but nonexistent. 
The system was like a casting mold; no matter how hard the metal, once it was 
melted and poured into that mold, it came out the same shape as everything 
else. Regardless of what kind of person went into the totalitarian system, all 
came out as conjoined twins facing in opposite directions: either despot or 
slave, depending on their position in respect of those above or below them. 
Mao Zedong was a creator of this mold…and he himself was to some extent a 
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creature of this same mold. Within the framework of this system, Mao’s own 
actions were conscious but to a certain extent also beyond his control. No one 
had the power to resist such a system, not even Mao… In accordance with the 
logic of that time and under the prevailing framework, things that now appear 
patently absurd at that time seemed reasonable and a matter of course.133 
In sum, Qin’s relational scholarship – I argue –  remains largely limited to 
accounting for China’s domestic situation (which is to maintain the CCP’s monopoly 
of power and to manage intra-China relations). It is also overly optimistic towards the 
CCP in making the right decisions for China (without taking into account the fallibility 
of even its highest leaders) while largely dismissive of individual ability to make 
meaningful change or contribution to social life.  
 
Zhao Tingyang: Tianxia (All-under-heaven) and world order 
The notion of All-under-Heaven (tianxia天下) and its relevance to international politics 
was given voice by Zhao Tingyang, a Chinese philosopher and a researcher at the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. In 2006, Zhao published an article “Rethinking 
Empire from a Chinese Concept ‘All-under-Heaven’ (Tianxia)” which argued for the 
Tianxia model as the best philosophy for world governance.134  In it, Zhao challenges 
the configuration of the present international order as being overly state-centric and 
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that it fails to transcend the perspective of the nation state to view issues and problems 
from a “world-ness” perspective. According to Zhao, Chinese political philosophy differ 
from Western philosophy as the former defines a political order in which the world is 
primary unlike the latter which which takes the nation state as a central unit of 
analysis.135 Linked to the idea of Tianxia is also the concept of the ‘Son of Heaven’ 
(tianzi天子) whose legitimacy to rule must be confirmed by the people. However, Zhao 
criticizes the Western system of democratic elections as a means of selecting the 
leader as such a system is being “spoilt by money, misled by media and distorted by 
strategic votes.” 136  Instead, the “Chinese way” as Zhao puts it, is by means “of 
observation of social trends or preferences and especially by the obvious fact that 
people autonomously choose to follow and pledge their allegiance, instead of voting 
for one of several dubious politicians.”137 According to Zhao, “sincerity of concern for 
the people”, not public preference, was the most important criteria for being a ruler. 
Furthermore, Zhao contends that “most people do not really know what is best for 
them”, hence the need for elite rule as they are most sharply attuned to what is best 
for the citizens.138  
 
Zhao also espouses the notion of a “family-ship” as an interpretive framework 
for understanding ethical and political legitimacy as it represents “the naturally given 
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ground and resource for love, harmony and obligations [thus exhausting] the essence 
of humanity.”139 To this end, the Tianxia system ought to be viewed in terms of family-
ship and that the “wholeness” and “harmony” of this system ought to be preserved. 
This is where Chinese political theory – with its emphasis on a world-society – can be 
most aptly appropriated. According to Zhao, “the world’s effective political order must 
progress from All-under-Heaven, to state, to families, so as to ensure universal 
consistency and transitivity in political life, or the uniformity of society, while an ethical 
order progresses from families, to states, to All-under-Heaven, so as to ensure ethical 
consistency and transitivity.”140 More tellingly, Zhao says that Chinese philosophy 
does not regard an individual “to be a political foundation or starting point” but instead 
“the political makes sense only when it deals with relations rather than individuals”, 
thus echoing Qin’s and Zhang’s earlier arguments.141 Zhao also observes that in 
Chinese thinking, politics aim at a good society of peaceful order which is a 
precondition to individual happiness and thus avoiding disorder. Hence, the concept 
of All-under-Heaven is fused together with Chinese concerns towards the legitimacy 
of its dynasties (when order is being maintained) as opposed to simply territorial 
conquest.142 Finally, Zhao also distinguishes Chinese ethics from Western systems by 
claiming that the West possesses a missionizing impulse a result of the Biblical 
mandate to “do unto others as you would have them do to you” (己所欲勿于人 jisuoyu 
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huyuren) while Chinese principles are passively presented in that one should “never 
do to others what one does not want others to do unto you” (己所不欲，勿施于人	 
jisuobuyu hushiyuren).143  
 
Tianxia: A World Liberated or a world enslaved?  
In the above, I summarized Zhao’s exposition of Tianxia and its ideational conceptions 
to our understanding of global order. Notwithstanding some of its contributions to 
Chinese thought pattern, Zhao’s ideas on All-under-Heaven remain severely limited 
not least because of its abstracting itself from the reality of the international structure 
and its problematic view of human agency. Furthermore, much of Zhao’s analysis 
lacks empirical evidence and cannot be verified in reference to social reality. For 
instance, Zhao tells us that the present condition of the world as it is, is that of a “failed 
world, a disordered world of chaos …[and] a non-world.”144 What does this actually 
mean, and more importantly, how true is this? Despite ongoing international conflict, 
the present international system cannot be said to be a failure, given that many 
countries, including China, have benefitted from the Western-led liberal order put in 
place after the second world war. 145  While Zhao is right in noting that political 
governance needs to be justified with reference to both domestic and international 
                                                   
143 Ibid., 35-36. 
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norms, it is unclear how this ought to be done. For instance, Zhao posits that the 
political goal of ‘All-under-Heaven’ is to create a “trinity of the geographical world, the 
psychological world and the political world” as a grand narrative, yet he is silent on 
steps taken in order to achieve this.146 Also by claiming that “world-ness is a principle 
higher than internationality” 147  Zhao sets up a further problem which is that of 
governance: who, and how should such a “world” be governed and what kind of rules 
ought to be established for such governance to take place? All these raise the key 
question as to whether a Tianxia system can truly liberate countries to live in harmony 
with one another, and whether deeper, more fundamental issues concerning global 
governance and international politics can be resolved simply by recourse to an 
idealized Tianxia concept.  
 
Furthermore, it is evident that much of Zhao’s criticism of the present 
arrangement of political order is trained at the West, particularly the United States, 
whose dominance Zhao terms as a “new imperialism, inheriting many characteristics 
of modern imperialism, but transforming direct control into the hidden, yet totally 
dominating world control by means of hegemony or the ‘American leadership’ as 
                                                   
146 To be certain, one might excuse Zhao for being silent on this matter, after all, he 
is a philosopher! However, this inability to spell out the specifics of action limits the 
extent to which his ideas ought to be taken as being politically viable.  
147 Zhao, Tingyang. "Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept ‘All-under-Heaven’ 
(Tian-xia), 39 
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Americans prefer to call it.”148 To be certain, such a line of argument is increasingly 
common among Chinese public intellectuals, many of whom perceive the liberalism, 
the West and the United States as a common enemy which limit the extent of China’s 
pursuit of being a great power.149 Zhao takes this line of thought further, for unlike 
other Chinese contemporaries who recognize the international structure as a given 
(and thus attempt to articulate China’s rise from within), Zhao goes as far as to claim 
that the present system as an utter failure and that the Tianxia system as the sole 
means of solving global problems. Indeed, Zhao cites globalization as a game changer 
due to its breaking the present system of the nation states, and that it was time to 
revisit deeply cherished norms concerning world governance. In place, what is needed 
– as suggested by Zhao – is an entire overhaul of the state system and a return to 
traditional Chinese political arrangements. To this end, Zhao presents an idealized 
Chinese history, arguing that the Tianxia system had brought about long periods of 
peace and stable society in China, unlike the present United Nations state-centric 
system.  This of course, is highly debatable, but one Zhao is conspicuously silent on. 
In his Tianxia ideal, perpetual peace is a given and conflict is largely absent (or made 
irrelevant). By attributing the root causes of international conflict to the state system 
(instead of other factors such as human nature, ideological differences, or material 
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competition), Zhao sets up a straw man argument which his Tianxia system is 
conveniently positioned to replace.  
 
Finally, in Zhao’s analysis, there is no mention of the internal dynamics of CCP 
politics, and the pervasiveness of domestic agendas in framing China’s international 
relations. This is by no means insignificant given heavily vested Chinese domestic 
interests in the conduct of Chinese foreign policy. For instance, recent Chinese global 
initiatives such as the highly-profiled Belt and Road Initiative (to be further discussed 
in Chapter 5) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank also involve large numbers 
of Chinese state-owned actors, many of whom have links with the CCP and whose 
economic fortunes are deeply intertwined with the fate of the CCP. According to one 
Renmin University professor, the “monetization” (huobihua货币化) of Chinese politics 
means that political decisions also encapsulate the material/financial interests of those 
which are involved, thus highlighting a close conflation of political and business 
interests in the overall CCP decision-making process. 150 Furthermore, self-interest 
remains a constant pursuit among Chinese leaders, thus sharply mitigating against 
the picture of a benevolent-like type leader as envisaged by Zhao.151 Indeed, Zhao’s 
                                                   
150 Interview with Renmin University professor, Beijing, China, June 12, 2017. For 
further studies into the relationship between Chinese businesses and politics, see 
Brødsgaard, Kjeld Erik. "Politics and Business Group Formation in China: The Party 
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151 Kerry Brown’s in-depth study of the 18th Politburo Standing Committee starkly 
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Tianxia system biggest problem lies in its conceptualization of Tianxia in an idealized 
vacuum with scant regard to the causes of conflict due to other factors such as human 
nature, domestic makeup of states and the anarchic structure of the international 
system.152 Relating to Chinese exceptionalism, it would seem that the more Zhao 
claims exceptionalism for his Tianxia system (that it is different and better compared 
to other ways of conceptualizing the world), the less its explanatory power becomes. 
Furthermore, as Zhao does not offer us any practical solutions to solve these problems 
except by advocating for the abolishment of the state system in favor of a 
supranational authority, it raises the issue as to whether such a system would end up 
not liberating, but rather enslaving countries that subscribe to such a political 
proposition. Indeed, what kind of authority would that be, and what kind of political 
arrangements ought to be in place to ensure the consent of those who are being 
governed? Unfortunately, Zhao’s Tianxia arguments remain silent on these salient 
points. 
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Chinese IR theory and a contestation over Chinese identity 
As my above discussion of the ideas promulgated by the four Chinese IR scholars has 
shown, Chinese IR theories possess little universal traction and are mostly used to 
lend legitimacy to Chinese political actions, both internally and externally. To this end, 
these theories reflect a common theme salient in China’s political worldview, that is, 
the importance of identity to China’s international politics. In the case of Yan Xuetong’s 
emphasis on moral realism, it is evident that in Yan’s mind, what ought to set China 
apart from the West is the need to explicate and demonstrate moral leadership and 
virtue in its international relations. This emphasis on morality dovetails with the broader 
question over Chinese identity, and more pertinently that of Chinese culture: what 
aspects of “being a Chinese” can be said to be superior or better compared to Western 
culture? Relating to Chinese exceptionalism, I argue that what is at stake is not simply 
a contestation over ideas (in the sphere of international relations), but a competition 
over influence. In other words, who has more influence in the world, China or the West? 
At the same time, this influence I argue, is not simply a matter of ‘getting others to 
follow’, but also in setting normative standards so that those who do not follow (or 
disagree) will be seen to be in the wrong. To this end, Chinese identity and its political 
worldview is thus seen to be the exemplifying (or at least accentuating) ‘all that is good’ 
in humanity as opposed to Western values and thinking which are said to be ‘bad’ or 
‘subverting that which is good’. However, such an approach begs a more fundamental 
question, that is, who decides what is good or bad? The fact that Yan seems to assume 
a priori an idealized view of the CCP as a political institution which remains untainted 
and unpolluted by the messiness of political practices, and thus in a privileged position 
to adjudicate between what is right and wrong is highly problematic to begin with. 
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Indeed, I argue that the biggest flaw to moral realism is that morality itself – in the 
Chinese system – is being politicized to achieve political goals. From this, I argue that 
Yan’s proposal of moral realism does not square with the political reality of what is 
happening in China, thus rendering his conclusions tenuous and not sufficiently 
convincing.  
 
In the case of Qin and Zhang, their emphasis on relationality represents not so 
much an attempt at moralization (unlike Yan) but rather to emphasize the importance 
of relations in influencing state relations. While such an approach challenges the 
tenets of structural realism and emphatically rejects structurally deterministic 
outcomes in political relations, problems arise if it is suggested that political relations 
can be exhaustively accounted for in relational terms. Indeed, it is one thing to say that 
international politics ought to be understood in relational terms it is quite another to 
say that their significance for us is explicable or ought to be solely reduced to such 
terms. By positing a relational framework, Qin and Zhang seem to suggest that 
personal identity is first and foremost, one which is relationally situated. While this may 
hold true at an individual level, extrapolating to the level of the nation state to account 
for state behavior is problematic due to its inherent assumptions that states and 
statesmen approach international politics with no prior idea what their national 
interests might be and that these interests can be infinitely modified (depending on the 
relational situation).  
 
Also, relational scholarship is premised on a hierarchical view of international 
relations in which China is central, and the Chinese emperor (leader) authority is not 
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in question. Nevertheless, this legitimacy of rule holds so long as the leader is able to 
maintain order within the borders of the Chinese nation (or empire). In other words, to 
rule is to ensure that China is stable. In the event China is unstable, the legitimacy of 
the ruler would be undercut thus signaling the need for either the elimination of those 
unstable elements or the removal of the ruler entirely. Seen this way, the self-identity 
of the Chinese leader is of crucial importance as it is tied intrinsically to the nation’s 
identity. Indeed as Lucian Pye puts it in his depiction of Deng Xiaoping, “Deng’s quiet 
approach to leadership conformed to important norms in traditional Chinese political 
culture, a political culture that was shaped by the role model of mandarin-bureaucrats 
and semi-divine, superman emperors, leaders who operate out of sight, secretly, 
behind the scenes.”153 From this, the Chinese leader is also seen to be a model for 
universal virtue and is perceived to be untainted by the corrupting influences of the 
society-at-large.154 
 
Finally, in the Tianxia system, Chinese self-identity is presented as a central 
problematic, that is, the extent to which it possesses universal properties thus drawing 
those who are ‘outside China’ into its orbit. According to one study by Jing and Wang, 
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Chinese political researchers generally do not accept the ‘value-free’ claim of Western 
IR theorists, but instead assert that there is a ‘value-involved’ problem in IR theory 
making thus bringing to bear their subjective interventions (or interpretations) to the 
knowledge-making process.155 Hence the Tianxia system represents an attempt to 
turn the tables on Western liberal system, which is perceived as incomplete and 
insufficiently inclusive (as it excludes the voices and views of the developing world). 
For instance, in a closed-door forum with several high-ranking Chinese academics in 
Singapore, the delegation leader was critical of the present configuration of 
international power, claiming that the rules and norms that are in place were created 
to protect Western interests and did not include the majority of the developing world. 
Instead there was a need to “adjust with the times” and to make changes to the 
international system that would better reflect the interests of other countries. At the 
same time the delegation was also quick to highlight the rise of China and its growing 
national interests and hence the need to preserve and protect these interests where 
they are seen to be challenged. 156 Such an approach I argue, is an example of the 
pervasiveness of Tianxia thinking in China’s foreign policy conduct whereby Chinese 
leaders attempt to project China’s worldview as wide as possible. By aligning China 
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with the developing world, it allows Beijing to muster support for its policy preferences; 
at the same time, by claiming major power status, Chinese leaders are wont to expect 
that China’s wishes be respected by other major powers. In short, by claiming both 
developing and developed nation status, China seeks to deepen its influence within 
the international system. More crucially, such an approach seeks to present China as 
being superior to other nations and, as pointed out by Singapore’s former top diplomat, 
ultimately to the “acknowledgement and acceptance of [China’s] superiority as a 
norm.”157 To this end, the Tianxia system proffers a theoretical framework whereby 
Chinese particularism and claims to exceptionalism can be universalized in a 
globalized world. Hence, by claiming the Tianxia system as an idealized outcome 
(however unattainable it might be), the objective is not to provide any solutions to the 
problems of global governance, but instead as a means of de-legitimizing the Western-
led international system, and to articulate its claim to ideological superiority by 
scapegoating the United States as the culprit to global problems (this will be further 
discussed in chapter 3).  
 
Conclusion 
  
In this chapter, I discussed recent developments in Chinese international relations 
thinking and how they provide us with important clues to the Chinese worldview 
concerning China’s international relations thinking and its claims to exceptionalism. As 
shown, what is strikingly common about the ideas in all three schools is that they seek 
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to present China’s approach to international politics as being unique and also superior 
to Western thinking. Indeed, their proponents seek to differentiate these ideas from 
existing scholarship and more importantly, attempt to infuse them with concepts and 
motifs taken from Chinese traditional culture. Part of the reason for doing so, apart 
from a dissatisfaction with existing IR scholarship in accounting for Chinese political 
behavior, is the more deeply-seated belief that China’s international relations must be 
interpreted on Chinese terms which include taking its culture and history seriously, 
which are important elements of the Chinese worldview.158 Furthermore, Chinese IR 
thinking also harbors a deep mistrust of the existing IR theory frameworks, believing 
them to be serving the vested interests of the United States and the West. As such, 
Chinese IR scholarship attempts to include the elements of morality, relationality and 
the pursuit of global-ness in their theoretical exposition, believing that these added 
aspects are necessary to remedy Western-centric IR theory, so as to allow a more 
equitable distribution of international voices to global issues.  
 
That said, Chinese IR scholarship, as shown, presents problems of its own: one, 
it remains largely Sino-centric in nature; two, it is mostly anti-Western and anti-
American; three, it assumes benevolence in Chinese leaders; and lastly, it is premised 
on an essentialized view of the East and West. Taken together, these four themes 
provide the basis of Chinese exceptionalism and represent the main themes in 
discussions of China’s international relations as my subsequent chapters will 
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demonstrate. In attempting to distinguish itself from the West, I argue that Chinese 
international relations theories seek to justify their relevancy in reference to so-called 
Chinese conditions (or Chinese characteristics) without critically examining whether 
these conditions are indeed unique to the Chinese experience. To this end, the 
question “when is a Chinese condition a Chinese condition” needs to be posed. To be 
certain, I am sympathetic to the view of these scholars in arguing for the need to take 
into account Chinese history and cultural traditions in understanding the Chinese 
worldview. Yet at the same time, to speak of Chinese culture and history as something 
given and unproblematic is to also ignore the highly politicized nature of Chinese social 
life and to take for granted the legitimacy of these narratives as part of the Chinese 
worldview. Also, these theories assume a priori the legitimacy and uncontested 
character of Communist party rule and ultimately can be said to be preserving the 
status quo as far as Chinese domestic governance is concerned. Furthermore, the 
issue of power – as a central piece in politics – is largely understated in Chinese IR 
thinking, unlike Chinese domestic politics where the discussion of power remains 
primary. All these raises further skepticism as to the ultimate objective(s) of Chinese 
IR thinking. In my view, Chinese IR thinking lends itself mostly to support the policy 
decisions and political objectives of the Chinese state and thus presents – at its core 
– a highly Sino-centric perspective of the world. Issues of academic freedom in China 
further problematize the work of Chinese IR scholarship. Indeed, the body of ideas of 
high profile Chinese scholars like Yan Xuetong and Qin Yaqing cannot be divorced 
from their affiliations with the Chinese government and hence can be said to be 
broadly sympathetic of the positions and political goals of the CCP, and not for sole 
purposes of academic inquiry.  
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Finally, the issue of identity remains China’s most vexing problem, and one 
which will continue to enforce limits on the credibility of its ideas. As we will see in the 
next chapter on Chinese self-identity and its encounter with modernity, contradictions 
between personal and political aspirations continue to exist which could profoundly 
affect the social landscape in China, for better or worse.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Who is China? National Identity and Social Capital in Liquid Times 
 
Sociological and anthropological studies into China of the late 20th and early 21st 
century China have highlighted a highly vexing trend among Chinese individuals: in a 
time of unprecedented social change, increasing numbers of Chinese citizens are 
asking the question, “who am I?”159 It is argued that the structural changes in Chinese 
society borne about as a result of political turmoil of the 20th century have led to the 
substantial severance of ties between the individual and the family as well as the 
individual and the caste-like structure of socialist hierarchy. 160  Among Chinese 
citizens, there exists, as Callahan puts it, a “curious mix of positive and negative 
feelings” intertwined in their understanding of Chinese politics, or a “pessoptimist 
structure of feeling.” 161  How then does this ambivalence play out in China’s 
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international relations, in particular towards its perception of the modern (or even 
postmodern) world? What can we say about Chinese national identity and how is this 
being played out in China’s interaction with the wider world, particularly in the realm of 
geopolitics? 162   To what extent does Chinese institutional politics matter in the 
production and preservation of Chinese national identity, and how has this identity 
changed given China’s rise of the past 40 years? More importantly, how is China’s 
political worldview being influenced and shaped by its national identity, and how is 
Chinese exceptionalism being used as a means of constructing China as being “good” 
and “different” from the West? As discussed in Chapter 2, Chinese ideas in 
international relations frequently allude to the need to differentiate China from the West. 
This is premised on the assumption that China and its citizens are wont to imagine 
themselves in ways that are distinct from people all over world, thus necessitating the 
need for scholarly insights that are peculiar to the Chinese lived experience. But how 
true is this of 21st century China, and to what extent can we speak of a monolithic 
Chinese identity given the rapid changes within modern Chinese society? In this 
respect, Qin Yaqing – whose ideas on relationality we have discussed about in 
Chapter 2 – has suggested that the main question surrounding China’s engagement 
with the world is not institutional politics of how China will fit into international 
organizations, but the identity politics of answering the question “Who is China?” The 
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heart of Chinese foreign policy thus is not a security dilemma, but an “identity 
dilemma”: Who is China and how does it fit into this world?163  
 In this chapter, I will argue that the issue of identity represents a foundational 
starting point with which to understand the Chinese worldview. Following from this, I 
will attempt to frame my analysis of the Chinese worldview, including its claims to 
exceptionalism within this identity framework and to analyze how this consequently 
affects China’s international relations. This is not to suggest that other issues such as 
factional politics and economic development do not matter; however, insofar as these 
issues are being debated, they are understood within a framework of identity politics, 
which seeks to prescribe the manner as to how Chinese citizens ought to relate with 
the state.  As such, the need to preserve a “unity of identity” is paramount for the 
Chinese government to continue to legitimize its authority to govern China.  To do so, 
I will use a sociological structure that builds upon the notion of “liquid  modernity” (or 
liquid times) proposed by Zygmunt Bauman and to examine the extent to which 
Chinese society is experiencing liquid modernity.164  A key theme of my study is the 
relationship between the individual and the state and how the negotiation of national 
identity and individual identity is being played out in practice. To what extent are they 
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co-constitutive or in conflict with each other, and how does this in turn affect the 
amount of “social capital” that is necessary for the proper function of Chinese society? 
I will argue that while there is considerably more freedom for individuals in their private 
pursuits, public institutions still remain highly politicized and are required to conform 
to the agendas of the Communist Party. I will also probe the extent to which Chinese 
nationalism is able to proffer the Party leadership with the required social capital with 
which to create a shared sense of meaning and cohesiveness (ningjuli 凝聚力) within 
Chinese society. I will conclude this chapter with a discussion on how this relates with 
the Chinese worldview and Chinese exceptionalism and highlight several problematic 
issues that remain salient to the Chinese political system and the limits they pose to 
building Chinese social capital. 
 
Liquid modernity and Chinese national identity 
In describing modernity to be “liquid”, Bauman writes of the “changing relationship 
between space and time” in which social patterns are no longer given or self-evident, 
but rather “clashing with one another and contradicting one another’s commandments, 
so that each one has been stripped of a good deal of compelling, coercively 
constraining powers.” 165  Under such conditions, “social forms” (i.e. political 
institutions) which tend to limit individual choices are not expected to “keep their 
shape” for long. Given the “local” character of politics, the modern state is unable to 
operate effectively at the “planetary” level in terms of its governance, thus ceding the 
sphere to “global space”, one which is extraterritorial, and thus politically 
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uncontrollable (from the vantage point of any one particular state). Hence, social 
solidarity within the borders of the nation state becomes increasingly stressed, and 
community bonds become frail and temporal. Under such a milieu, individuals’ 
interests are best preserved, not by conforming to authoritatively-issued rules 
(however imperfect), but by being flexible, that is, “a readiness to change tactics and 
style at short notice, to abandon commitments and loyalties without regret – and to 
pursue opportunities according to their current availability, rather than following one’s 
own established preference.”166  
 While various scholars have debated the extent to which Bauman’s 
observations are a true reflection of contemporary times,167 Bauman’s explication of 
liquid modernity – I argue -  remains highly relevant for our understanding of the 
changing relationship between state and society, between those who govern and 
those who are being governed. Why is this so? Firstly, Bauman is not alone in 
highlighting the changing nature of global society and the effects on individual identity 
and social life. For instance, Manuel Castells writes of the rise of the “network society”, 
one whose social structure is “made up of networks powered by micro-electronics-
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based information and communications technologies.”168 Likewise, Alastair Macintyre 
observes a present crisis in moral discourse (or the “language of morality”) whereby 
“the appearances of morality persist even though the integral substance of morality 
has to a large degree been fragmented and then in part destroyed.”169 Consequently, 
it is surmised that a high degree of uncertainty pervades contemporary global society 
and modern life, thus further problematizing issues of national identity (are there any 
shared values?)  and what it means to be a good citizen (given changing moral 
discourse).  
 Secondly, given the scholarly challenge to the state-centric understanding of  
international politics,170 it behooves us to look deeper at how national identity is being 
socially understood and how this in turn influence and affect state action. If one views 
the state as a “social actor”, then much of state action (i.e. foreign policy) is being 
“guided and constrained by domestic expectations that are considered legitimate and 
by social conventions which both define and delimit these broader social purposes.”171 
Hence, the issue of identity is of crucial importance particularly as these identities 
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“emerge from their interactions with different social environments, both domestic and 
international.”172 This is where Bauman’s scholarly analysis of the interplay between 
global forces and individual appropriation of these ideas come in. What can we say of 
individual identity, or even state identity given the “intrinsic volatility and unfixity of all 
or most identities”, as Bauman puts it. 173 What are the challenges and consequences 
to the issue of governance if notions of citizenship and nationhood are made 
problematic and called to question? If statehood is linked to territorial boundaries and 
the ability to govern and maintain such territory, then how does governance take place 
in a world whereby human beings and information interact across huge geographical 
swaths and in which the idea of place (as circumscribed by territorial space) is now 
being dominated by what is termed as the “space of flows.” 174 While this does not 
mean necessarily a “flattening” of all global differences, as popular accounts of 
globalization have it,175 it does suggest that substantial changes in global society are 
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taking place that could possibly accentuate internal fissures and fractures within and 
across specific societies.176 
 Thirdly, the issue of power needs to be reconsidered on the basis of the 
changing dynamics between the state and its citizens. If one considers state power as 
defined in terms of the national interest, then it is necessary to probe how the national 
interest is now being framed and articulated. Is it possible to still speak of the national 
interest in pure material terms? Given the increased attention to “soft power” in global 
politics,177 what can we say about the nature of power in liquid times? To what extent 
does the state and its institutional representatives continue to wield influence over its 
citizens, and what are the consequences to social life under such modified conditions? 
Contrasting solid and liquid modernity, Bauman observes, “if the flipside of the ‘solid 
modern’ domination-through-order-building was the totalitarian tendency, the flipside 
of the ‘liquid- modern’ domination-through-uncertainty is the state of ambient 
insecurity, anxiety and fear.”178  
 How then, does liquid modernity feature in Chinese society and national 
identity, and more importantly for this dissertation, how does it affect China’s 
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international relations? One study argues that China, under the stresses of liquid 
modernity, faces the dual pressures of external globalization and internal social 
transformation; hence, national identity possesses functional powers that would 
substantially ensure the “individual’s ontological security, maintaining harmonious 
national development, and renewing national identity in an era of globalization.”179 
Moreover there remains substantial ambiguity concerning how the relationship 
between Chinese individuals and the Chinese state ought to be. In his study of the 
incipient psychological changes within Chinese society, Arthur Kleinman notes that 
the intensifying of the “sense of division in the self and society…is evidence of a 
deepening and complexifying of the interiority of the person. Subjectivity in today’s 
China is expanding. The space of the self is being more richly furnished in emotion, 
memory and sensibility…At the core of this transmutation is a divided self (or even 
multiple self) that increasingly can multitask, feel comfortable with contradiction and 
imagine a new and different China.”180 This raises an important question on how 
Chinese national identity should be understood, and how it is being played out in 
China’s international relations.  
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Community and its discontents 
 According to Bauman, the issue of community looms large in the present 
whereby individuals are exhorted to be part of a community, so as to remedy the 
anxiety brought about by the uncertainty of modern society and to procure a sense of 
security amidst the “accelerating liquefaction of modern life.”181 One way this is done 
is through the promotion of an “ethnic community”, in which ethnicity is being used as 
a means of “naturalizing history, of presenting the cultural as ‘a fact of nature’, freedom 
as ‘understood (and accepted) necessity.”182 Furthermore, the principle of ethnic unity 
is frequently promoted as a success story of the nation-state whereby “ethnicity (and 
ethnic homogeneity) [becomes] the basis of unity and self-assertion”, hence resulting 
in the production of a “natural community.” 183  Consequently this results in a 
patriotic/nationalist narrative whereby differences between “people like us” and 
“people who are different from us” are being accentuated without admitting the 
possibility that “people may belong together while staying attached to their 
differences.” 184  Individual interests, where they differ, are being relegated to the 
private sphere (or privatized) and thus are rendered “fragile, temporary…[thus 
signaling] the end of definition of the human being as a social being” and in which 
“uncertainty, insecurity and unsafety” abound in daily living. 185 
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 According to the Chinese economist Mao Yushi, almost 48 per cent more 
people reported greater levels of anxiety in China in 2013 compared to 2008. In his 
analysis, Mao attributed the causes of discontent in China to the vast power inequality 
(between the Chinese authorities and its citizens) and the lack of social justice and 
opportunities to seek redress. Economic factors alone, it is argued, would not be 
sufficient to remedy the problems of anxiety faced by the Chinese people.186 Likewise 
Callahan, in his analysis of Chinese citizen intellectuals, noted the presence of “grand 
aspirations and deep anxieties” and that China’s rise presents for the Chinese people 
“a challenge of ideas and norms, in the drive to build a new world order.”187 In a study 
of China’s cultural politics, Christopher Hughes highlights the tension between what is 
termed as the “Great Tradition, which takes the form of some kind of Communism or 
‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ as the official orthodoxy has it and all these 
other cultural phenomenon that bubble away at the grass-roots level.”188 Given rising 
alienation and growing social unrest in China, President Hu Jintao had pushed for a 
revival of Chinese tradition under his leadership and the advocating of a “Harmonious 
Society.” 189  This “enigmatic relationship between modernity, tradition and 
nationalism”, as Hughes puts it, was then most vividly fleshed out during the opening 
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ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics through the use of digital technology in the 
show.190  
 What the above evidence suggests, I argue, is the highly fragmented character 
of Chinese society, with little coherence in the ideas propagated by the Chinese state 
and those that impact upon individual citizens. Consequently one might say that 
China’s national identity is in flux, and under the conditions of liquid modernity, is now 
vulnerable to further stress, highlighted by the multiple accounts and renditions that 
individuals bring to bear on their interaction with modern Chinese society. 191  As 
argued, the moral context in Chinese society “is divided against the moral person” and 
that “the state that has been so successful at creating prosperity (albeit with worsening 
social inequality) is also repressive and can be dangerously so. The moral context 
created by the part-state is as much a place of collusion and collaboration with 
ruthlessly pragmatic power as it is a place of aspiration for an achievement of a better 
life for many of it citizens.”192 Hence, there exists a deep and ambivalent tension 
between “what ought to be” (as formally demanded by the state) and “what is” (as 
practiced by Chinese citizens in everyday life). To be certain, such incongruities take 
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place in many advanced capitalistic countries and are thus not confined to the Chinese 
experience.193 Yet, as a result of the Chinese’s state preoccupation and emphasis on 
stability and order within its borders, the relationship between the nation-state and 
individual citizens may be far more problematic than in Western society.  
Given these conditions, the imperative to inject a “narrative of unity” is 
paramount to the survival of the nation-state, particularly one whose leaders are 
concerned about staying in power. In the following, I will argue that the Chinese 
government pursued the following ways in order to forge a social contract between the 
party and the citizens: one, to promote a unified sense of Chinese national identity (or 
“Chinese-ness”), two, to use nationalism as a means to foster cohesiveness among 
Chinese citizens, and three, to project the idea of the “goodness” of the Chinese state 
vis-à-vis the wider world comprising of foreign forces which are deemed to be “evil” 
(or at least substantially subversive) so as to warrant mistrust and suspicion from the 
Chinese people. Taken together, these three proffer the Chinese state with the means 
with which to portray its governance of China as being exceptional, and to 
consequently generate support for its international relations and legitimize its political 
ruling.  
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Chinese-ness and Chinese national identity  
 The idea of “what it means to be a Chinese in the 21st century” has been the 
subject of renewed scholarly debate.194 More crucially, how would Chinese national 
identity affect the way the Chinese leaders think about China’s place in the world, and 
how would it consequently influence the actions that are being taken, both in China’s 
internal and external affairs? What are the implications of the interaction between 
national and global identity? While my study emphatically rejects the idea of a 
“Chinese essence” or a singular, defining aspect of “Chinese-ness”, it nonetheless 
recognizes the existence of certain peculiarities that, for better or worse, continue to 
dominate the manner its national identity is conceived and thought of.  
 As such, I argue that the idea of Chineseness represents a means of building 
a “collective identity” among Chinese citizens by the Chinese state, a type of “social 
capital” which seeks to bind and connect disparate communities of Chinese citizens 
into a collective unit. In a way, this parallels the type of social capital that is discussed 
about in American intellectual circles, which according to Robert Putnam, refers to 
“connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
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trustworthiness that arise from them.”195 Why is this important?  Drawing a distinction 
between the bridging (or inclusive) and bonding (exclusive) nature of social capital, 
Putnam explains that bridging social capital is able to “generate broader identities and 
reciprocity whereas bonding social capital bolsters our narrow selves.”196 But more 
than just for ontological purposes, the existence of social capital  imbues civic 
engagement with a certain moral character which is highly consequential to political 
life  As Putnam explains, “social capital affects not only what goes into politics, but 
also what comes out of it…our collective interest requires actions that violate our 
immediate self-interest and that our neighbors will act collectively, too…Social capital, 
the evidence increasingly suggest, strengthens our better, more expansive selves. 
The performance of our democratic institutions depends in measurable ways upon 
social capital.”197   
 Seen in this way, the issue of Chineseness presents the Chinese government 
the means whereby to procure social capital so as to ultimately lend weight to the 
CCP’s political credentials towards the governing of China. In one sense, this is not 
unlike the utilization of social capital in countries with democratic institutions where 
private voluntary groups contribute to larger public life by functioning as “intermediary 
associations” whereby individuals are able to express their interest and demands on 
government, protect themselves from abuses of powers by political leaders, instill 
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habits of cooperation and public-spiritedness, as well as the practical skills necessary 
to partake in public life.198 One key difference however, lies in the relationship between 
political life and civic life. Unlike the democratic systems where there is a clearer 
demarcation and separation of powers between what is political and what is not (hence 
the existence of civil society to bridge these gaps), Chinese social life is argued to be 
far more organizational fluid and politically bounded. 199 The political character of 
Chinese society however can be problematic in practice, especially if Chinese political 
leaders “over-reference” their political motivations in their course of discharging their 
duties. As such, there is a need to legitimize their actions with recourse to motivations 
other than political ones. In this respect, “Chineseness” represents an ideal choice, 
due to its highly dynamic (and diffusive) nature. According to Wang Gungwu, the 
notion of Chineseness, above all, is seen in its political utility and dynamic nature: 
“It is living and changeable; it is also a product of a shared historical experience 
whose record has continually affected its growth; it has become an increasingly 
a self-conscious matter for China; and it should be related to what appears to 
be, or to have been, Chinese in the eyes of non-Chinese.”200 
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This sense of “being Chinese” can be most vividly seen in the 2008 Olympic 
Games, which proffered Chinese leaders the opportunity to showcase the story of 
China’s global success. Writing on the event, Victor Cha notes that “sport is an 
unmistakable prism through which nation-states project their image to the world and 
to their own people…in some instances, sport is critical to the process of 
independence and nation-building…poor performance in sport can render negative 
images of national identity and self-worth beyond anything imagined in politics.”201 But 
more than just an opportunity for nation-building and image promotion, the Olympics 
also allowed Chinese leaders to narrate a political vision of China’s future vis-à-vis the 
outside world. In the following, I will look at the song “Beijing Welcomes You” (北京欢
迎你 Beijing huanying ni),202 a feature song for the 100-day countdown to the Games, 
and whose composition involved one hundred celebrities from mainland China, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Japan and South Korea. Notwithstanding the bright visuals 
and upbeat melody (which made the piece a standout favourite among many Chinese), 
there are a number of themes that reflect certain aspects of Chinese self-identity as 
well as the political narratives that its leaders are attempting to convey to the world. 
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Beijing Welcomes You 
 
1.   China Welcomes the World, but on its terms 
At first glance, the words of the song seem to suggest that China is prepared 
to go all-out to welcome its international guests (“Beijing Welcomes You/we’ve split 
the heaven and earth for you…The vastness as big as heaven and earth/we are all 
friends/there is no need to stand on ceremony”), yet the reality of the Olympics suggest 
that Chinese hospitality is qualified, and only countries who are willing to accept 
China’s international actions are accorded the right of welcome. For instance, critics 
of China’s human rights’ records were reportedly being detained by the Chinese 
authorities, and in a veiled challenge to Western democratic norms, the United States 
was criticized for not ensuring its citizens to “abide by the law in foreign countries.”203 
Such harsh treatment, it seems, was not directed only at outsiders; millions of ordinary 
Chinese citizens also had their lives turned upside down as a result of the Chinese 
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government’s policies to “clean up” the capital for the games. 204 These examples 
highlight the difficulties faced by Chinese leaders in convincing a global audience of 
its magnanimity, which is conditional upon countries willing to acquiesce to Chinese 
terms. While the theme song seems to exhort the world to “be at home” in Beijing, the 
irony is that Chinese leaders are far less comfortable “at home in Beijing” in the 
presence of outsiders than they are in their absence.  
 
2.   To be Chinese, is to be supportive of the PRC 
While the hundred celebrities involved in the video are of East Asian descent, 
countries like Singapore, Japan and South Korea represent distinct nation-states with 
political constitutions far removed from that of China; in the case of Taiwan and Hong 
Kong, the relationship with Beijing remain highly problematic till this day. Watching the 
video however, one gets the impression that these differences do not matter, or at 
least, ought not to matter in the larger scheme of things, which is the achievement of 
China’s Olympic goals. For instance, Chinese-American singer Wang Lee Hom (who 
is of Taiwanese origin) sings the words “we promised to get together here, we 
welcome you”; likewise, Singapore-born singer JJ Lin sings “Beijing welcomes you, 
people who have dreams all are extraordinary.” Commercial reasons aside, the fact 
that these ethnic Chinese citizens are included in the song, I argue, reflects a broader 
political-cultural mindset at work here: China’s cultural hegemony makes no difference 
between mainland Chinese citizens and foreign-born Chinese citizens. To be ethnic 
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Chinese, it is frequently assumed, is to be supportive of China. Indeed, China’s 
nationality law operates on the basis of the “right of blood” (jus sanguinis) whereby 
Chinese nationality is obtained when at least one parent is a Chinese national or by 
naturalization. In practice such an approach is highly problematic given that only 
Chinese with a hukou are considered legitimate citizens and that separate 
arrangements are enforced for citizens of Hong Kong and Macau despite the PRC’s 
claim to territorial sovereignty of them. This is corroborated by the author’s 
conversations with a number of senior Singaporean diplomats who pointed out they 
are frequently chastised by Chinese officials for not “defending China’s interests” in 
their conduct of diplomatic work with Western countries. Moreover, Chinese policy-
makers make little distinction between military/economic work and cultural affairs. 
Both are used to promote China on the world stage as the number one country in the 
world. As observed in one study of Chinese internal publications, Chinese elites 
involved in policy making are widely convinced that China is locked in a realist 
competition with the United States and the broader West “not only in military and 
economic affairs but also for the power to shape the construction of Chinese culture 
and the mentalities of people in China and other societies.”205 Under the conditions of 
such a competition, ethnic Chinese are seen as supporters of the Chinese state (or at 
least, they ought to); other national loyalties are permissible so long as they do not run 
against the grain of what the Chinese government stands for.  
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3.   One must first embrace China in order to love (and discover) China 
More problematic is the need for outsiders or guests to first embrace China in 
order to truly “love” and discover China. As Chinese singer Na Ying and Singaporean 
songbird Stephanie Sun put it, “I (China) always open the doors of my home and my 
arms to embrace you (the guest or outsider), once embraced there will be a rapport 
and you (the outsider) will love this place (China).” In other words, the outsider is 
exhorted to make an a priori commitment to China even before he is allowed to 
examine for himself the country and its people. To be fair, some kind of “faith 
commitment” or risk is necessary for every social endeavor, however, it would seem 
that in this instance, one is asked to “suspend judgment” about China. This, together 
with the added certainty that one would ultimately come to love China and to have 
one’s dreams fulfilled in China (“Beijing welcomes you, people who have dreams are 
all extraordinary, keep your courage than you will have miracles”). How is this possible, 
and upon what basis are outsiders to be assured that their dreams will be achieved in 
China? (after all, there are only so many world records that can be broken, and most 
athletes actually end up with dashed dreams!) Indeed, if we examine the words of the 
song not so much for their cognitive content (what it means logically) but for their 
affective content (i.e. the kind of emotions it is supposed to invoke in the viewer or 
listener), then it is evident that these words are composed with the purpose of 
persuading the outsider that “China is the future”206 and that the Games represent the 
precursor event to the ushering of that future.   
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As the above observations show, implicit in the discourse surrounding the 2008 
Olympics and its theme song is the desire to portrait China as exceptional, that is, 
good and different. While it is necessary for countries which host large-scale events 
like the Olympics to often invoke elements of theatric and make-belief in the marketing 
campaigns, in the case of China, such campaigns are not just about the promotion of 
events for commercial reasons, but also the projection of a type of image that China 
seeks to proclaim about itself to the wider world. In other words, the Beijing Olympics 
is not about showcasing sporting excellence per se, but about highlighting China’s 
story; to the extent that sporting events matter, they allow China to showcase and 
narrate its story of its rise and success to the outside world. Indeed, one might also 
argue that the Olympics is also a reflection of geopolitical competition as seen by the 
rivalry between China and the United States. Prior to the 2008 Olympics and following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was the top sporting nation globally 
and had topped the Olympic medal table in the three previous competitions (1996, 
2000 and 2004); in 2008 however, China became number one, with 12 more gold 
medals than the United States. Indeed, events in the same year such as the Lehman 
Brothers collapse, Beijing’s subsequent 4 trillion yuan global stimulus as well as 
sending its own astronaut to space prompted Chinese leaders to view China’s role in 
the world from a position of strength. China’s former ambassador to Japan, Chen Jian, 
reflecting on the above events said that “the US is beginning to degenerate [while] 
China will become the world’s next superpower, and such recognition has been 
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floating, fermenting and spreading around the world.”207 Relating this to Chinese 
national identity, we might argue that a sense of exceptionalism is needed to generate 
a strong national identity. The events surrounding the Beijing Olympics provided the 
Chinese government to highlight its credentials as an exceptional power, and thus to 
perform its role as a custodian of Chinese identity. Furthermore, by suggesting that 
China is both good and different, Chinese exceptionalism seeks to coopt others into 
the preferred worldview of the Chinese state, or what we might term as a CCP-centric 
view of seeing the world. As Rey Chow points out, “the collective habit of 
supplementing every major world trend with the notion of "Chinese" is the result of an 
overdetermined series of historical factors, the most crucial of which is the lingering, 
pervasive hegemony of Western culture.”208 By conflating ethnicity with citizenship, 
Chinese leaders purport to assume a certain sense of de facto entitlement over other 
ethnic Chinese, as a result of their ruling positions within China.  
 
Fostering cohesiveness via Chinese nationalism 
 The notion of social cohesiveness likewise features prominently in Chinese 
political discourse. This is particularly so, as Minxin Pei argues, given the considerable 
decline of Communist ideology which had formerly been used as an ideological tool in 
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buttressing support for the Chinese government. 209 Hence, the concept of national 
cohesion has been regularly referenced in official CCP statements indicating that 
Chinese leaders are increasingly concerned and are paying close attention to it.210 To 
address the issue of a trust deficit and to promote social cohesion within broader 
Chinese society, Chinese culture is used as a means to “unite the people” (ningju 
renxin 凝聚人心)，as described by its propaganda chief Liu Yunshan.211  
Why is this important for China? Much of this is related to the issue of trust. In 
a study of the relationship between self-identity and modernity, Anthony Giddens 
argues that one central feature of late modernity is the “separation of time from space.” 
Unlike pre-modern cultures and ways of life, “modern social organizations[s] presumes 
the precise coordination of the actions of many human beings physically absent from 
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one another.” 212 Hence the need for trust, which “presumes  a leap to commitments, 
a quality of faith [and which] is specifically related to absence in time and space, as 
well as to ignorance.”213 Relating this to China, one might pose the question: how 
much trust is there between the government and its citizens? Can the central 
government trust the citizens to do the right thing in the absence of supervisory 
mechanisms (given the inherent impossibility of controlling all aspects of social life); 
conversely, to what extent do Chinese citizens trust the central government to act in 
the right way given the lack of accountability mechanisms (such as elections) that 
could be utilized to register their feelings towards the authorities. The uncertainty that 
is brought about as a result of the separation of time from space means that trust is 
vital to the effective ordering of social and political life. As Giddens puts it, “we have 
no need to trust someone who is constantly in view and whose activities can be directly 
monitored.”214  
Various studies of Chinese cities have posited a relationship between 
government action and social trust. 215  A number of Chinese writers have also 
lamented the lack of social trust within Chinese society. For instance, well-known 
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Chinese sociologist Li Yinhe laments a crisis of social trust (shehui xinren weiji社会信
任危机) permeating Chinese society as a result of four problems: ideology,  legal 
mechanisms, social customs and religion.216 Zheng Yongnian likewise locates the 
problem of trust in the field of politics, economics and society-at-large. He cites the 
“irrational investments” (feilixing touzi非理性投资) of local authorities as causing harm 
to the social contract (shehui qiyue社会契约) built up between the central government 
and the citizens. In addition, “black box operations” ( anxiang caozuo暗箱操作) , or 
illegal activities, have also damaged the reputation of public officials in the eyes of the 
ordinary citizens. 217 
In his study of Chinese propaganda, Kingsley Edney argues that the CCP – in 
order to enhance China’s standing in the world – must first foster domestic cohesion 
at home. By doing so, the CCP would also increase China’s soft power, and 
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consequently, remedy the negative perceptions of China from the outside.218 The 
difficulty however, as Edney points out, lies in the lack of separation in China between 
government, state and society (which exists in liberal democracies to varying extents), 
as such, “the Party and state are intertwined in a way that makes it difficult for 
observers to distinguish persistent political values from fluctuations in CCP policy.”219 
For instance, it remains to be seen whether Xi Jinping’s concept of the Chinese dream 
(which we will further touch upon in Chapter 4) is truly representative of a genuine 
collective national sentiment or whether it is an ideological concept that is designed to 
unify the CCP with the Chinese people. As Edney observes, “the process of 
introducing and defining the Chinese dream is top down, rather than bottom up, and 
is driven by the CCP rather than the public.”220 In other words, it is unclear whether 
the promulgation of certain political values in China is congruent with broader societal 
aspirations (thus leading to greater national cohesion) or are they purely for political 
(party) goals without addressing the issue of cohesion.  
One way the CCP has attempted to foster a stronger sense of national cohesion 
is through the means of referencing nationalism. By doing so, it is argued that the party 
seeks to de-problematize what is essentially a contested concept of the Chinese 
nation and consequently, to seek to legitimize the manner of its rule over the 
                                                   
218 Edney, Kingsley. The Globalization of Chinese Propaganda : International Power 
and Domestic Political Cohesion. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, see pp.101-
121. 
219 Ibid., p.118.  
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country.221 But more than just for regime stability, Chinese nationalism also has the 
added effect of also attributing a moral basis by which one’s loyalty to the Chinese 
nation is to be judged upon. According to Bauman’s description of nationalism, it is the 
“[proclamation of] the nation itself, the living legacy of long and tortuous history, to be 
a good in its own right – and not just one good among many others, but the supreme 
good, one that dwarfs and subordinates all other goods.”222 Instead of the search of a 
“common good” (in which would-be citizens engage in by “looking at themselves and 
calling themselves into question”), the solution offered by nationalism to the problem 
of communal security is “my country, right or wrong.”223 
To be certain, varieties of nationalism exist, and a number of critical scholars 
have raised questions concerning the validity of nationalism concepts, given 
contemporary events which significance is increasingly played out on a global scale. 
                                                   
221 For studies into Chinese nationalism, see: Unger, Jonathan., and Barmé, 
Geremie. Chinese Nationalism. Contemporary China Papers. Armonk, N.Y: M.E. 
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Politics, and Diplomacy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. 
222 Bauman, Zygmunt. In Search of Politics. Oxford: Polity Press, 1999, p.165.  
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224 But given the ability of the Chinese government to suppress alternative narratives 
of how China’s nation-building efforts ought to be prescribed, Bauman’s observations, 
in my view, would continue to remain valid. Indeed, Christopher Hughes argues that 
the CCP has become adept in the use of nationalist ideology and has consequently 
utilized such an ideology to maintain its stranglehold on power while at the time, 
ensure that its version of nationalism is compatible with the requirements of attracting 
foreign investment so as to sustain its economic development. 225 Nevertheless the 
conditions of liquid modernity raise a crucial problem: Can such a distinction 
(assuming it can be drawn) between what is “Chinese/non-Chinese”, “local/foreign” be 
clearly delineated given the highly fluid borders of global flows of ideas, knowledge 
and expertise, or as Bauman puts, “the political economy of uncertainty.”226 Also,  if 
one sees Chinese nationalism as a call to patriotism (i.e. aiguo zhuyi 爱国主义), then 
a further question can be raised: upon what basis is one asked to do so, and to what 
extent does love for one’s country is dependent upon one’s unqualified support for the 
ruling Communist party, and the type of foreign relations that it undertakes? All this 
                                                   
224 Breen, Keith., and O'Neill, Shane. After the Nation? : Critical Reflections on 
Nationalism and Post-nationalism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; Buttle, 
Nicholas. "Critical Nationalism: A Liberal Prescription?" Nations and Nationalism 6, 
no. 1 (2000): 111-27; Özkırımlı, Umut. Theories of Nationalism : A Critical 
Introduction. 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
225 Hughes, Christopher R. Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era. Abingdon, Oxon: 
Routledge, 2006.  
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suggests that Chinese nationalism is not a one-sided exercise. As Callahan observes, 
the Chinese people are also “consuming nationalism as part of a symbolic economy 
that generates identity”; in this respect, nationalism – it can be argued – is not 
“imposed by elites so much as it resonates with people’s feelings as it is circulated in 
the market.” 227  In other words, how Chinese citizens appropriate (or consume) 
nationalism may be quite different from that of state prescription. This means that 
Chinese nationalism may be far more dynamic and diffusive than is assumed, and that 
attempts by the state to demarcate clearly the parameters of nationalistic ideas may 
be less successful than expected.   
 
Projecting the idea of China’s goodness vs. the evil outside world 
 The emphasis on identity also represents a particularly potent weapon to help 
promote “nation-building” amidst the social flux pervading Chinese society. Crucially, 
this is seen by the promulgation of the Chinese state as “good”, and that Chinese 
civilization is magnanimous and embracing of outsiders. 228  As Callahan notes, 
“Beijing’s idealized view of imperial China is constantly repeated as a way of explaining 
how China’s peaceful rise is not a threat, but an opportunity for all to prosper in a 
harmonious world.”229 By positing a priori that Chinese ideals are representative and 
                                                   
227 Callahan, William A. "History, Identity, and Security: Producing and Consuming 
Nationalism in China." Critical Asian Studies 38, no. 2 (2006): 179-208, see 179 and 
202.  
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reflective of what all (or at least, a majority) countries in the world ought to approximate 
and accept, Chinese leaders are able to justify their policy actions on the basis of a 
superior morality, while in the process challenging those who are against its actions 
by characterizing them as lacking in morality (or evil).    
One way this has been done is via the “scapegoating” of the West in which 
China’s ills and problems are often blamed upon. In a series of studies on the role of 
violence towards the sustainability of a society, Rene Girard suggests that beneath 
the calm surface of peaceful and friendly cooperation of communal life lies the seeds 
of violent urge. Given the propensity of modern society to eschew violence within their 
own communities, such a violent disposition has to be channeled beyond the borders 
of the in-community on to an external group. Hence the need to channel such 
sentiments on to a “surrogate victim” (or scapegoat) who would take on the sacrifice 
so as to restore a sense of communal unity. According to Girard, “the victim is not a 
substitute for some particularly engendered individual, nor is it offered up to some 
individual of particularly bloodthirsty temperament. Rather, it is a substitute for all the 
members of the community, offered up by the members themselves. The sacrifice 
serves to protect the entire community from its own violence. The elements of 
dissension scattered throughout the community are drawn to the person of the 
sacrificial victim and eliminated, at least temporarily, by its sacrifice.230  
The selection of the victim is crucial; to be suitable for the sacrifice, the potential 
object “must bear a sharp resemblance to the human categories excluded from the 
ranks of the ‘sacrificeable’ while still maintaining a degree of difference that forbids all 
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possible confusion.”231  The candidates must be outside, but not too far; similar to “us 
rightful community members” yet unmistakably different. The purpose of sacrifice is to 
draw tight unsurpassable boundaries between the “inside” and “outside” of the 
community. Interestingly, Girard observed such literature sacrificial rites existed in 
ancient Chinese literature and possessed a propitiatory function – such practices 
“pacify the country and make the people settled…It is through the sacrifices that the 
unity of the people is strengthened…sacrificial ceremonies, music, punishments, and 
laws have one and the same end: to unite society and establish order.”232 
 How should we understand this in light of China’s construction of its national 
identity? To what extent can scapegoating provide the means to ensure Chinese social 
solidarity, thus providing the basis whereby to generate support for its international 
politics and foreign relations? And how does the human propensity for “mimesis” (as 
Girard terms it)233 fits into the wider scope of the Chinese leaders’ strategy of building 
a unified Chinese society? In Bauman’s discussion of scapegoating within the context 
of liquid modernity, it is argued that the sacrifice of such “surrogate victims” provide 
the means of calling into “remembrance of an historical or mythical ‘event of creation’, 
of the original compact on the battlefield soaked with enemy blood. If there was no 
such event, it needs to be retrospectively construed by the assiduous repetitiveness 
of the sacrifice rite.”234  
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To understand how this scapegoat mechanism works in Chinese politics, we 
need to see how the CCP has refashioned itself to ensure that it retains a monopoly 
of power over the right to rule over China. In his study of elite training and state building 
in modern China, Frank Pieke observes that the CCP’s greatest strength lies in its 
“organizational (rather than ideological) credibility” to play the leading role in society. 
“As the undisputed ruling party, the CCP continues to draw on the charismatic 
impersonality of Leninist party organizations. As the infallible source of absolute truth, 
the party has an unchallengeable and almost mystical mandate to resolve 
contradictory trends and objectives by relating them to an unquestioned final and 
overriding mission and desire, no matter how vaguely defined.” 235  This claim to 
infallible truth means that Chinese leaders are wont to transfer blame to others rather 
than admit that the Party could possibly err. While party members individually are open 
to prosecution for personal mistakes, as a collective whole, the Party is absolved from 
blame. As Pieke puts it, “at the root of [the CCP] survival as a Leninist organization 
lies the party’s almost uncanny ability time and again to learn from its mistakes and 
act upon itself and its ideology. Approaching revolution and later rule as a learning 
process has given the party a virtually unique capacity for renewal, change and 
reinvention.”236 By scapegoating the West, Chinese leaders avoid the burden of blame 
and “buy time” to respond to internal criticisms and to ultimately preserve their moral 
standing among its domestic constituents.  
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But more than just maintaining party rule, there is a need to present the party 
as a positive attractive force so that Chinese citizens are able to actualize their 
aspirations only if the Party remains in power. This is where Chinese soft power and 
the practice of scapegoating comes in hand-in-hand. According to Callahan, a 
“positive Chinese self” is built “through the negative exclusion of Otherness.” 237 
Furthermore, Chinese domestic politics and Chinese foreign relations are also 
intimately intertwined via means of drawing a civilization/barbarian distinction, “a 
positive, civilized inside takes shape only when it is distinguished from a negative 
barbaric outside…to understand the soft power of China’s dreams, [one] needs to 
understand the negative soft power of its nightmares.”238 Hence the West becomes 
the source of Chinese nightmares, its actions and policies towards China – as the 
argument goes - are representative of a larger effort to contain China’s rise and to 
preserve Western global primacy and leadership. However, in order to persuade its 
citizens that this is so, it is necessary to incarnate the West in real, tangible terms 
which its citizens can relate to in their everyday life. Seen this way, issues such as the 
Dalai Lama, cross-straits relations, Hong Kong independence and the South China 
Sea disputes thus become surrogates for the West, whereby Chinese leaders claim 
to hold the moral high ground and are consequently perceived to be infallible. 
According to Rey Chow, what is frequently encountered in modern day China is a type 
of cultural essentialism or Sinocentric worldview, which draws an imaginary boundary 
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between China and the world, “everything Chinese, it follows, is fantasized as 
somehow better – longer in existence, more intelligent, more scientific, more valuable, 
and ultimately beyond comparison.”239  
Relating this to China’s foreign relations with the West, one sees certain 
parallels, not least because the West has been the subject of repeated criticisms by 
Chinese leaders in what they perceive as historical injustices towards China up until 
today. As pointed out by a number of scholars, the “century of national humiliation” 
has been a common refrain among Chinese leaders in framing the manner in which 
modern China relates with the West.240 This is most clearly seen in China’s relations 
with Japan whereby a vivid sense of victimhood continues to pervade Chinese 
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thinking.241 Indeed, this deep suspicion towards the West and its allies is seen in the 
attempts by Chinese leaders, possibly President Xi Jinping himself, to clamp down on 
Chinese teachers in recent years for spreading “subversive values”, synonymous with 
“Western capitalist values.”242 
To be certain, scapegoating the West is not a novel practice, particularly in 
geopolitics whereby Western foreign policies are frequently touted by political regimes 
who are antagonistic to the West as the reason for the problems in their respective 
countries. What makes China stand out however, is that unlike some of these 
countries, it can be argued that China has benefitted most from the rules-based 
Western-led international order and thus have little incentive to want to modify that 
order upon which much of its success is derived from.243 As such, it would seem that 
Chinese leaders, in their criticism of the West, is doing so as a result of a deep-seated 
suspicion that the West is attempting to challenge its domestic political system and 
consequently, to bring about political changes that will erode the power of the CCP. 
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By scapegoating the West, it also offers Chinese leaders a ready-made panacea to 
deflect attention from its own domestic limitations and to maintain the aura of 
“sacredness” that the CCP is wont to possess. 244  
 
Conclusion 
 As the above discussion suggests, the issue of identity remains highly 
enigmatic and elusive in modern China’s engagement with the wider world. At the 
same time, identity represents an integral aspect of the Chinese political worldview 
and deeply influences how Chinese leaders perceive China’s relations with the world. 
Given the conditions of liquid modernity, the question of whether the party-centric 
worldview of Chinese leaders is sufficient in responding to the myriad and complex 
social challenges pervading Chinese society. While scholars like Pieke have pointed 
out the durability and strength of party leaders to evolve and reinvent itself, a number 
of scholars have also noted the increasing challenges to governance in China, not 
least in the lack of coherence in its foreign policy and domestic governance,245 or as 
Jonathan Fenby puts it, “a series of different agendas pursued at different times in 
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different ways by different actors.”246 Furthermore if we maintain that a country’s 
political order is dependent upon its social order and the extent to which its citizens 
are able to freely participate in social life, then the Chinese government growing 
assertion over matters of culture and society in recent years is problematic, particularly 
in a time of flexible economic and social relations that characterize liquid modernity. 
Consequently, I argue that the idea of Chinese social capital that is circumscribed by 
ethnic affiliation is highly debatable, especially if individuals do not see themselves as 
part of a broader Chinese narrative (Chinese Dream?) which is able to encapsulate 
their own private aspirations. In my view, the international system, which is configured 
around nation-states is unlikely to acquiesce to a Pax-Sinica arrangement; indeed, 
efforts by the Chinese government to expand its circle of influence beyond Chinese 
shores have been difficult, even in ethnic-majority city-states such as Hong Kong and 
Singapore. Finally, the attempt to present the Chinese state as “inherently good” and 
“superior” to others is increasingly called into question. A case in point would be 
Chinese intransigence in its territorial disputes with its neighbors. The refusal to play 
by international norms, to a large extent, blunts the claims of Chinese leaders that 
China’s rise would be non-hegemonic and peaceful, and that China is not unlike other 
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great powers, and that its actions are similar to other great powers (including the 
United States which it frequently criticizes).247  
Relating to China’s political worldview and its claims to exceptionalism, it would 
seem that China finds itself in a double bind: it wants to be exceptional (good and 
different) from the West in its international politics, yet at the same time it needs to 
contend with domestic problems such as social mistrust and growing unrest that are 
not unlike those faced in other societies. To what extent then can an authoritarian 
government be sufficiently responsive to the needs of its citizens, given the emphasis 
on domestic stability and a monopolistic claim to truth? Can top party leaders suffer 
damage to themselves and the party for the greater good of its citizens and the country 
(however that “greater good” be defined)?  While a full assessment of China’s 
domestic conditions is beyond the scope of this thesis to address, a central point of 
contestation, I argue, lies in the extent to which the CCP’s worldview is being accepted 
by ordinary Chinese citizens. Given the fading memory of ideological factors (during 
the Maoist period), especially among the younger generation, who are given to very 
different set of considerations and ambitions about what a “good life” entails, it remains 
to be seen whether the Chinese government’s brand of governance is able to obtain 
wider resonance among the public. 
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Chapter 4 
Dressing up the Dragon:  
Chinese national image and global leadership 
 
In my earlier chapters, I examined how China’s political worldview is being reflected 
in the study of China’s international relations thinking as well as the issue of its national 
identity. From these, we also see how embedded in its worldview is a deep sense of 
exceptionalism in which China claims itself to be good and different from the West. 
Building from this, I will analyze in this chapter and the next the issue of China’s 
national image and how this is played out in China’s international relations. In this 
chapter, I will look at the national image(s) that Chinese leaders are attempting to 
project on the world stage vis-à-vis Beijing’s global interactions. In chapter 5, I will 
examine the discourse surrounding the high profile Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) rolled 
out by President Xi Jinping in 2013 to see how such a worldview is being understood 
by Chinese thinkers and what it tells us about China’s view of the global order.  
 
In this chapter, I will argue that a positive national image is essential for a country’s 
political worldview to be accepted by others, and strengthening a country’s claim to be 
an exceptional power. Furthermore, a positive national image could proffer states with 
diplomatic goodwill in their international relations and affecting the way political 
relations are being structured. States which are negatively perceived by other states 
face greater diplomatic challenges, not least in the issue of trust, which is seen to be 
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a central backbone of any societal or political arrangement. 248  Likewise the 
apprehension of a threat  is also closely related to the perception of the target. 
According to Stein, “perception is the process of apprehending by means of the senses 
and recognizing and interpreting what is processed…the basis for understanding, 
learning, and knowing and the motivation for action.”249 While it can be argued that 
states’ perceptions of each other are not the only decision-making variables that are 
important, Robert Jervis argues in his seminal work that “the roots of many important 
[international] disputes about policies lie in different perceptions. And in the frequent 
cases when the actors do not realize this, they will misunderstand their disagreement 
and engage in a debate that is unenlightening.”250  
Seen this way, many countries, particularly in East Asia, regard the rise of 
China with some unease, and are wont to perceive Chinese activities within their own 
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territorial jurisdiction with some measure of suspicion.251 It is argued that China has 
been unable to shed its image of an “international propagandist inherited from the 
years past” even though it has attempted - through means of public diplomacy 
(gonggong waijiao 公共外交) - to boost the legitimacy of the CCP to rule China, lure 
foreign investment to China while making China “palatable to the region and the world 
at large.”252 Indeed, as a sovereign nation-state with global ambitions, managing 
China’s national image is crucial to how China is perceived by the rest of the world. 
As one study of China’s public diplomacy puts it, “China has not yet been successful 
in projecting the image of a responsible great power”253; if this is so, then what steps 
are Chinese leaders taking to remedy this problematic image, and to what extent have 
they been successful in doing so?   
In my subsequent discussion, I will first relate my study of China’s political 
worldview, particularly on its claims of exceptionalism to the issue of national image 
so as to highlight the importance such an image has towards whether a country is 
perceived as exceptional or not, and whether its political worldview is being accepted 
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or otherwise. I go on to analyze the ways in which Chinese leaders attempt to promote 
the country’s national image on the world stage. Finally, I will examine the extent to 
which these images have been successful in promoting China’s national image to the 
outside world, and what this tells us about its political worldview.  
 
The Importance of National Image 
What then constitutes a “national image”, and more importantly, how does a state 
arrive at a “favorable” national image? In his analysis of images, Kenneth Boulding 
defines perceived images as the “total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of 
the behavior unit or its internal view of itself and the universe.”254 Given that decision-
makers do not make decisions in a social vacuum, but to their “image” of the social 
situation as it is being perceived, Boulding argues “it is what we think the world is like, 
not what it is really like, that determines our behavior.”255 The desire to maintain 
“cognitive consistency” would compel decision-makers to attribute “favorable 
characteristics…to liked nations, and unfavorable characteristics to disliked 
nations.”256 Seen this way, whether a country is ‘liked’ or ‘disliked’ has got to do with 
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whether it is able to project a “favorable” national image, one that is sufficiently 
“attractive” to be worthy of emulation. Furthermore, a well constructed national image 
can serve a dual function of shoring up domestic support while expanding a country’s 
global and regional influence.257 
 Relating this to the study of China’s political worldview and its claims to be 
exceptional, I argue that a country that seeks to have its worldview accepted must 
foremost be able to project a positive national image of itself. In his study of public 
opinion,  media theorist Walter Lippmann argues that one’s external environment is 
so complex that humans reduce it to a simpler model in order to comprehend and to 
take decisive action.258 Scholars of international relations have also utilized image 
theory in relating how state-to-state relationships are being conceived of as a function 
of perceived threat or opportunity that a subject believes another actor represents.259 
This national image is closely related to what a country does, both domestically and 
internationally. In this respect, a national image is not inherently self-evident, and 
actions are interpreted within a certain mental framework which involve prior 
assumptions, preconceptions and value judgment about a country’s intentions and 
interests. At the same time, these images and actions are not entirely a relative matter: 
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there exists certain characteristics of state behavior, or “baseline social processes”, 
that function as key determinants of international social processes. 260 To the degree 
countries are able to exhibit such traits, they are likely to be favorably perceived, and 
vice versa. In other words, a national image is produced not simply by words, but 
through the actions of the state. 
  Given my analysis of China’s worldview and its exceptionalist claims involve 
the examination of how Chinese elites view China as being good and different from 
the West, having a favorable national image is essential towards the achievement of 
that objective. In this chapter, I will look at how Chinese elites perceive China as being 
“different” from the West within the space of domestic governance and the extent to 
which these governance priorities reflect the playing out of Chinese exceptionalism 
ideas. To do so, I will look at the speeches made by President Xi Jinping that are being 
published in the book The Governance of China (Xi Jinping Tan Zhiguo Lizheng).261 
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Through a closer study of this work, I hope to uncover several key themes that reflect 
how China is being presented to the outside world as “different” vis-à-vis the processes 
of domestic governance. I will also examine how China’s national image is being 
portrayed in these instances, and the extent to which they help or hinder attempts to 
generate a favorable national image.  
 
Xi Jinping: The Governance of China  
First I use The Governance of China as a springboard to anchor my analysis of China’s 
national image. The choice of the book is made for the following reasons. Firstly, it 
comprises of 80 speeches made by President Xi Jinping in his first 18 months of 
becoming China’s leader, and thus represents an important attempt to narrate how 
China’s future might be like. Given Xi’s thorough consolidation of power within the 
party, the book can be viewed as a blue-print concerning Xi’s vision of China under 
his rule.262 Secondly, given the translation into English by the Foreign Languages 
Press of Beijing (in 2014), the book was likely written and compiled with an external 
audience in mind. A careful study of this book would thus allow us to glean further 
clues on the type of national image that Xi and senior party leaders purport to project 
to the outside world. Thirdly, it was observed that the book, despite being almost 500 
                                                   
of Xi’s writings, I train my focus on topics that in my view, matter most to China’s 
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262 Hengjun, Yang. “Why Read Xi Jinping’s book?” The Diplomat, January 31, 2015, 
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pages long, possess little reference to the United States and the Western world but 
instead articulates Chinese perspectives in regards to various aspects of global 
governance, in particular China’s relations with Asia.263 This suggests a desire among 
Chinese leaders to differentiate itself from the West on the basis of its self-perceived 
cultural and political superiority. Taken together, the book provides important clues to 
how Chinese leaders perceive China’s international relations ought to be structured 
and the priorities that Chinese leaders are wont to emphasize, both in their domestic, 
regional and international affairs. As observed, the book is helpful because it “gathers 
together otherwise scattered speeches and comments to show Xi’s hopes, dreams, 
goals, and plans for China and the world.”264 Indeed, the publisher writes that the book 
was written in order “to respond to rising international interest and to enhance the rest 
of the world’s understanding of the Chinese government’s philosophy and its domestic 
and foreign policies.”265  
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(retrieved December 11, 2016). 
265 Xi, Jinping. The Governance of China. Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 2014. 
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 In my subsequent analysis, I will focus on three themes which constitute key 
narratives of China’s image promotion. They are: (I) the Chinese Dream and the image 
of China as a flourishing civilization; (II) an image of a progressive and peaceful China; 
and (III) China being a moral example for the international community to emulate. 
Besides analyzing Xi’s speeches which relate to the above themes, I will also look at 
the writings and ideas of Chinese scholars that touch on the above topics. By linking 
the subsequent analysis to my broader study of Chinese exceptionalism, I argue that 
China’s national image represents a crucial aspect of China’s ability to influence and 
lead the world. A negative image would sorely dent Chinese ambitions to lead and to 
have others follow its lead. Hence, to what extent do the ideas articulated by Xi in The 
Governance of China allow the PRC to remedy its national image, as exemplified in 
the area of governance, and to what degree does Xi’s vision of governance can be 
said to be “different” from the West?  
  
I)   The Chinese Dream: Image of China as a flourishing civilization 
 
On 29 November 2012, shortly after the unveiling of China’s fifth generation 
leaders at the 18th National Congress, President Xi gave a speech “Achieving 
Rejuvenation is the Dream of the Chinese People” while visiting the National History 
Chinese Museum in Beijing. In his speech, Xi exhorted Chinese citizens to pursue the 
Chinese Dream (Zhongguo meng 中国梦): 
“In my opinion, achieving the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has been the 
greatest dream of the Chinese people since the advent of modern times. This 
dream embodies the long-cherished hope of several generations of the 
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Chinese people, gives expression to the overall interests of the Chinese nation 
and Chinese people, and represents the shared aspiration of all the sons and 
daughters of the Chinese nation.”266 
Given that the setting in which the speech was made, one might view Xi as 
invoking among the Chinese citizenry a strong sense of historical pride towards their 
country so as to unite them under the umbrella of a shared common destiny. As noted, 
“expectations are high in China for Xi to act quickly on a range of issues; there is a 
sense of urgency in Beijing because people feel that China’s ‘window of opportunity’ 
for global greatness is closing.” 267  
This appeal towards the Chinese Dream was again made in Xi’s first official 
address to the Party as president during the 12th National People’s Congress on 17 
March 2013 following the official handover of power.268 Unlike his earlier speech 
where the “Chinese Dream” was defined vaguely as national rejuvenation, this speech 
was a clarion call to action, with parameters more clearly defined: 
“To realize the Chinese Dream, we must take our own path, which is the path 
of building socialism with Chinese characteristics” 
“To realize the Chinese Dream, we must foster the Chinese spirit” 
“To realize the Chinese Dream, we must pool China’s strength, that is, the 
strength of great unity among the people of all ethnic Chinese (zhonghua minzu
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中华民族).”269 
 The Chinese Dream theme would go on to be repeated in five other speeches 
in the book that Xi made over the next fourteen months (April 2013 – June 2014).270  
As earlier suggested, these multiple reiterations of the Chinese Dream should not be 
construed or dismissed simply as propaganda or as facts to be proven or disproven. 
Rather the Chinese Dream represents a “moral drama that expresses a community’s 
aspirations and fears.”271 In this respect, I argue that efforts to forge a Chinese national 
identity is closely intertwined with how Chinese leaders endeavor to generate the kind 
of social cohesiveness within Chinese society (as earlier discussed in Chapter 3). But 
more than just social cohesion, the Chinese Dream also symbolizes an effort to 
showcase and highlight China’s credentials to the outside world and to enhance its 
national image, particularly if its citizens are able to identify with a sense of shared 
destiny in regards to China’s future. To this end, the Chinese Dream can be seen as 
a way of engaging with the emotions of the Chinese people, thus generating greater 
affinity between Chinese political leaders and the citizens.  
 As such, the Chinese Dream can be understood as a proclamation of a Chinese 
political “gospel”, whereby China seeks to “confer blessings” to both its own citizens 
                                                   
269 Another plausible translation can be read as “Chinese of all ethnicities.” As 
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and the international community. As one Chinese scholar writes, “the core message 
of the Chinese Dream is that China’s rise is not a zero-sum game, but a mutual win–
win situation for the rest of the world.”272 The image is then of China as a flourishing 
civilization whose values and way of life is attractive to both insiders and outsiders, 
thus rendering cooperation inevitable and conflict obsolete. Such an outcome, 
however, is not a certainty, but is contingent on the preservation of two key criteria, 
namely, socialism (with Chinese characteristics) and the centrality of the Communist 
Party of China.   
Given that socialist ideology and the CCP are closely intertwined, it is not 
surprising to see how they contribute to Xi’s vision of the Chinese Dream. Socialism 
represents a ideological core of the CCP’s institution while the CCP likewise presents 
itself as a custodian of the doctrines of socialism. Indeed, as Xi himself puts it, 
socialism with Chinese characteristics, according to Xi, remains an indispensable 
“doctrine” which “can save China…[and] bring development to China.”273  Xi refers to 
China’s history to buttress his point, noting that the socialist system was a result of the 
Party’s “painstaking efforts” over the years. 274 As such, Xi is allying himself with 
Chinese history – as interpreted through the Party’s vantage point – and concludes 
that Chinese socialism remains the “only way to achieve China’s socialist 
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modernization and create a better life.”275 Xi also maintains that Chinese socialism – 
however imperfect at present – remains “unique and effective” and that party members 
should guard against “erroneous views aimed at abandoning socialism.”276 
Similarly, on the CCP leadership, Xi emphasizes the importance of party 
members to “accomplish concrete deeds that can stand the test of practice, survive 
the scrutiny of the people and history.”277 Quoting the ancient Chinese philosopher 
Lao Zi, Xi said   “governing a big country [like China] is as delicate as frying a small 
fish (zhidaguo ru pengxiaoxian, 治大国如烹小鲜)” , thus party members ought not to 
be negligent in the smallest of matters and need to devote themselves to work and the 
public interest.278 Interesting, the above quote was also used by former U.S. president 
Ronald Reagan in his 1988 State of the Union speech, but with the added words “do 
not overdo it.” From this, it can be adduced that while Reagan’s emphasis was for a 
more laissez-faire approach to domestic governance, Xi’s approach would be to retain 
considerable Party oversight over matters of governance and policy affairs. This is 
because given the single-party system of Chinese governance, the fortunes of the 
Communist Party are coterminous with the fortunes of China. 
Why should we care about the Chinese Dream, Chinese socialism and the 
Chinese leadership? Xi’s words are not entirely unexpected, and his proclamations 
are not exactly unique. At the same time, the China dream discourse is not simply 
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empty talk, but reflect a broader Chinese mindset concerning how Chinese leaders 
perceive China’s economic development and its place in the world. In the words of 
Zhou Tianyong, who is the vice director of Research at the Party School of the 
Communist Party of China's Central Committee, the Chinese dream “is rooted in [the 
Chinese] people’s obligations, trust, hopes and dreams for themselves, families, 
society and country in the future, and the pursuit for the vision and ideal of China.”279 
However, it raises the larger question of the extent to which the Chinese dream is able 
to incorporate and account for the interests of other countries, and that Chinese 
leaders are not thought of merely acting on the behalf of only China’s own national 
interests. In a discussion of “the China model”, which was widely promulgated in the 
late 2000s, Suisheng Zhao observes that such a model, despite its “non-ideological, 
pragmatic and experimental approach” suffers from several fault lines: one, it lacks 
moral appeal, two, it had not been effective in dealing with important dimensions of 
human development home and abroad, and, three, the success of the model is very 
short and its durability is questionable.280 If one sees such a model as possessing 
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shades of what the China dream entails, then the bigger question that needs to be 
answered is: does it possess universal appeal? 
In other words, we might ask as to whether a Chinese model (however it may 
be defined today) is sufficiently attractive enough so as to persuade other states to 
follow its lead, thus affirming the positive aspects of the Chinese dream and 
consequently improve China’s national image? If China is to be perceived as 
exceptional and if its leaders are wont to present China’s governance as being both 
good and different from the West, then how much traction does such a line of 
exceptionalist reasoning has with the states that the PRC purports to influence?   
According to one study of China-Africa relations, the Chinese government is 
challenged by the need to reconcile ideal aspirations with policy prescriptions (and the 
messy reality on the ground), in addition to the difficulty in ensuring that Chinese 
official rhetoric can be conclusively demonstrated in the substantive nature of its day-
to-day interactions with African counterparts.281  
This brings us back to the crucial question surrounding the Chinese dream: can 
it be actualized in the the day-to-day work of governance or is it simply an exercise in 
idealized reality? In a recent study of China, Frank Pieke notes that the future “of and 
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with China will not be determined by a simple clash of ideologies or civilizations. 
Recombination and evolution will produce new realities and ideas…not only in China 
but across the world. Not only will they require new analytical concepts; they will also 
bring new expectations, apprehensions, fears, desires and, ultimately, ideologies.” 282 
Similarly, Callahan observes that the Chinese dream reflects a wider debate within 
Chinese society about values, even as the objective of the dream is national 
rejuvenation through state power.283 Seen this way, I argue that the Chinese dream is 
not without deeper political overtones: to achieve the Chinese dream, the party-state 
needs to be in charge, and will not tolerate any challenge to its monopoly of power. To 
be certain, the desire to preserve political power is not unique to China, and likewise, 
Beijing’s political system should not be simply labelled as a dictatorship (and thus to 
be condemned) as opposed to a democratic system (which is to be praised). As Pieke 
puts it, “democracy and dictatorship are not…antagonistic political systems. 
Democratic enclaves can exist within authoritarian regimes just as authoritarian 
enclaves can exist within democratic political systems…[China] is a bit of both and at 
the same time also something altogether new.”284 Nevertheless, the need to preserve 
party centrality and control at all costs presents sharp difficulties for Chinese leaders, 
not least because of the rapidly changing character of Chinese society, whereby the 
CCP does not necessarily possess sole monopoly over ultimate values (or what its 
citizens should value). As discussed in Chapter 3, the conditions of liquid modernity 
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complicate the CCP’s efforts in enforcing a single unifying narrative of what Chinese 
national identity ought to encompass. Hence, I argue that the Chinese dream and the 
conjuring of the image of China as a flourishing civilization is diluted by flux in Chinese 
social life, and thus showing up the limitations of the CCP in responding, let alone 
providing a solution, to the deeper moral and existential tensions in Chinese society. 
The highly diffusive nature of the Chinese dream means that it can be taken to mean 
anything and everything, and consequently rendering the concept itself ultimately 
vacuous and empty of concrete meaning. Indeed some Chinese scholars themselves 
have questioned the concept of the Chinese dream, and the extent to which the 
concept can be used to generate feelings of patriotism and national identity among 
Chinese citizens.285  
  
II)   Reform and restraint strategy: Image of China as “progressive and peaceful” 
  
a)   The Language of Reform: China is progressing 
A frequently emphasized refrain of Xi is the need for “all round and deeper-level 
reforms” which are described as “ongoing tasks [that] will never end”286. Indeed the 
topic of reforms was viewed by the Communist Party as crucial to China’s future that 
it was made the central topic for discussion during the Third Plenary Session of the 
18th CCP Central Committee. Reforms, according to Xi, had to be comprehensive 
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(from the economy to the ecology), but most importantly, these reforms were to be 
“connected to and integrated in the reform of Party building.”287 In this respect, I argue 
that whether specific reforms can be actualized or not in practice is not the point, since 
no policy is without consequences; rather the fact that reforms are often emphasized 
suggest that they are of paramount importance, even if they are unable to be fully 
applied in reality. Why then, are reforms so important to the Communist Party, and 
how should one understand this repeated emphasis? Is it purely used as a rhetoric 
device to bolster the Communist Party legitimacy or is there more to what reform 
entails and how reforms are being perceived? More importantly for our study, how do 
reforms help to promote a favorable Chinese national image? 
To be certain, the concept of “reform” (改革  gaige) is not unique to Xi’s 
administration, instead it is frequently echoed among Chinese leaders since Deng 
Xiaoping, all recognizing its necessity in governing China successfully. This is 
because reforms, as David Lampton points out, confer legitimacy on Chinese leaders, 
and is premised on “bringing China’s social, economic, and governing systems into 
greater harmony with one another in the very different PRC that has evolved since 
mid-1977.”288 More importantly, the Communist Party – as a result of reforms – would 
emerge stronger and be better prepared to meet the needs of the country.289 In 
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addition, Xi’s recent recentralization of political power around himself suggests that 
reforms in China are not without a political purpose: to strengthen Xi’s governing 
authority and solidify his control of the party.  
For instance, the “Rule of Law” is being espoused by Xi as a “fundamental 
principle by which the Party leads the people in running the country [so as] to ensure 
that the people lead a happy life.”290 In a speech to commemorate the 30th anniversary 
of the PRC’s post-Cultural Revolution constitution, Xi spent considerable amount of 
time explicating on the need to “comprehensively implement” the constitution. 291 
However, six months later in the summer of 2013, Chinese leaders started to clamp 
down on constitutionalist academic and popular discourse that flourished following Xi’s 
speech. Since then, a number of human rights lawyers have been arrested or detained 
for having participated in “subversive activities.”292 Scholars argue that adherence to 
the rule of law in China is a problematic notion, and checks and balances have 
traditionally played a smaller role in limiting a leader or empowering the ordinary citizen 
in China than in the West.293 As Xi puts it, “our judicial, procuratorial and public security 
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officers are good. They are loyal to the Party, serve our people, are able to take on 
tough challenges, and brave death.”294 To the degree which members of the judiciary 
are expected to abide by Party guidelines and serve the interests of the party, these 
reforms remain limited in scope and contingent upon the decisions of China’s top 
political leaders. 
Seen against this backdrop, I argue that China’s reforms are conceptualized in 
order to further strengthen institutional power, to project the image of Chinese leaders 
as being capable and coherent in their governance, so as to ultimately lend legitimacy 
to their being in power. Given that the Chinese government is frequently criticized by 
the West for human rights’ violations, the use of “reforms” provide Chinese leaders 
with the necessary credentials by which to impress both its citizens and the outside 
world that its political processes are in tandem with the domestic needs of its polity, 
and thus accentuating the competency of its leaders. Moreover, the language of 
reform also lends weight in generating a “progressive mindset” among Chinese 
leaders, in that these changes are necessary to imbue China with the required skill 
sets to ensure its ongoing development.  
 To what extent then are these reforms sufficient to improve China’s image? In 
a discussion of how images permeate the political process, Kenneth Boulding 
observes the difference between democratic and authoritarian political systems which 
lies in the nature of the feedback from lower to higher roles in the decision-making 
process. Whereas in democratic models the feedback is more direct and thus resulting 
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in a more powerful influence in the modification of decisions, feedback in authoritarian 
structures tend to be inadequate as the “tyrant controls his sources of information [thus 
rendering] these sources [to] become increasingly unreliable.” In addition, the leader 
also tends to surround himself with likeminded people (i.e. “yes men”)  and hence “his 
image of the world becomes increasingly divorced from the image of the lower 
roles.”295 Can this be said of China, and is President Xi’s increasing centralized 
approach to governing China symptomatic of a bigger problem within China’s 
governing system? Indeed, the decision made by the Communist party Central 
Committee to bestow the title of “the core” (hexin 核心) upon President Xi in October 
2016, thus arrogating maximum political power to Xi in a manner similar to that of Mao 
Zedong and Deng Xiaoping was justified by the need to push forward the “fundamental 
needs of the Party and the nation” and to achieve national rejuvenation.296 But as a 
number of scholars have noted, it is unclear whether such an attempt by Xi to exert 
such widespread control is at all feasible, let alone effective in managing the needs of 
the country.297 One might even ask, are reforms meant to progress the country, or to 
prosper the party? 
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b)   The Logic of Restraint: China is “peaceful” 
On China’s relations with major powers, three powers, namely Russia, the 
United States and the European Union loom large in Beijing’s imagination. Xi’s 
speeches in Moscow, Sunnylands (California) and Bruges all attempted to find 
common ground between Chinese civilization and his respective hosts. 298There was 
virtually no mention or acknowledgement of existing bilateral problems and his 
speeches touched mostly on positive developments, including the role played by 
China in helping these nations to flourish. Why is this so? 
Part of the answer lies in China’s acute sensitivity towards major power 
relations and a foreign policy tradition of “realist thinking, situational ethics, and a 
deeply embedded sensitivity to being bullied.”299 At the same time, Chinese leaders 
since Deng Xiaoping are wont to describe Chinese foreign policy as being 
fundamentally peaceful, and that China does not harbor hegemonic designs nor would 
it seek global expansion.300 By affirming areas of common interests with major powers, 
Xi is pursuing two objectives, one for a domestic audience, the other for a foreign 
audience. In the case of the former, Xi is attempting to narrate, and consequently instill 
a sense of pride among Chinese citizens towards China’s global achievements and 
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international parity with the major powers.  
More crucially, such a platform also proffered Xi with an opportunity to portray 
China as not wanting to seek international dominance, but instead to usher a “new 
model of major country relationship“（新型大国关系, xinxingdaguoguanxi), a foreign 
policy slogan that would be repeated many times over among Chinese scholars and 
diplomats in the following two years.301 A central theme underlining this policy, as 
observed, was to provide a basis for solving bilateral issues between China and the 
United States, but from a “more symmetrical position than before” and a “signal of an 
acceptance” that China has a special role and duty as a major power to work with the 
United States and other major powers to solve global problems.302 As one Chinese 
scholar puts it, Xi’s diplomacy strategy is leading the major-country diplomacy with 
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Chinese characteristics. 303  But what are these characteristics, and why are they 
important for China? In one sense, it is highly symbolic (more on this later); but beyond 
symbolic value, such expressions are intended to shore up China’s national image, in 
that Beijing would eschew Cold-war style confrontational politics but instead exercise 
restrain and responsibility in its external relations. While both the U.S. and China 
remain deeply suspicious of each other (notwithstanding their leaders’ high-profile 
meetings), at the same time, it can be argued that Chinese leaders and scholars – 
more so than Western counterparts – frequently go to great lengths to characterize 
Chinese foreign policy as inherently peaceful. 304 This fits into the “peaceful 
development” narrative that was earlier promoted by President Hu Jintao during the 
2000s, casting China as a model of a benevolent power that pursues peaceful 
development. 305 
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To see how the notion of Chinese peaceful development is being understood, 
we look at the “Asian security concept” which was mooted by Xi in in a 2014 speech 
made at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia.306 
While much of his speech covered predictable terrain, notably Xi spoke of the need 
for the “people of Asia [to] run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold 
the security of Asia.”307  Not surprisingly, the notion of “Asia for Asians” was met with 
substantial debate both among Chinese and Western scholars.308 Is China attempting 
to coerce Asian countries to  stand up with China to challenge American primacy in 
Asia? Or, is China attempting to create a Pan-Asia community of nations in which 
China sits at the apex of such a grouping? According to Jakobson, Xi's speech reflects 
his aspirational vision of a new Asian security framework, although the details of such 
a security framework remain at present, vague.309 What then, is the value of such a 
security framework, if indeed China – at present – is not prepared (institutionally or 
capability-wise) in establishing it?  
In my view, this emphasis on Asia tells us two things about China’s present and 
future priorities: one, China sees Asia as a key region in its global quest for greatness, 
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and two, China is attempting to reduce American influence in Asia, particularly in the 
realm of its security relations. The Asia for Asians framework, as observed, 
demonstrates Chinese contestation against the relevance of the U.S. regional alliance 
as a Cold War relic and as irrelevant to its more “exclusivist vision of Asian regionalism 
and institutionalism.”310 In order to do so, China needs to differentiate itself from the 
United States and to promote a regional – even international – order that is distinctively 
different from the U.S.-led system. One way this is done by Chinese leaders is by 
repeatedly emphasizing the peaceful nature of Chinese international relations and 
contrast it with the United States as a hegemonic power. This sense of competition is 
especially vivid in China’s interactions with its Asian neighbors, and more specifically, 
in its relations with countries within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), as we shall see in the next chapter. Furthermore, as observed by Callahan, 
debates about how China can fit into the world system as a “responsible great power” 
have emerged in recent years among liberal Chinese IR scholars. “China is trying to 
prove to the world (especially the West) that it is no longer a revolutionary state that 
challenges international order, but is a responsible member of international society.”311 
Another view proposed by Deborah Larson is that China wants to restore its previous 
status as a great power, but at the same time to preserve its culture and norms, without 
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assimilating Western liberal values, that are seen to be problematic.312 
How successful has this strategy been? Has China been able to convince 
skeptics that it eschews the behavior of a hegemon (particularly that of the United 
States which it frequently criticizes?) The answer is no. Despite the best efforts of 
Chinese diplomats and scholars to promote a peace-loving image of Beijing, China’s 
closest neighbors continue to eye its actions with suspicion. This reinforces the earlier 
idea that states’ actions, and not words, matter more in how its national image is being 
perceived. Seen this way, the proclamation of China’s peaceful rise, if not backed up 
by concrete action, is insufficient to produce a favorable national image (I shall return 
to this in Chapter 5 in my discussion of Southeast Asia perceptions of China).  
 
(III)  China as a moral example in international politics 
The notion of morality features widely in Chinese international relations 
scholarship, especially in recent times where Chinese scholars attempt to distinguish 
China’s practice of international politics from those of the West (as analyzed in Chapter 
2). Among them, Yan Xuetong – who leads the Institute of Modern International 
Relations at Tsinghua University – has been highly vocal in formulating what is 
considered to be a normative model of Chinese international relations.313 Two of his 
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recent works, as we have touched upon in Chapter 2, deals heavily with the theme of 
moral standing in international politics, which in Yan’s mind, is indispensable to a 
country’s ability to lead. 314  Yan distinguishes hegemonic authority from humane 
authority and argues that the latter – while more difficult to achieve – would provide a 
better basis for international leadership. More pertinently, Yan regards the United 
States as a hegemonic power and argues that China should strive for a higher moral 
standing: “If China wants to become a state of humane authority, this would be 
different from the contemporary United States. The goal of our strategy must be not 
only to reduce the power gap with the United States but also to provide a better model 
for society than that given by the United States.”315  
Seen this way, I argue that part of how Chinese leaders perceive and attempt 
to project China’s moral quality is through “symbolic acts” whereby the social reality of 
China is being constructed through “performative acts.” As observed, states are not 
passive objects of socialization but active agents who continuously attempt to shape 
international discourse of themselves, hence much of everyday political interaction 
can be construed as a performative act, whereby states attempt – through policies 
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enacted and articulated – to communicate how they ought to be seen and treated. 316 
Indeed Erving Goffman’s seminal work on The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life 
highlights the importance of co-constitution of social relations. “When an individual 
plays a part he implicitly requests his observers to take seriously the impression that 
is fostered before them.”317 Following from this, the importance of symbolic action 
becomes of crucial importance in determining the type of impression that is conveyed 
by a state to the outside world, but also how a state understands itself to be. As 
Goffman notes, “an individual may be taken in by his own act or be cynical about it.”318  
Relating this to China, one sees a number of actions that, I would argue, are 
highly symbolic in nature. More so, given that Chinese society is largely given to 
“ritualistic” action, the act of governance thus becomes not a social contract between 
the government and the people, but also carries with it certain obligations that are 
morally defined. 319  Fei Xiaotong defines ritual (礼 , li) as “an act performed in 
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accordance with ceremonial forms” and that “rituals work through the feeling of respect 
and of obedience that people themselves have cultivated. People conform to rituals 
on their own initiative.” 320   Thus those who govern would have to “perform” as 
expected, if they are to be viewed as legitimate by the people. More so, given the 
challenges of domestic governance, there is a need for symbolic action, or what Lucian 
Pye terms as, “theatrical gesture” whereby great importance is placed on the “manner 
and the form of actions and not just to look for substance.” 321 To this end, whether 
such acts are merely performance in nature or whether they are in and of themselves 
“good” and beneficial to the people is not as important as how these actions are being 
constructed and perceived.322 From this, we might say that China’s national image is 
contingent on the extent to which its leaders are able to convince its citizens that they 
are discharging their responsibilities with recourse to moral considerations. As pointed 
out by Richard Madsen in a classic study of the interpersonal dynamics within a 
Chinese village, the emphasis on the importance of good “human feeling” in political 
conduct reflect the broader commitment to a Confucian paradigm that govern 
individual thinking – self-consciously or otherwise – in which man is not by nature 
selfish.323  
Such a framework thus allows us to better understand of some of Xi’s social 
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undertakings, especially those with utopian-sounding objectives or goals that seem 
overly idealistic. As Sujian Guo observes, although the post-Mao era has become far 
less attentive than in Mao’s era to utopian visions of an ideal future, “CCP ideology 
still officially retains many utopian elements as stipulated in the CCP constitution and 
reflected in the leaders’ speeches.”324 In this case, one might interpret these utopian 
elements as statements or actions expressing symbolic intent and not necessarily 
realistic initiatives to be achieved. For instance, at a 2013 Politburo study session, Xi 
spoke on the need to “usher in a new era of ecological progress”, the speech however, 
provided no details as to how this might transpire, except to highlight the importance 
of implementing the “guiding principles of the Party’s 18th National Congress”, “Deng 
Xiaoping Theory”, “the Three Represents” and “Scientific Outlook on Development” 
among others.325 Similarly during a visit to Hebei province in 2012, Xi spoke on the 
need to “eliminate poverty and accelerate development in impoverished areas”, but 
did not specify how that is to be done, except to note the importance of the Party 
committees in achieving this goal. 326 
To be sure, statesmen are not always expected to be intimately involved in day-
to-day policy making given that this is done by lower officials. However in the case of 
China, this is complicated by the fact that “Chinese national politics revolves around 
the personages of leaders…the mystique of the leader as the great man, the savior of 
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the nation, the one whose will and wishes become the collective obligations of the 
country.”327 This is particularly so in the case of President Xi, who has far more 
personal power invested in himself than his predecessors, hence the expectation that 
his words carry substantial weight even though those who subsequently interpret and 
translate these words into actual policies may face a very different set of situational 
constraints from that of Xi. According to Lucian Pye, symbolism, when faced against 
the constraints of reality, produces the “peculiar Chinese combination of wishful 
thinking and cold practicality.”328 This is particularly so if institutional capability is 
unable to cope with what is politically demanded, thus potentially deepening the 
fissures between the party leadership and ordinary citizens.  
What symbolic action can achieve however, is that it serves to imbibe political 
action with a certain moral quality, thus lending legitimacy to Chinese leaders in their 
course of government. This fixation with morality is most vividly seen in Xi’s high profile 
anti-corruption campaign since he took power. In a January 2013 speech, Xi touched 
on the need to catch “tigers” and “flies” (in a reference to powerful leaders and lowly 
bureaucrats respectively) and that party members should not “seek any personal gain 
or privilege” over and above what they are entitled to in their course of their jobs.329 It 
is unclear however whether such a campaign is truly aimed at eradicating corruption, 
or, to purge Xi’s political opponents. As such, anticorruption campaigns can be said to 
be dual purposed: as an instrument of personal power (for political purges) and as a 
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demonstration of good governance whereby the party is able to – or at least be seen 
to – claim a moral high ground.330  
Furthermore, the fact that Chinese society is particularly sensitive to issues of 
“face”331 means that social policies are often couched in moral language: not only are 
they expected to benefit the people in a real way, they are also expected to portray 
the Party in a favorable light (i.e. the Party is “good”), which is ultimately linked to 
China’s success or failure in the world. As Pye observed, “[the] powerful and 
essentially mystical belief that moral uprightness and ethical correctness on the part 
of rulers is enough to determine the fate of empires.”332 What is different, I argue, is 
the basis upon which a moral code is built upon. Unlike Western ethical systems that 
posit values from a Judeo-Christian base (however imperfectly), Chinese society lacks 
a transcendental referent point with which to establish a set of guiding – and binding 
– moral code. In this respect, the Communist Party is being enthroned (or made 
sacred) and thus becomes the ultimate reference point to which Chinese citizens 
(including party officials) are required to pledge their allegiance to. As Pye notes, “the 
absence of an unchallengeable code of ethics or a widely–held belief in otherworldly 
retribution sets the stage for a purely opportunistic calculus of behavior. The problem 
has been intensified with the decline in ideological faith in Communism and the 
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consequent weakening of the concept of socialist morality.”333  
In sum, the value of morality lies in its symbolic power for the Party to utilize in 
order to claim credit for its success in ruling China. Given the one-party system of the 
Chinese state and the absence of popular elections, besides bringing economic 
prosperity, Chinese leaders are also being appraised through their “moral standing” 
among the people. The Chinese saying, “if the leader is not upright, the subordinates 
will also be crooked” (shangliangbuzheng xialiangwai上梁不正下梁歪) dovetails well 
with how Chinese politics function: to legitimize their governance, Chinese leaders 
have to be perceived as being “morally good”, insofar as they represent the public face 
of the CCP and reflect the extent to which the Party and the nation are being viewed 
favorably by the outside world. Hence Frank Pieke argues that the CCP is being 
vested with a certain “sacredness and secret void at the heart of its rule that has to 
remain separate and untouched by the profane realities of ordinary politics.”334 The 
image of the party which the CCP seeks to project is that of a party which remains 
untainted by the immoral vagaries and vicissitudes of everyday politics, instead it is 
kept pure through a process of self-criticism and self-reflection, all these without 
without “expos[ing] the inner core of CCP politics to the gaze of ordinary people [thus] 
stripping the Party of the mystery and sacredness that have rendered its rule 
unquestionable and untouchable for so long.”335 
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Conclusion: Whither China’s National Image 
As my above analysis has shown, China’s national image remains largely 
problematic notwithstanding efforts made by Chinese leaders to remedy it through 
image-promotion efforts. Consequently, China’s political worldview remains 
unattractive to the outside world and is unlikely to be accepted by other countries. In 
the case of the Chinese dream, it is unclear how much Chinese citizens themselves 
identify with this dream. Furthermore, as Callahan observes, the “optimism of the 
China dream relies on the pessimism of the national humiliation nightmare… rather 
than being attractive and embracing difference, the China dream is part of a broad 
practice whereby identity is constituted by excluding difference.”336 The Sino-centric 
focus of the China dream also raises questions concerning the extent to which nations 
which do not subscribe to the Chinese worldview are being excluded, or worse, seen 
as hostile to China.  
Likewise, the leitmotifs of reforms and restraint propounded by Chinese leaders 
are not entirely convincing. For one, the reluctance by the Party to cede control of 
power severely limits the extent to which domestic reforms can be made; as Francis 
Fukuyama warns, “the very stability of institutions is also the very source of political 
decay…[as these] institutions fail to adapt to changing circumstances.”337 In its foreign 
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relations, particularly with Southeast Asian neighbors such as Vietnam, Philippines 
and Indonesia, China’s image has also been severely dented since 2009 as a result 
of territorial disputes. In the next chapter, I will examine how China’s self-image is 
being perceived by two of these countries, namely Indonesia and Vietnam.  
Finally the ritualistic character of Chinese society may yet afford Xi’s 
administration some leeway if reality falls below expectation (provided the necessary 
rituals are kept up). But given the increasing diversity and “restlessness” of China338, 
to what extent social transformation can be made without political reforms, even to the 
weakening of party power. As such, I argue that for China to improve its international 
image, more than just political rhetoric slogans are needed: China will be evaluated 
not by what it says, but by what it does, both domestically and internationally. In my 
view, this is not going to be easy. The biggest obstacle I argue lies in the highly 
particularized character of how China’s image-building is being convened: if Chinese 
leaders and scholars purport to represent the Chinese worldview as being utterly 
distinct from the West, then on what basis is it possible to validate the Chinese 
worldview as a model for other nations to follow, let alone in claiming global appeal 
(i.e. this is what all countries want). As the American political scientist David 
Shambaugh notes, China needs to go beyond making claims about its own 
uniqueness and to instead appeal to more universal standards. 339 For China to be 
seen as more than just “looking out for itself”, it would have to eminently demonstrate 
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that its approach to global governance display broader standards that are 
internationally valid. Consequently, for China’s image promotion to work, a less Sino-
centric way of seeing and relating with the world might be needed, particularly in its 
diplomatic relations with its closest neighbors. This may however compromise the 
authority of the CCP in portraying itself as the vanguard of Chinese rejuvenation 
efforts, particularly if a “desacralized” image of the party would to prevail.  
Relating this to Chinese exceptionalism, for Chinese leaders to project an 
image of China as being different and good, they would have to – paradoxically 
speaking – divest the party of its power, particularly those which purport to inhibit the 
operation of basic human rights, such as the freedom of worship and the ability to 
express one’s individual conscience with regards to sensitive issues without fear of 
political persecution or party purge. Hence to do so, there is a need to harness the 
energies and dynamism of a far more diverse and politically-heterogeneous population 
of people, both home and outside China, and beyond party prescriptions. This identity 
dilemma (as earlier discussed in Chapter 3) is something Chinese leaders would have 
to wrestle with if China’s global influence is to be positively perceived and sufficiently 
attractive for international emulation.  
  
	   170	  
 
Chapter 5 
The Belt and Road Initiative and China’s Quest for Global Greatness 
In 2013, China proposed the establishment of a Silk Road Economic Belt and 
a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. Among the objectives, the Silk Road Economic Belt 
was focused on promoting the development of China’s Western territories, spanning 
a region from Central Asia to Europe while the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road served 
to promote economic cooperation within major maritime regions and links between 
coastal regions. Termed as the One Belt One Road (OBOR), it was later renamed the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2016340, and was said to enable China to strengthen 
its relations with countries around the world while also shouldering greater 
responsibilities and obligations to others.341 
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 As noted in Chapter 4, China wants to promote a favorable national image to 
the outside world and for its political worldview to be accepted by others. As such, the 
Belt and Road Initiative represents a key center piece of China’s international outreach 
strategy and to articulate its preferences towards global order. This was vividly 
demonstrated by the speeches made by Chinese leaders, led by President Xi Jinping, 
all touting the benefits and opportunities that the Belt and Road Initiative would bring 
about, not just to China, but to countries all throughout the world that were connected 
with it.342 In addition, scores of Chinese scholars and commentators had attempted to 
articulate the finer aspects of what the Belt and Road Initiative entailed. For instance, 
results of a simple search on the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) 
database—currently the largest and most comprehensive of its kind on Chinese 
journals and periodicals, through the liberal arts/history/philosophy, politics/military 
affairs/law and education/comprehensive social sciences sections of CNKI journals 
and periodicals in 2014 (1 Jan to 31 December) showed 1,002 papers featuring the 
phrase yidaiyilu (“one belt one road”) in their titles. The same search for subsequent 
years (i.e. 2015, 2016 and 2017) saw a tremendous increase in the Belt and Road 
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Initiative with 12,780，13,628 and 22,892 articles found respectively.343 While not all 
these papers or newspaper articles were directly relevant to China’s international 
politics or had to do with its foreign relations, the fact that the Belt and Road Initiative 
had garnered much popularity within Chinese intellectual circles suggested the extent 
of interest among Chinese observers and scholarly interlocutors. As clear evidence of 
the importance that the Belt and Road Initiative wields in Chinese political circles, a 
Belt Road Forum was held in May 2017 in Beijing which saw 28 other heads of state 
and representatives from more than 130 countries and 70 international organizations 
with the stated purpose of building "a more open and efficient international cooperation 
platform, a closer, stronger partnership network, and to push for a more just, 
reasonable and balanced international governance system.”344 
  What do all these developments mean, and how should we understand the Belt 
and Road Initiative from an international relations perspective? How does the Belt and 
Road Initiative reflect China’s vision concerning international order and Chinese 
preferences on the rules and norms underlining international relations? What kind of 
political worldview is being envisaged and expounded through the Belt and Road 
Initiative? What does it tell us about the way China perceives the present configuration 
of global power, and the future arrangement of global political order? In relating to my 
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study of China’s political worldview and its claims to exceptionalism, what does the 
Belt and Road Initiative tell us about the manner in which China perceives its own 
initiative as being good and different from existing initiatives and institutions, 
particularly those which are Western-led? As discussed in earlier chapters, many 
countries look to China for economic opportunities and consequently, the Belt and 
Road Initiative can be said to function as an instrument of Chinese economic 
statecraft, so as to allow Beijing to extend its global influence.   
The chapter will proceed as follows. Firstly, I will discuss the importance of 
economic statecraft to China’s global diplomacy and public image, in particular the 
extent to which economics is being understood as a form of Chinese soft power and 
as a means of procuring political influence. Next, I will go on to analyze both official 
and unofficial sources proffered by Chinese international relations scholars on the Belt 
and Road Initiative and to examine how it is being understood within the broader 
worldview characterizing China’s foreign policy and international relations. To this end, 
I argue that the Belt and Road Initiative represents an ambitious attempt at economic 
statecraft with the objective of entrenching and promoting China’s geopolitical 
influence abroad, as well as preserve the Communist Party legitimacy of ruling China 
domestically.  I then go on to relate these ideas to the study of Chinese exceptionalism 
and to examine the degree to which these ideas – carried along by the Belt and Road 
Initiative - attempt to portray China as a good and different power compared to the 
West. Through a study of the discourse emanating in Chinese scholarly circles about 
the Belt and Road Initiative, this chapter hopes to provide important clues as to how 
China – in its quest for global greatness – seeks to challenge the existing international 
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system in place, and the associated set of ideas it purports to promulgate within its 
own theatres of influence.  
 
Economic statecraft and Chinese political influence 
 According to existing studies of Chinese economic statecraft, Chinese leaders 
have been highly adept in perusing economic tools in promoting its own national 
objectives, particularly in those which it perceives as core national interests.345 This is 
certainly not unique to China, countries all over the world have in varying degrees 
utilized economic statecraft in pursuing their political objectives. According to Baldwin, 
economic measures are particularly useful in helping states gain political influence for 
they are “likely to exert more pressure than either diplomacy or propaganda, and are 
less likely to evoke a violent response than military instruments.”346 In this respect, we 
might echo what Huntington has posited, “[in] that economic activity is probably the 
most important source of power…in a world in which military conflict between major 
states is unlikely [and] economic power will be increasingly important in determining 
                                                   
345 See for instance, Norris, William J. Chinese Economic Statecraft : Commercial 
Actors, Grand Strategy, and State Control. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016; 
Zhang, Shuxiu. Chinese Economic Diplomacy : Decision-making Actors and 
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the primacy or subordination of states.”347 Seen this way, if we take economic relations 
between states – not as a dispassionate realm of economic activity (concerned purely 
with profit) – but as a derivative of wider geopolitical interests and calculations, then 
the political character of economic statecraft cannot be ignored.  
 From this, I argue that in the case of China, the Belt and Road Initiative 
represents a grand strategy through economic means348; hence, economic power is 
seen as a means of generating greater political influence among the countries Beijing 
seeks to win over into its camp. From this, I argue that the goal of economic initiatives 
(like the BRI) is linked to how Chinese leaders seek to present and project Beijing’s 
worldview to others and to ultimately achieve China’s foreign policy and domestic 
goals. This “selling” of Beijing’s worldview is also closely linked to how Chinese soft 
power is being conceptualized and operationalized. While Western iterations of soft 
power tend to emphasize the non-coercive aspect of soft power, and thus the stress 
on culture and values as instruments of soft power, 349  such a distinction as to whether 
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economics ought to be seen as “hard” or “soft power” is less clear cut in China. 
According to one study, Chinese discourse concerning soft power is frequently 
expressed within its domestic context and towards domestic objectives, and also 
involves touting the economic success of China’s development model.350 Such a 
narrative suggests that in the Chinese mind, economic resources can be used as a 
source of soft power as it also allows China to evidence its political model and 
worldview to the outside world, thus rendering Beijing a model for others to emulate. 
For instance, it was observed that the “success story of China’s own economy make 
China cultural merits self-evident…[and] a prime opportunity to expand its cultural 
influence.”351 This was further evidenced through interviews with various Chinese 
scholars who also observed the highly fluid nature of soft power and its relevance to 
economic sphere in China.352  
From the above, I argue that economic activity in China is not purely restricted 
to the economic sphere, but intermeshes with geopolitical objectives. Indeed studies 
in Chinese business fields have noted the pervasive influence of politics in the 
economic sphere353 while the practice of Chinese politics, as one Chinese scholar 
                                                   
350 Li, Mingjiang. "China Debates Soft Power." Chinese Journal of International 
Politics 2, no. 2 (2008): 287-308. 
351 Ibid., 292.  
352 Interviews conducted in Beijing and Guangzhou, 2017 and 2018 respectively.  
353 Wank, David L. Commodifying Communism : Business, Trust, and Politics in a 
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recounted, is subjected to monetary forces.354 According to one study, the biggest 
Chinese enterprises which account for most of the Chinese companies on the Fortune 
Global 500 list of the world’s largest companies also dominate the strategic sectors of 
the Chinese economy. The leaders of the 53 largest companies, “national champions” 
as they are called, are not being appointed by the State-Owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission (SASAC), but rather by the Party’s Organization 
Department. “They are part of the Party’s nomenklatura system and are cadres ranked 
at vice ministerial level. This means many business executives are subject to cadre 
rotation and are moved to take up government or Party positions…The renewed 
emphasis on cross appointment and on the role of Party organizations in SOEs 
indicates that the CCP’s current policy is to strengthen rather than weaken its control 
over SOEs.”355 
 From the above discussion, we can surmise the following: one, that Chinese 
economic power and Chinese geopolitical objectives go hand-in-hand with the former 
representing a means to achieve the objectives of the latter, and two, Chinese 
economic activities are used to generate political influence, regardless whether such 
                                                   
Erik. "Politics and Business Group Formation in China: The Party in Control?" The 
China Quarterly 211 (2012): 624-48. 
354 Interview with Renmin University professor, 13 June 2017, Beijing, China.  
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March 5, 2018,  
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influence take on the form of soft or hard power. In other words, China perceives its 
utilization of economic statecraft as a legitimate means with which to substantiate its 
exceptionalism claims, and that its economic influence allows Beijing to claim that its 
approach to global economic governance is good and different compared to Western 
economic practices and norms. In the following, I will analyze how this sense of 
exceptionalism, and its broader political worldview is being reflected in the discourse 
surrounding the Belt and Road Initiative among Chinese scholars and the type of 
international order that is being envisaged amidst China’s growing global influence. 
Notwithstanding the expansive variety of topics that permeate discussions of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, Chinese international relations scholars in their writings, have tend 
to train their focus on three areas: (I) rules of the international system, (II) competition 
for regional influence, and (III) China’s own internal-domestic affairs and its 
responsibility towards its own people. Taken together, these three themes provide 
important hints as to how Chinese thinkers conceptualize the Belt and Road Initiative 
as a platform for China to highlight its sense of exceptionalism and consequently how 
this seeks to portray China as both different and good.  
 
Chinese discourse of the Belt and Road Initiative 
 
(I)   Challenging the Rules of the International System 
This need to call into question the existing rules of the international system 
represents a key starting point of how the Belt and Road Initiative is being 
conceptualized by Chinese thinkers. In this respect, the ideas of Chinese philosopher 
Zhao Tingyang (whose thoughts on international relations we have discussed in 
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Chapter 2) are useful for our understanding towards how Chinese thinkers consider 
the existing rules of the international system. In an article entitled “New Game Expects 
New System” (xinyouxi xuyao xintixi 新游戏需要新体系) Zhao cited globalization as 
having ushered new political conditions and political issues which requires states to 
fundamentally alter the manner in which they approach the practice of international 
relations. 356 In Zhao’s mind, the pursuit of national interests and modern political 
thinking within a Western paradigm was a zero-sum game in which countries struggle 
for power to dominate and compete for hegemony thus resulting in “suspicious and 
irrational anticipations, which are, ironically, based upon the modern rational 
analysis.”357 Instead countries of the world ought to forge closer interdependency with 
each other whereby all nations are involved in “reciprocal interrelations” with one 
another, or as his all-under-heaven (Tianxia) system puts it, “an all-inclusive and all-
compatible system for the world.”358 Seen this way, we might say that in Zhao’s 
thinking, the rules of the existing international system do not cohere with the changed 
reality of the world (brought about by globalization) and thus the need for a new system 
of political arrangements. While Zhao’s worldview is highly problematic (as I analyzed 
in Chapter 2), they reflect a common ideological thread permeating the thinking among 
Chinese IR scholars, that is, the widely-held perception that the norms and governing 
                                                   
356 Zhao, Tingyang. “Xinyouxi xuyao xintixi” [New Game Expects New System]. Guoji 
anquan yanjiu [Journal of International Security Studies] 1 (2015), 4-14.  
357 Ibid., 6.  
358 Ibid., 13.  
	   180	  
principles of the post-World War 2 international system are deeply flawed, and thus in 
need of a change.359   
To this end, other Chinese scholars thus propose the need for deepened 
interaction between China and the world, and thus perceive the Belt and Road 
Initiative as a means to achieve that end. For instance, Xing argued that the Silk Road 
has traditionally been an icon of Chinese history and culture and thus possess much 
significance and value. Given economic globalization, it was said that “China will 
reshape cultural and economic exchange in a civilized, modern, and convenient 
manner to create a friendly atmosphere in Eurasia as a whole.”360 Similarly the Belt 
and Road Initiative was also perceived as allowing China to actively shape its external 
environment, and through deepened cooperation with other countries, to allow China 
to further integrate itself with the wider world. As observed, “it will create a new 
situation, an all-around opening up, that will further the global interaction and 
exchange of China and the entire Asia-Europe-Africa region.”361 Zheng Yongnian also 
                                                   
359 This is a common refrain among many Chinese scholars and policy interlocutors 
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360 Xing, Guangcheng. “Lijie zhongguo xiandai sidiao zhilu zhanlue” [Understanding 
China’s Modern Silkroad Strategy]. Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and 
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wrote that the Belt and Road Initiative was primarily designed so as to allow China to 
play a leading role in international development, and to promote a global economy 
with the participation of other countries within such an arrangement. Hence, both 
China and international society were seen to be in need of globalization, and to this 
end, the objectives pursued by China and the wider world are seen to be synonymous 
with one another.362 Zhao Kejin, the deputy director of Tsinghua’s University Center of 
U.S.- China relations observed the Belt and Road Initiative as China’s response to 
“international anarchy” (guoji wuzhengfu zhuangtai 国际无政府状态)and at its core 
sought to transcend “the international system and international order” so as to forge a 
more just and equitable world order.363 Similarly, another Beijing-based scholar Zhong 
Feiteng also argued that the Belt and Road Initiative would allow China to “transcend 
Western centralism” (chaoyue xifang zhongxin zhuyi 超越西方中心主义)and thus to 
provide a novel model of development that is not dependent on a “limited Western 
                                                   
362 Zheng, Yongnian. “Yidaiyilu yu guojijingji guize de shuxie” [One Belt One Road 
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posture of fixed thinking” (bushou xifang guhua siwei yueshu de zitai 不受西方固化思
维约束的姿态).364 
From the above observations, I argue that the Belt and Road Initiative – in the 
eyes of Chinese political scientists – is not simply an economic endeavor, but presents 
a form of grand strategy for the Chinese state to achieve its strategic interests. 
According to one study of Chinese economic statecraft, economic tools of national 
power presented a particularly attractive lever for China to use to attain its foreign 
policy strategic objectives for several reasons: (I) its exercise need not be as obvious, 
threatening or as dislocating as military or diplomatic power can be; (II) relying on 
economic power limits the domestic bureaucratic influence of military-related political 
interests; (III) it offers the possibility of attracting partners with a win-win mentality thus 
assuaging regional concerns over a growing China, and (IV) the possibility that China 
can realize its economic growth objectives while pursuing its foreign policy goals (to 
the extent the two are complementary).365  Beyond achieving its strategic objectives, 
the Belt and Road Initiative – I argue – represents also a challenge to the rules and 
norms that of the international system that is traditionally associated with the Western 
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liberal order.366 Indeed this point was made by a number of Chinese interlocutors I 
spoke to in the course of my fieldwork in which it was perceived that the Western-led 
order – as a result of 2008-09 financial crisis – was delegitimized as being universally 
valid, thus offering an opportunity for China to articulate its ideas concerning how 
global governance ought to be like.367 In this respect, we might say that in the eyes of 
Chinese scholars, political order and economic order are interrelated in which the 
success of the latter to some extent legitimizes the practice of the former. Seen this 
way, the Belt and Road Initiative was seen as an opportunity to showcase Beijing’s 
vision of global governance and to put forth its suggestions as to what such a political 
order ought to entail.  
To this end, the domestic problems faced by the United States in the past 
decade were perceived by Chinese scholars to present the ideal opportunity for China 
to stake its claim to global leadership, to promote its worldview and its claims to 
exceptionalism. American international image – as a result of its global war on terror 
                                                   
366 For a discussion of China’s challenge to the rules-based international order, see 
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and the economic crisis – was seen to have taken a battering, thus presenting China 
with favorable circumstances with which to portray its leadership as being good and 
different. As Zheng Yongnian wrote, “the United States is currently undergoing a 
period of adjustment, once it readjusts, it will come out (zai chufa 再出发). From this 
vantage point, to the Chinese, this undoubtedly is an opportunity. However it should 
be emphasized that this is not a simple case of American decline and thus an 
opportunity to write the rules, but rather a process to explore what a different set of 
rules might entail.”368 In my view, this articulation of difference is crucial to how the 
Belt and Road Initiative is being positioned as: an opportunity to offer the world an 
alternative source of global governance and to subscribe to the rules associated with 
such a form of governance.369  
 
(II)   Competition for Regional Influence 
As will be discussed in Chapter Six, Sino-America competition for influence can 
be most pervasively felt within the Southeast Asia region whereby both countries were 
significantly invested (both economic and military). While security issues continue to 
frame and dominate the discourse of Sino-American relationship, economic issues 
have taken center stage of late as witnessed by the ongoing trade war as of writing 
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between both countries. Seen this way, the Belt and Road Initiative represents not 
only a challenge to the rules of the international system, but at the same time, a 
competition for regional influence, that is, which country is perceived to be good and 
better in delivering difference (measured in economic growth) to other countries in the 
region.  
As such, the Belt and Road Initiative was seen to proffering China with several 
advantages in cultivating positive influence among the countries that it comes into 
contact with. According to one comparative study of China and American economic 
relations in the Asia-Pacific and Eurasia, the US strategy primarily was one that  
focused on regional security while China was focused on regional economics. As the 
authors put it, “the economic relationship between China and countries along the belt 
is like one of fish and water, whereas the relationship between the United States and 
these countries is more like one of oil and water.”370 Indeed, the presence of the United 
States was seen to be the main reason that China’s global influence was being 
impeded. One Chinese scholar puts it bluntly, “if the United States did not exist on the 
planet, the rise of China basically would have been realized. In large part, the United 
States intends its strategy of rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region to counter the 
rise of China. In turn, the Chinese government introduced the One-Belt-One-Road 
Initiative, in part, to offset the unfavorable impact that the US rebalancing strategy may 
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impose on China.” 371 At the same time, it was recognized that many of China’s 
neighboring countries continue to distrust it (for various reasons), and had adopted a 
strategy of depending on Beijing for their economic needs while looking to the US for 
security.372  
According to Shi Yinhong, Chinese leaders usage of military hard power since 
the 18th national congress in 2012 had eroded its international soft power, thus 
resulting in a danger of “strategic overreach” (zhanlue touzhi 战略透支 ) and 
consequently the danger of being overstretched in its political commitments and 
material resources.373 To avoid such pitfalls, Shi suggested that Chinese leaders 
ought to emphasize that the security, prosperity and development of its neighbors 
were synonymous with China’s own and to also win trust among the governments and 
people of those countries. Shi added that “Chinese leaders must be careful not [to] 
give the impression that they consider their help to other countries as charity. China 
must neither play the role of big brother to other countries nor rush to scramble for 
benefits at the sacrifice of justice…The One-Belt-One-Road Initiative should be 
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understood as an undertaking of both China and the international community. Instead 
of just trying to predict what countries along the One-Belt-One-Road Initiative route 
need, China should make direct enquiries…By assuming that other countries along 
the One-Belt-One-Road Initiative route accept all facets of its initiatives, China could 
ignore the complex and unique conditions of other countries or fail to see conflicts in 
policy and strategy. If it does not take all of these issues into considerations, China 
risks repeating universalistic Western practices that it has repeatedly criticize.”374   
This competition for regional influence was also emphasized in Central Asia, 
this time involving not only the United States, but also Russia. As such, the Belt and 
Road Initiative proffered China with the opportunity to distinguish itself from the two 
other superpowers, and more importantly, to demonstrate that its conceptualization 
towards geopolitical matters was better than others. For instance, it was suggested 
that the United States had largely viewed Central Asia as a region that is  “full of danger” 
(weixian zhongzhong zhidi 危险重重之地) and “difficult to tame” (nanyi xunfu 难以驯
服) whereas Russia had perceived the region as its “soft underbelly” (ruan fubu 软腹
部 ) and under its “sphere of influence” (shili fanwei 势力范围 ). In contrast, China was 
said to view Central Asia as “among the sources of human civilization” (renlei wenming 
de fayuan zhidi 人类文明的发源地之一) and the “central of the world which potential 
has yet to be realized” (qianli shangwei dedao chongfen wajue de shijie zhongxin 潜
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力尚未得到充分挖掘的世界中心). 375 Hence, it was said that while the policies of the 
US were aimed at getting countries in Central Asia to adopt the Western model of 
development and Russia was pushing for policies that would integrate these countries 
within Russia’s own geopolitical orbit, the Chinese approach was to respect the 
national sovereignty of these countries and promote mutual “beneficial cooperation” 
(huli hezuo 互利合作). 376  
As the story goes, Chinese influence was being portrayed as benign that was 
sharply contrasted with the influence of other major powers. To this end, I argue that 
in the minds of Chinese thinkers, bringing economic development was sufficient to 
legitimize Chinese initiatives as being good and better than Western alternatives. In 
this respect, it would seem that what was assumed is that countries in the region 
ultimately desired economic prosperity and that China was well-placed to meet those 
needs through the Belt and Road Initiative. According to Zhang Yunling, who heads 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Belt and Road Initiative represented a 
certain spirit (jingshen 精神) whereby China would peacefully engage with the outside 
word in achieving a win-win outcome. It was further pointed out that China’s rapid 
economic development had made it to become the main market for its neighboring 
countries. This expansion of economic development was said to be the “highest 
common factor” (zuida gongyueshu 最大公约数) in deepening relations between 
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between China and its neighbors, and allowing for a rich and dynamic process of 
interaction. 377 Furthermore, the practice of public diplomacy (gonggong waijiao 公共
外交)to generate political influence was primarily achieved through economic and 
financial means, according to one recent commissioned study.378 Seen this way, the 
Belt and Road Initiative – I argue – can be said to allow China to showcase its 
superiority compared to the West and in by doing so, to effect a shift of regional 
influence in which countries that are traditionally supportive of Western objectives 
perceive their national interests more in tune with Beijing’s. This sense of 
eschatological inevitability and Chinese exceptionalism – that a Chinese-led future is 
both certain and better – pervades the message of the Belt and Road Initiative as 
being China’s grand contribution to the world.   
 
(III)   China’s domestic environment and responsibility to its people 
While the earlier two points reflected a confident Chinese posture to the world, 
Chinese leaders and scholars nonetheless frequently lament the problems that China 
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continues to face domestically due to its size and population.379 According to Fu Ying, 
who chairs the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress, China’s 
magnitude belies its actual strength as it was still learning how to become a global 
player: 
“On numerous occasions, American and Europeans have asked China to play 
a leading role with regard to international affairs. Leading role, to the ears of 
the Chinese, is an almost alien phrase. It will take time for us to master the 
steps necessary to waltz gracefully across the global stage. Domestically, we 
have our own issues and challenges to resolve, which demand our focused 
attention.”380  
 This reference to domestic conditions in somewhat inhibiting China’s ability and 
willingness to play a more active role in international politics may at first glance, seem 
to contradict the earlier discussion of China’s intention to challenge the rules of the 
international system as well to compete with the United States for regional, if not 
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global, influence. To this end, I argue the Belt and Road Initiative represents an 
important conduit for China to utilize in legitimizing its overseas forays in response to 
domestic demands. According to the prominent Chinese economist Justin Lin, the Belt 
and Road Initiative showcased China’s new opening-up strategy in response to the 
changed domestic and international circumstances. As such, it would provide China 
with a sounder market economic system thus further its development into a high 
income country, in addition to facilitating the industrialization and modernization of 
other developing countries.381 Renmin University professor Wang Yiwei also argued 
of the “Sinicization of globalization” (zhongguohua de quanqiuhua 中国化的全球化) , 
and that the Belt and Road Initiative was not just about encouraging Chinese 
companies to head out, but rather to allow “China itself to head out” (rang zhongguo 
de difang zouchuqu 让中国的地方走出去)so as to enable China to built and deepen 
its relations with the world. 382 From this vantage point, Wang’s contention was that 
the Belt and Road Initiative represented an effort to marry together both the  
“sinicization of globalization”（zhongguohua de quanqiuhua 中国化的全球化） and 
“China’s own globalization” (zhongguo de quanqiuhua 中国的全球化)383 with the 
resulting effect not unlike Zhao Tingyang’s earlier proposal of an all-under-heaven 
system. Similarly, Zhao Kejin also explained that the success of the Belt and Road 
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Initiative would not be dependent on the responses of the countries along the belt and 
road, but rather on the assessment of the sustainability of the funding that would be 
contributed by Chinese stakeholders. Zhao observed that in the short run, it was 
unlikely that the Belt and Road Initiative would bear much fruit given the volatility and 
uncertainty of the domestic conditions among the recipient countries. Nevertheless, it 
was said that once the basic infrastructure was being set up, then the Belt and Road 
Initiative – in the medium to long term – would proffer China with much “spillover 
effects” (yichu xiaoying 溢出效应) . Given this, Chinese companies ought to continue 
to persist in doing “loss-making” transactions (赔钱买卖) as the other “derived benefits” 
(yansheng shouyi 衍生受益) would be well worth the money spent.384 
 From the above Chinese narratives, I argue that the Belt and Road Initiative 
was conceptualized with an acute awareness of China’s own domestic conditions, and 
consequently, also reflect China’s own domestic priorities and concerns. To speak of 
China’s going out (zouchuqu 走出去), one needs to take into account the Chinese 
actors at work, and the domestic interests that these actors represent. According to 
Norris, China today defines its strategic security interests in maintaining the 
Communist Party’s control of power. To do so however, requires continued economic 
growth which in turn requires raw inputs, especially energy inputs. 385  For instance, in 
a study of the “going out” activities of the China National Petroleum Corporation, it was 
observed that the original impetus to go abroad was primarily driven by commercial 
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factors, and without prior government approval. However, given the difficulty of 
working with certain unsavory regimes where oil reserves were still available, the 
Chinese authorities sought to re-establish control over these activities of its 
commercial actors but only after much struggle.386  
To what extent then is the Belt and Road Initiative an instrument of state control, 
and what are the effects of the Belt and Road Initiative in benefitting ordinary Chinese 
citizens? According to one Chinese scholar, there are six domestic relationships that 
would determine the success or failure of the Belt and Road Initiative. These are: 
relations between the Chinese government and business enterprises, relations 
between the central government and provincial governments, relations between the 
historical and contemporary conceptions of the Silk Road Belt, relations between 
financial and non financial institutions, relations between utilizing comparative 
advantage and the development of new comparative advantages, and relations 
between institutional cooperation and non-institutional cooperation. 387  Indeed, the 
degree to which the Chinese state is able to exercise control over commercial and 
economic activity – while maintaining the profitability and dynamism of these 
enterprises – is a subject of considerable debate, and beyond the scope of this chapter 
to answer. Seen this way, it was also unclear whether the Belt and Road Initiative 
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would bring about the economic prosperity that is being talked about by Chinese 
leaders, or would it exacerbate existing economic inequalities within Chinese society.  
To this end, Chinese IR scholars were relatively more guarded in their 
assessment of the Belt and Road Initiative vis-à-vis the improvement of domestic 
conditions. The common refrain among Chinese scholars is that China had enough 
problems of her own and thus possessed little appetite to shoulder the problems of 
the wider world. According to Zhao Kejin, Chinese leaders have their hands full with 
domestic problems, and are generally contented to be “number 2 in the world and to 
let the United States bear the load of providing public goods to the rest of the world.” 
388  While American scholars like David Shambaugh criticize such reasoning as 
indicative of China being a “selfish power”389 it also mitigates the extent to which China 
– through the Belt and Road Initiative – will be able to generate positive influence 
among its neighbors, particularly if a slowing Chinese economy imposes limitations on 
Beijing’s economic statecraft. Indeed, if “China’s ambition is not to surpass the United 
States but to look after its own people”390 – as former Singapore foreign minister 
George Yeo puts it – then one should be cautious and not overstate the degree to 
which the Belt and Road Initiative can truly represent a unique Chinese economic 
proposal to the wider world. Relating to Chinese exceptionalism, I argue that domestic 
conditions are likely –  in the long run – to dampen over exuberant claims of China’s 
                                                   
388 Speech made at the RSIS-CSIS conference on China’s public diplomacy, June 
27, 2018, Singapore.  
389 Personal interview, April 10, 2017, Singapore.  
390 Email interview, June 10, 2015.  
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economic leadership and global influence. Indeed some Chinese scholars have voiced 
concerns that other countries were overly dependent on Chinese economic resources 
and were not prepared to contribute an equitable share of their own developments 
needs.391  
 
The Belt and Road Initiative and Chinese exceptionalism 
 I provided in the preceding paragraphs a non-exhaustive excursion of Chinese 
discourse over the Belt and Road Initiative insofar as they were being spoken about 
by Chinese IR scholars. While Chinese scholars generally eschewed using the term 
exceptionalism (liwailun or teshulun 例外论 ／特殊论) in academic discourse, many of 
them nevertheless do insist on the existence of “Chinese characteristics” 
(zhongguotese 中国特色) in their exegesis of China’s international politics, believing 
that these characteristics presented a unique Chinese model and contribution that was 
substantially distinct from Western political configuration.392 Seen this way, Chinese 
characteristics were seen to be unique and hence, exceptional, to the degree that they 
proffer the Chinese state with the means of justifying Chinese initiatives as being “non-
Western” and thus necessarily good and better than those of Western origins. This is 
where the contribution of the Belt and Road Initiative comes in. While Chinese scholars 
                                                   
391 See for instance the series on essays on the topic of “Yidaiyilu de qianzai 
fengxian” [Inherent risks in the One-Belt-One-Road] in Li, Yining, Yifu Lin and 
Yongnian Zheng, eds., Dudong Yidaiyilu [Understand the One-Belt-One-Road]. 
Beijing: Zhongxin chuban jituan [ChinaCiticPress], 2015, pp.279-299.  
392 Interviews with Chinese scholars in 2017 and 2018.  
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generally did not go so far as to claim the Belt and Road Initiative as being utterly of 
Chinese-origin, many of them do insist that the Belt and Road Initiative provide a more 
equitable outcome between China and other countries compared to Western initiatives. 
As argued earlier, the utilization of economic initiatives in order to generate economic 
influence and in turn validating China’s global prominence is central to understanding 
the strategic consideration behind the Belt and Road Initiative. To this end, the Belt 
and Road Initiative can be said to confer China with the opportunity in presenting itself 
as a non-hegemonic power, and that it harbored no ill-will or intentions to interfere in 
the domestic affairs of countries it comes to contact with. Hence Chinese scholars 
frequently emphasized the need for mutual respect and trust in how the Belt and Road 
initiatives ought to be conducted. As Chinese economist Li Yining observed, “China 
wants to cooperate better with countries along the Belt, and to understand them, this 
is very important, all countries have to offer mutual trust and sincerity, and the One-
Belt-One-Road would certainly succeed.”393 In my view, such an argument was borne 
out of the belief and perception that Western economic initiatives were fundamentally 
hegemonic, and inherently bad in character, as they sought to entrench Western 
strategic interests. In contrast, Chinese economic initiatives were frequently touted as 
non-hegemonic, as they allowed countries to preserve their domestic political 
autonomy and thus were said to be inherently good. 
                                                   
393 Li, Yining. “Yidaiyilu wei zhongguo jingji dailai zhongyao zengzhang dongli” [One-
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 But how true is this in practice, and how do existing examples of Chinese 
economic initiatives bear out this non-interference principle of China’s foreign policy? 
Current debate over Chinese economic investments in Sri Lanka and Malaysia, to 
speak of two examples, suggest that the Chinese state remain considerably active, if 
not coercive, in employing economic initiatives to achieve geopolitical goals, even if 
these run against the political autonomy of states in concern. 394 Indeed, there are 
concerns that countries who are economically overly dependent on China run the risk 
of being caught in a “debtbook diplomacy” whereby China extends loans to developing 
countries who are unable to repay these loans, and thus having to give up strategic 
assets in exchange to Beijing.395 A bigger issue at stake here – I argue – is the 
question as to whether China is able to articulate a new set of rules – through the Belt 
                                                   
394 See for instance, Lim, Darren, and Rohan Mukherjee. "Does Debt Pay? China 
and the Politics of Investment in Sri Lanka." The Diplomat, January 20, 2018, 
https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/does-debt-pay-china-and-the-politics-of-investment-
in-sri-lanka/ (retrieved February 27, 2019); Lim, Guanie. "China's Investments in 
Malaysia: Choosing the "Right" Partners." International Journal of China Studies 6, 
no. 1 (2015): 1-30. 
395 Parker, Sam, and Gabrielle Chefitz. Debtbook Diplomacy: China’s Strategic 
Leveraging of its Newfound Economic Influence and the Consequences for U.S. 
Foreign Policy. Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 
2018, 
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Debtbook%20Diploma
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and Road Initiative – as evidence of its claim to be good and better than the West 
which it criticizes. To this end, Chinese scholars’ treatment of globalization as being a 
new global reality in which China – through its Belt and Road Initiative – is well-placed 
to respond to compared to the Western liberal system which was seen as being 
inadequate to meet the challenges of globalization. 396   Indeed Zhao Tingyang’s 
sweeping claim that a new game required a new system is reflective of such thinking 
among the Chinese intelligentsia notwithstanding disagreement over what the 
attributes of such a system might actually be.397  
 In addition, the competition for regional influence was most vividly seen in 
China’s depiction of its relations with its neighbors – particularly smaller countries in 
Southeast Asia – as being “a partnership of good neighborliness and mutual trust” 
                                                   
396 See for instance, Yan, Xuetong. “Yan Xuetong: Xifang gainian yi wufa yongyu lijie 
xianjin guojiguanxi” [Yan Xuetong: Western thinking no longer can be used to 
understand modern international relations]. Pengpai [The Paper], July 4, 2018, 
https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_2239041 (retrieved July 6, 2018).    
397 Some Chinese scholars I spoke to were uncomfortable with the idea that China 
would play a leading role in such a system, although the majority critiqued the 
existing international system as being problematic and in need of reform. At the 
same time, there was a tacit acknowledgement that China was an influential player 
and that its preferences and interests needed to be reflected, or at the very least, 
acknowledged in international affairs.  
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(mulinhuxin de huoban guanxi 睦邻互信的伙伴关系).398 This was premised on two 
assumptions: one, that China’s economic power is seen as proffering Beijing with 
political influence over its neighbors, and two, that its neighbors have little choice, but 
to align themselves with Beijing if they are to prosper economically. Both of these 
assumptions are problematic to begin with. While China’s economic might does allow 
it to some extent in advancing its strategic objectives, effecting actual political 
influence among elites remain largely limited. To this end, I argue that Chinese 
conceptions of soft power (through the utilization of economic initiatives) are highly 
problematic. This is because economic influence alone is unable to generate the 
sustaining effect that would result in political goodwill and attraction to the Chinese 
worldview. For instance, Chinese efforts to use financial diplomacy in its relations with 
Malaysia had provoked criticism that these projects increased Malaysia’s 
indebtedness while advancing China’s strategic interests. Also, the lack of sensitivity 
to Malaysia’s domestic context on the part of Chinese companies and the Chinese 
embassy had also undercut the efficacy of Beijing’s public diplomacy overtures.  
Furthermore, while Beijing possessed outsized influence in setting terms for its 
economic deals, it was uncertain how much real concessions it has won from Malaysia 
                                                   
398 Liu, Mei Ping. Yidaiyilu de lilun yuju yu jianshe fanglue yanjiu [A Study of the 
Theoretical Basis and Construction Strategy of the One-Belt-One-Road]. Henan: 
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leaders.399 This suggested that economic power alone was insufficient to persuade 
countries of China’s claim of its benign intentions and that it was different and good.  
In the same way, I argue that China’s neighbors are not without choices or 
options in who they seek to engage with to maximize their geostrategic objectives. 
This is particularly important to our understanding of how Chinese exceptionalism is 
being framed in Beijing’s geopolitical strategy. Indeed the idea that China is good and 
different and countries in the region ought to align their choices and preferences with 
Beijing if they are to prosper is a frequent refrain in China’s diplomatic overtures. 
According to former Singapore top diplomat Bilahari Kausikan, the Chinese state – in 
their public diplomacy – often made use of coercion techniques to “create a 
psychological environment which poses false choices for other countries…This 
technique of forcing false choices on you and making you choose between false 
choices is deployed within a framework of either overarching narratives or specific 
narratives… The purpose is to narrow the scope of choices and they are usually 
presented in binary terms.”400 To what extent then, are countries in Southeast Asia 
are then beholden to China in achieving their own domestic objectives? According 
to Evelyn Goh, in a study of China’s influence in Southeast Asia, countries in the region 
                                                   
399 See Custer et al., Ties that Bind: Quantifying China’s public diplomacy and its 
“good neighbor” effect, p.23.  
400 Wai, Albert. “S’pore should guard against false binary choices in Chinese public 
diplomacy: Bilahari Kausikan.” Todayonline, June 27, 2018, 
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possessed considerable ability in negotiating with Beijing.  As observed, “China’s 
record of influence is mixed, and often unsuccessful, in persuading, inducing or 
coercing developing Asian states to do what they do not want to do.” 401 From this 
vantage point, we can surmise that Chinese influence is not a one-way street as 
countries seek to maximize their gains from working with China while simultaneously 
ensure they do not compromise on more fundamental national interests such as 
territory or political autonomy.  
Moreover, the ability of China’s economy to generate a sustained economic 
presence – vis-à-vis Belt and Road initiatives – should not be taken for granted. This 
is particularly so if the Chinese economy in the coming years faces structural 
limitations to its growth and starts to slow down, thus impacting the extent of China’s 
overseas forays. Also, the domestic conditions of recipient countries can also pose a 
challenge to Chinese economic statecraft. Indeed, Chinese scholars I spoke to also 
expressed caution against Chinese risk-taking behavior in their economic endeavors, 
particularly in countries where insufficient attention had been paid to matters of 
domestic governance as this was seen as posing long-term challenges and threats to 
China’s presence on the ground. 402  As earlier mentioned, China’s foreign aid 
frequently saw Beijing charging much higher market rates and no grants to countries 
it seeks to cultivate relations with unlike Western countries, including Japan which 
provide grants and low interest loans to developing countries. This may back fire on 
                                                   
401 Goh, Evelyn. "The Modes of China’s Influence. Cases from Southeast 
Asia." Asian Survey 54, no. 5 (2014): 825-48, see 848.  
402 Interviews in Beijing and Guangzhou, 2017 and 2018.  
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China especially if these countries perceive their national interests as compromised 
due to having to acquiesce to Chinese terms. For instance, following Malaysia’s 
general elections in May 2018 where the opposition Pakatan Harapan coalition was 
voted into power, the East Coast Railway Link and two gas pipeline projects worth 
billions of dollars that were inked under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative by 
the Chinese government and the previous government administration were being 
cancelled due to concerns that the terms of these projects were excessively benefitting 
Beijing while presenting Kuala Lumpur with unfavorable terms.403 This push-back 
effect – if sufficient political will can be mustered – suggests that China’s economic 
might do not always result in determinative outcomes. In the case of Sri Lanka, the 
Hambantota port, which was handed over to China as a result of the country being 
unable to service its debt, remained highly unattractive to cargo ship thus raising 
concerns on the long-term economic viability of such an undertaking.404 Again this 
suggests that notwithstanding certain geopolitical benefits that Beijing might stand to 
                                                   
403 “East Coast Rail Link and pipeline projects with China cancelled, says Malaysia 
PM Mahathir Mohamad.” The Straits Times, August 21, 2018, 
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gain from possession of the port, the possibility of such assets becoming an economic 
burden to China cannot be ruled out as well.   
Finally, the state of China’s own domestic environment also represents a 
challenge to the Chinese state ability to project influence abroad. According to Norris, 
in order for economies to be used as an active instrument of statecraft, nations must 
be able to control or direct the behavior of the economic actors that carry out the 
international economic activity. To this end, it was argued that a state that is divided 
often cannot even agree on what its best national interests, let alone pursue those 
interests via economic channels of national power.405 To what extent then can the 
Chinese state said to be acting in a unified manner, particularly concerning its core 
national interests? Given the size and magnitude of governing China, it can be argued 
that elements of factional politics will continue to exist in the CCP,406 nevertheless, 
China ultimately remains a hierarchical, single-party authoritarian regime, and thus 
state unity can be forged from the top down where deemed necessary - as seen by 
the setting up of the National Security Commission led by President Xi in November 
                                                   
405 Norris, William J. Chinese Economic Statecraft : Commercial Actors, Grand 
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406 Li, Cheng. "The End of the CCP's Resilient Authoritarianism? A Tripartite 
Assessment of Shifting Power in China.” The China Quarterly 211 (2012): 595-623; 
Ho, Wing-Chung. "The Rise of the Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie and Factional Politics of 
China." Journal of Contemporary Asia 42, no. 3 (2012): 514-21. 
	   204	  
2013 in order to coordinate the policies of the state.407 That said, I argue that one 
should not assume that top Chinese leaders possess a monopoly over the knowledge 
and wisdom needed to make decisions on behalf of China’s best interests. Indeed, 
given the growing complexity of decision-making and the increasing pantheon of 
political and commercial actors involved in economic enterprises, top CCP leaders 
may find it hard-press to provide appropriate responses to the challenges of domestic 
governance, let alone those of the Belt and Road Initiative which involve political 
relations with other countries. Furthermore, if the Belt and Road Initiative is seen 
primarily as a domestic issue to deal with the problem of overcapacity and 
overproduction within China, then such an emphasis raises the bigger question as to 
how prepared China is in taking on the challenges of the global economy, which would 
necessitate the Chinese government to look beyond domestic priorities in its policy-
making. This brings us back to the question as to “how unique is the Chinese model 
of domestic governance”, and to what extent can the governance principles in such a 
model be said to possess principles that can be universalized and thus applied to other 
countries which do not share its political values. Indeed, I argue that while the West is 
frequently being criticized by China as being hegemonic and that Western political 
models are seen to be incompatible with Chinese preferences, however what these 
Chinese alternatives might be remain vague. While many Chinese scholars have 
articulated the problems they perceive with the Western led international order (as I 
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discussed in Chapter 2), it remains unclear what kind of global order China is truly for, 
except for the fact that its interests ought to be taken into account, or at the very least, 
acknowledged.  
Finally, I argue that the lack of clearly spelt out objectives in the Belt and Road 
Initiative discourse also suggest considerable ambiguity and the lack of consensus 
among Chinese scholars and policy makers as to the actual outcomes that the Belt 
and Road Initiative is designed to achieve. If it is to entrench China’s position and 
influence in the world, then the growing suspicion among many countries towards 
Beijing’s economic statecraft (vis-à-vis the Belt and Road Initiative) is inherently 
limiting China’s ability to cultivate political goodwill and positive diplomatic relations. 
Likewise, the increasing chorus of domestic opposition – notwithstanding the Chinese 
state attempts to muzzle these voices - towards China’s outward economic forays that 
are seen to be ill-advised and highly risky, are also generating social turbulence that 
may inadvertently affect the CCP’s mandate to govern.  
 
Conclusion: 
 In the above chapter I discussed the importance of economic statecraft to 
China’s quest in being perceived as a great power globally and also to enhance its 
national image in the wider world. As I alluded to in Chapter 4, the conception of 
China’s national image is crucial to Beijing’s aspirations to be seen as being good and 
different from the West, and consequently to having its political worldview being 
accepted by others. To this end, economic power remains a central instrument that 
the Chinese government uses in order to wield influence in its international relations 
as this is seen as being less direct, thus allowing Beijing to subvert official diplomatic 
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channels while at the same time also applying political pressure in the pursuit of its 
national interests. Furthermore, China perceives the use of economic statecraft to be 
a legitimate means of procuring soft power, which is unlike Western iterations of soft 
power which tend to focus on aspects such as culture and values.408 As such, the Belt 
and Road Initiative ought to be understood beyond mere economics, but a state-
backed attempt to generate political influence among countries traversing the belt and 
road.  
 Relating the study of the Belt and Road Initiative to the study of Chinese 
international relations, I also highlighted three key themes that frequently permeate 
the discourse among Chinese IR scholars. Seen as such, I argue the Belt and Road 
Initiative can be interpreted as a geostrategic instrument for China to challenge the 
rules of the international system so as to better reflect its national interests and global 
objectives. This is supplemented by the criticism of Western economic initiatives such 
as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank that are said to be entrenching 
Western interests while presenting developing countries – whose rights Beijing claim 
to represent – with unfavorable terms. At a regional level, China uses the Belt and 
Road Initiative to cultivate influence among countries that it seeks to influence to its 
side. From the Southeast Asia region, poorer countries like Cambodia, Laos and 
Myanmar are highly susceptible to Chinese economic inducements as examples in 
recent years show.409 Given existing territorial disputes between China and other 
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Southeast Asian countries, how much trust Beijing receives from the region will be 
crucial to how the Belt and Road Initiative is being perceived and received. Last but 
not least, domestic conditions continue to affect how the Belt and Road Initiative is 
being conceptualized and put into practice. While some Chinese scholars read the 
Belt and Road Initiative as an opportunity for China to “go out” and demonstrate its 
credentials to the world and “striving for achievement” (yousuozuowei 有所作为), 
others caution China not to overstretch its resources and to instead focus on domestic 
development. 410 To this end, I argue that any economic or political turbulence in 
China’s domestic conditions would affect Beijing’s ability to conduct its foreign policy, 
including aspects of its Belt and Road Initiative.  
 Finally as part of a broader discussion on the Chinese worldview and its claims 
to exceptionalism, this chapter also raises the question as to how different and good 
the Belt and Road Initiative can be said to be in comparison to existing economic 
institutions and initiatives. While many Chinese scholars shun the term 
“exceptionalism”, preferring to preface their analysis of China’s geopolitical worldview 
with the phrase “with Chinese characteristics” (zhongguo tese 中国特色), the issue of 
whether these characteristics are unique or otherwise remains an issue of 
considerable debate, particularly if China seeks to claim its brand of global governance 
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as being superior to the West. Given more than five years (as of writing) have passed 
between President Xi’s high-profile proclamation of the the Belt and Road Initiative 
and now, there exists a dearth of clear ideas, let alone actions as to how the Belt and 
Road Initiative ought to progress. While some Chinese observers have attempted to 
recast the objectives of the Belt and Road Initiative as not so much goals to be 
achieved, but rather as an ongoing process underlining Beijing’s long-term 
direction,411 the fact that little substantive outcomes have been achieved up till now 
suggests that the need to reexamine the thinking behind the Belt and Road Initiative 
and the ideological foundations upon which it is built.412 Furthermore, it remains to be 
seen if China’s economic statecraft represents an utterly novel endeavor or whether it 
merely rehashes the tenets of Western political norms which Chinese leaders often 
criticize. More crucially, the issue as to whether these Chinese characteristics are 
sufficiently universal so as to be attractive for other countries to emulate will determine 
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the extent to which China can be said to be a model for global governance and force 
for global good. As the responses of Southeast Asia countries such as Indonesia, 
Vietnam and Singapore (as I will point out in the next two chapters) to Beijing’s global 
influence show, China’s approach to international politics continue to raise suspicion 
among political elites in the region as to whether Beijing could be trusted to do good 
as a global power. In sum, I argue that if the Belt and Road Initiative is to be perceived 
to be more than just China looking out for itself, then Beijing might have to 
inadvertently begin to assume a bigger share of global public goods and burdens 
where they exist. Paradoxically speaking, this may require the Chinese to de-
emphasize their “Chinese characteristics” and to articulate a vision of political 
governance that coheres with the realities of international society rather than that of 
what its own Communist Party stands for.  
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Chapter 6: Perceiving China – Two case studies (Indonesia and Vietnam) 
 
In chapter four, I analyzed the themes germane to the priorities of China as seen from 
the speeches made by President Xi Jinping during his first 18 months in office. As 
argued, the images of China as a flourishing civilization, China as a peaceful and 
progressive country, as well as China being a moral example in international politics 
are themes that are frequently expressed by Chinese leaders in their international 
relations. To this end, the important question of how the outside world perceives China 
needs to be likewise asked. Just as China’s view of the world is being reflected in its 
foreign policy actions and international behavior, then how other countries react and 
respond to China would also provide us with important insights into how China is being 
perceived, and more crucially, whether its political worldview and its thinking towards 
global order are being accepted. To do so, I will focus my analysis on three Southeast 
Asia countries, Vietnam and Indonesia in this chapter, and Singapore in the next. By 
doing so it would not allow me to understand how countries interpret China’s political 
behavior, but also whether they perceive China as being exceptional, that is, being 
different and superior to the West in Beijing’s claim to global leadership.  
 In my following discussion, I will examine how two ASEAN countries, namely, 
Vietnam and Indonesia, perceive China in the course of their political relations, 
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particularly from 2013 onwards following President Xi’s taking over of power.413 Given 
the sizeable population of both countries (Indonesia and Vietnam ranks as 1st and 3rd 
most populous states in Southeast Asia), they represent a significant community of 
views to draw from with which to analyze China’s regional influence. Furthermore, 
Vietnam’s proximity to China (and its territorial disputes) means that it is highly 
sensitive to Chinese actions within its periphery and will thus provide highly 
contextualized insights into China’s regional diplomacy. Moreover its Communist 
government structure mirrors that of Beijing thus allowing for a sharper appreciation 
of how party dynamics factor into the broader scheme of policy-making. In the case of 
Indonesia, being one of the region’s major players, and widely considered as a middle-
power, its views are undoubtedly taken very seriously by China and the region. Of late, 
Indonesia-China tensions have also surfaced with instances of Chinese fisherman 
being detained by Jakarta over allegedly illegal fishing activities within the maritime 
waters of Indonesia.414  
 The selection of these two cases also allow us to analyze the extent to which 
historical events contribute to and color overall ASEAN-China relations. In this respect, 
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both Indonesia and Vietnam have had turbulent relations with Beijing. During the mid-
60s when many ethnic Indonesian Chinese were killed during then President 
Sukarno’s anti-communist purge, while Vietnam have had border conflicts with China 
throughout its history (the latest being the 1979 Sino-Vietnam war). Contemporary 
studies of ASEAN-China relations tend to focus more on economic and geopolitical 
themes, but tend to downplay historical factors, in particular during the Cold War 
period in Southeast Asia. How then do locally narrated experiences in Vietnam and 
Indonesia in historical encounters with Chinese actions affect the manner in which 
China is consequently being perceived today? Given the Chinese leaders frequent 
use of historical narratives, particularly national humiliation discourse, to highlight the 
rightful place of China on the world stage,415 it will be useful to compare how these 
two countries – through their respective histories – perceive themselves vis-à-vis their 
relations with China so as to flesh out patterns in Chinese international behavior that 
reflect both change and continuity in Beijing’s regional relations.  
 Finally, this study hopes to also probe further the extent to which norms and 
values matter in relations between China and its ASEAN neighbors. Besides economic 
opportunities, what do smaller states look for in China?  This is particularly salient 
given that China’s economy has since late 2014 slowed down and is unlikely to return 
to the high growth of the 90s and 2000s. This is not to suggest that economic 
inducements do not matter, indeed they do, as China represents Indonesia’s second-
largest export market and its largest source of imports while it is also Vietnam’s largest 
                                                   
415 See, Callahan, William A. "National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and 
Chinese Nationalism." Alternatives 29, no. 2 (2004): 199-218. 
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trading partner, and which Vietnam runs a huge trade deficit with.416 Yet, if we argue 
– as Martha Finnemore has done – that “state interests are defined in the context of 
internationally held norms and understandings about what is good and appropriate”, 
then what are those norms and values which China purport to hold and to what extent 
does its regional neighbors “subscribe” to these values? 417  As Evelyn Goh has 
argued, China’s record of influence in Southeast Asia is highly complex, “there are not 
many cases in which Beijing tries to make these countries do what they otherwise 
would not have done.”418 In other words, does Chinese regional diplomacy contain 
certain attributes of Chinese exceptionalism that are congruent with the social 
purposes and political values and objectives of these states? If so, then one is able to 
argue that Chinese economic influence might be less important as imagined, and 
China’s influence is not contingent on its ability to dole out economic incentives but 
rather on normative and ideational aspects embedded within its political relations. 
                                                   
416 See U.S.- China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 17, 2015, 
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China's%20Economic%20Tie
s%20with%20ASEAN.pdf (retrieved September 23, 2016); “Vietnam - China 
economic relations after 25 years” , 
http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/business/145683/vietnam---china-economic-
relations-after-25-years.html (retrieved September 23, 2016).  
417 Finnemore, Martha. National Interests in International Society. Cornell Studies in 
Political Economy. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1996, p.2.  
418 Goh, Evelyn. "The Modes of China's Influence: Cases from Southeast Asia." 
Asian Survey 54, no. 5 (2014): 825-48, see 848.  
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Further to that, proponents of Chinese exceptionalism would thus be able to affirm the 
validity of China claiming to being good and different in its relations with its neighbors. 
On the other hand, if little or minimal common ground in terms of normative values 
exist between China and these two countries, then it severely weakens the claims of 
Chinese exceptionalism and one might seriously question the extent and sustainability 
of China’s regional influence should its economic strength weakens.  
 This chapter will proceed as follows. I will first provide a brief overview of the 
state of relations between China and Southeast Asia since 2010, which a number of 
scholars view as a turning point in Beijing’s relations with the region, marked by a more 
assertive approach to the former’s territorial claims. 419 Next I will go on to examine 
the perceptions that Vietnamese and Indonesian scholars and senior policy makers 
have towards China utilizing the data gathered from fieldwork trips to both Hanoi and 
Jakarta made in the fall of 2017. 420  Given this chapter is not meant to be a 
                                                   
419 Hoo, Tiang Boon. "Hardening the Hard, Softening the Soft: Assertiveness and 
China’s Regional Strategy." Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 5 (2017): 639-62; 
Hong, Zhao. "The South China Sea Dispute and China-Asean Relations.” Asian 
Affairs 44, no. 1 (2013): 27-43.  
420 Most of the Vietnamese respondents are scholars and senior policymakers who 
are still active in Track 1.5 and Track 2 work, and agreed to the interviews on the 
condition of anonymity. Where possible, I included their institutional affiliation without 
making mention of their names. In the case of Indonesia, all of them were amenable 
to be identified, and had expressed the “open and democratic” nature of Indonesia’s 
political system for their views to be openly cited.  
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comprehensive discussion of bilateral relations between China and the two countries, 
but rather a snapshot analysis of existing perceptions towards China, the focus will be 
largely on how these countries react to China’s image-promotion efforts. More 
specifically, I look at how the three images proffered by President Xi as discussed in 
Chapter 4 are being understood and appropriated in these two countries. In my 
interviews, I pose these three questions to my respondents (i.e. what do you think of 
the Chinese Dream, what do you make out of China’s peaceful rise, do you think China 
can be said to be a moral example in international politics?) and subsequently use 
their responses to elicit further observations and views towards China.421 Given the 
varying contexts circumscribing these two countries experiences with China, my 
interviewees responses likely differ particularly in terms of how they perceive their 
respective countries’ political priorities in dealing with China. From these, I will identify 
points of convergence and divergence in these countries’ perceptions of China and 
how these views reflect a wider debate over China’s international influence and global 
ambitions. I contend that notwithstanding the strong economic leverage China has 
among Southeast Asian countries, the experiences of Vietnam and Indonesia is 
illustrative of broader global perceptions towards China as well as reflective of the 
                                                   
421 Given that a number of my interviewees are well-known Sinologists in their 
respective countries, and are more proficient in Mandarin than the English language, 
the interviews were thus conducted in Mandarin. On these occasions, I translated 
their responses to English while retaining the original verbatim in Chinese (in the 
parentheses).   
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dynamics present in China-Southeast Asia relations.422 From my study, I argue that 
China – despite its strong influence in the region – is still perceived with considerable 
suspicion by its Southeast Asian neighbors. This is in due to the fact that Beijing was 
seen to be attempting to modify – though not entirely revise – the rules of Asian politics 
to suit its needs without taking sufficiently into account specific national interests of 
other ASEAN states. Furthermore, how Beijing is perceived has more to do with what 
it does rather than what it says. In this respect, I argue that China’s assertive actions 
in the South China Sea has generated a negative image of itself with ASEAN, given 
the importance these countries place on territory issues. Finally, in relating this 
analysis to the overall study of Chinese exceptionalism, this chapter hopes to provide 
a textured understanding of China’s regional diplomacy, and the extent to which 
                                                   
422 In a 2018 survey conducted by a Singapore-based think-tank on political 
developments in Southeast Asia, it was found that while many respondents agreed 
that China wields the most influence within Southeast Asia, more than half of them 
expressed little or no confidence that China would “do the right thing” in contributing 
to global peace, security, prosperity and governance. These findings further 
corroborate the overall perceptions held by respondents in this chapter. For results 
of this survey, see Tang, Siew Mun, Moe Thuzar, Hoang Thi Ha, Termsak 
Chalermpalanupap, Pham Thi Phuong Thao and Anuthida Saelaow Qian. The State 
of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report, Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/TheStateofSEASurveyReport_2019.pdf 
(retrieved February 18, 2019).  
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Beijing’s claims of being different and good is shared by its neighbors in the course of 
their respective international politics.  
 
Return of the Dragon: Sino-Southeast Asia relations since 2010 
Since 2010, China’s political relations with the 10-member Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been unusually tense. Territorial disputes over maritime 
boundaries, which existed in the past but were largely absent from political dealings 
between the 80s to early 2000s, were cast into the spotlight as China was perceived 
to be acting increasingly assertive over its territorial demands, particularly in the South 
China Sea (SCS).423 In 2012, for the first time in its 45-year-history, the 10-member 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) were left with a diplomatic 
embarrassment as it found itself unable to issue a joint communique following its 
annual meeting of its foreign ministers. Cambodia, who was then ASEAN chair, was 
criticized by many as not abiding by ASEAN norms, but instead choosing to ally itself 
with China in exchange for Beijing’s economic benefits. 424  Subsequent years 
                                                   
423 See for instance, Thayer, Carlyle A. "Chinese Assertiveness in the South China 
Sea and Southeast Asian Responses." Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 
30, no. 2 (2011): 77-104. Chapman, Bert. "China’s nine-dashed map: Continuing 
Maritime Source of Geopolitical tension.” Geopolitics, History and International 
Relations 8, no. 1 (2016): 146-68.  
424 Sutter, Robert, and Chin-hao Huang. "China-Southeast Asia Relations: Hu Visits 
Cambodia as South China Sea Simmers." Comparative Connections 14, no. 1 
(2012): 69-80,154-155. 
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witnessed further clashes between China and ASEAN claimant states, notably the 
Philippines and Vietnam over what was perceived as further incursions into the latter 
maritime waters through Beijing’s aggressive island-building works. Attempts to curtail 
China’s territorial expansion through diplomatic means proved largely futile, as Beijing 
insisted that these disputed islands were under its jurisdiction, and thus within its 
sovereign right to do as it wished.  
In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled that there was no 
legal basis for China to claim historical rights to resources within the so-called “nine-
dashed line.” Among others, the Tribunal also ruled that Chinese actions in the South 
China Sea such as persistent interference with Philippine fishing and exploration 
activities and its failure to regulate its own fishing activities were either in violation of 
the sovereign rights of the Philippines, or had breached various obligations under the 
Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).425 Not surprising, Beijing’s reaction was 
blunt, its foreign minister Wang Yi described the judicial decision a “political farce 
under the pretext of law.” President Xi further stated that “China will not accept nor 
recognize the decision, while the country’s territorial sovereignty and maritime 
                                                   
425 Chan, Jane G.Y. and Liow, Joseph C.Y. “The PCA Ruling and ASEAN: A Call for 
Unity”, RSIS Commentaries, July 14, 2016, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-
publication/rsis/co16177-the-pca-ruling-and-asean-a-call-for-unity/#.V9QrlmWQL-Y 
(retrieved September 10, 2016).  
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interests in the South China Sea will not be affected under any circumstance.”426 
Notwithstanding the tough talk, scholars have observed that the PCA ruling may have 
affected China’s future ability to assert its territorial rights for a number of reasons: (I) 
that the success of its domestic economic transformation could be undermined by 
regional instability;427 (II) any future conflict in the South China Sea will inevitably be 
linked to and scrutinised through the arbitration ruling;428 and (III) Beijing would not 
want to further provoke unnecessary conflict with its neighbors, and thus might rein in 
some of its aggressiveness in the wider interest of its regional relations.429 At the same 
                                                   
426 Beech, Hannah. “China slams the South China Sea Decision as a Political 
Farce”, Time, July 13, 2016, http://time.com/4404084/reaction-south-china-sea-
ruling/ (retrieved September 19, 2016).  
427 Goh, Evelyn. “How should Southeast Asia respond to the South China Sea 
ruling?” East Asia Forum, July 17, 2016, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/07/17/how-should-southeast-asia-respond-to-
the-south-china-sea-ruling/ (retrieved September 19, 2016).  
428 Li, Mingjiang. “The South China Sea Arbitration: Turning Point in Chinese Foreign 
Policy?” RSIS Commentaries, August 12, 2016, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-
publication/rsis/co16205-the-south-china-sea-arbitration-turning-point-in-chinese-
foreign-policy/#.V-AXPjuQKu4 (retrieved September 19, 2016).  
429 Hayton, Bill. “What will follow China's legal defeat in South China Sea?” Nikkei 
Asian Review, July 13, 2016, http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Viewpoints/Bill-
Hayton-What-will-follow-China-s-legal-defeat-in-South-China-Sea (retrieved 
September 19, 2016).  
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time, realist scholars have long highlighted the structural factors that could yet provoke 
major power conflict.430 To what extent then, are these characteristics exhibited by 
China in its regional/international relations, and how is Chinese behavior being 
understood by its smaller neighbors? Is conflict inevitable , as structural realists 
maintain, or is China able to – as some of its leading scholars argue431 - avoid the 
“tragedy of great power politics” that is associated with a realist reading of international 
politics?   
Following from Chapter 4, in which I argued that Chinese leaders are highly 
sensitive to the management of China’s international image, hence the portrayal and 
perception of China’s image represents a crucial aspect of its international diplomacy 
and foreign policy. This is not to suggest that China will compromise on its national 
interests if they are being threatened by external powers in order to preserve a positive 
image. As Graham Allison writes in the aftermath of the PCA ruling, “China, like all 
great powers, will ignore an international legal verdict…except in particular cases 
                                                   
430 See for instance, Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 
updated edition. NY: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2014.  
431 See for instance, Qin, Yaqing. "Continuity through Change: Background 
Knowledge and China’s International Strategy." The Chinese Journal of International 
Politics 7, no. 3 (2014): 285-314; Yan, Xuetong. "China's New Foreign Policy: Not 
Conflict But Convergence Of Interests." New Perspectives Quarterly 31, no. 2 
(2014): 46-48; Zhang, Feng. Chinese Hegemony : Grand Strategy and International 
Institutions in East Asian History. California: Stanford University Press, 2015. 
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where they believe it is their interest to do so.”432 Nevertheless, if one takes seriously 
the importance of national image in international relations, 433  then it becomes 
essential for China, especially if it wants to assume a greater share of global 
leadership, to be able to project a favorable image. Joseph Nye, for instance, writes 
on the necessity of “soft power” – the ability to attract and co-opt, rather than to coerce 
others - as being essential to success in global politics, 434  while Robert Jervis 
highlights the spiraling effect that a negative national image can bring about in state 
relations, including giving rise to misperceptions.435  
                                                   
432 Allison, Graham. “Of Course China, Like All Great Powers, Will Ignore an 
International Legal Verdict.” The Diplomat, July 11, 2016,  
http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/of-course-china-like-all-great-powers-will-ignore-an-
international-legal-verdict/ (retrieved July 17, 2016). 
433 See for instance, Valencic, Jana. and Chong, Alan. The Image, the State and 
International Relations. European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper No. 2001/2, 
International Relations Department, The London School of Economics and Political 
Science, 2001; Kaplowitz, Noel. "National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and 
Conflict Strategies: Psychopolitical Dimensions of International Relations." Political 
Psychology 11, no. 1 (1990): 39-82.  
434 Nye, Joseph S. Soft Power : The Means to Success in World Politics. 1st ed. New 
York: Public Affairs, 2004.  
435 Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, 
N.J. ; Princeton University Press, 1976.  
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More specifically for my study, the issue of Chinese national image, I argue, is 
a crucial element of its regional diplomacy, given that Chinese leaders constantly 
exhort on the need to differentiate and distinguish China’s international relations from 
the West (as we have seen in Chapter 2). In other words, how China is being perceived 
among its regional neighbors is highly indicative of the extent of its international 
influence, and whether it is able to muster broader support for its global initiatives. 
More importantly, if China is to play a more substantial role in the international system 
– as many Chinese scholars have argued – then it stands to reason that such a role 
requires China to be positively perceived and that Beijing’s interests do not come into 
sharp conflict with those of its neighbors. While much has been made of China’s 
economic relations with its neighbors in East Asia, and the substantial diplomatic 
goodwill that is accorded Beijing’s policy makers as a result of such ties,436 political 
tensions continue to fester as a result of contentious territorial claims, to the extent of 
possibly upsetting the balance of power in East Asia. As Singapore’s former top 
diplomat pointed out, “these developments are reinforcing powerful centrifugal forces 
that are pulling ASEAN away from its preferred balance, with potentially profound 
                                                   
436 Chin, Gregory. "China's Bold Economic Statecraft." Current History 114, no. 773 
(2015): 217-23; Goh, Evelyn. "The Modes of China's Influence: Cases from 
Southeast Asia."; Wong, John, Zou, Keyuan, and Zeng, Huaqun. China-ASEAN 
Relations : Economic and Legal Dimensions. London: World Scientific, 2006.  
	   223	  
political and strategic consequences.”437 With this in mind, I will examine in turn the 
perceptions of China from Vietnam and Indonesia.  
 
China and Vietnam: The meeting of two dragons 
Among various studies of Sino-Vietnamese relations, Brantly Womack’s description of 
the inherently asymmetrical character of their relationship represents a valuable 
framework with which to consider the interactions both countries have with each 
other.438 Arguing that contemporary international relations scholarship is accustomed 
                                                   
437 Kausikan, Bilahari. “ASEAN will not drown in the South China Sea.” Nikkei Asian 
Review, September 2, 2016, http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Viewpoints/Bilahari-
Kausikan-ASEAN-will-not-drown-in-the-South-China-Sea?page=2 (retrieved 
September 23, 2016).  
438 Womack, Brantly. China and Vietnam : The Politics of Asymmetry. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 2006. Other sustained studies of Sino-Vietnam 
relations that I have consulted in this analysis include, Hiep, Le Hong. "Vietnam’s 
Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization." Contemporary Southeast 
Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 35, no. 3 (2013): 333-68; 
Hoang, Thi Tuan Oanh. The Evolving Hedging Strategy of Vietnam towards China. 
Ph.D. Dissertation. Singapore: RSIS, 2016; Thayer, Carlyle A. "Vietnam’s Foreign 
Policy in an Era of Rising Sino-US Competition and Increasing Domestic Political 
Influence." Asian Security 13, no. 3 (2017): 183-99; Thayer, Carlyle A. "Vietnam and 
Rising China: The Structural Dynamics of Mature Asymmetry." Southeast Asian 
Affairs 1 (2010): 392-409. 
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to view “asymmetry as a disequilibrium rather than as a sustained condition” , Womack 
puts forth the theses that “disparities in capacities create systemic differences in 
interests and perceptions between the stronger and weaker sides of the relationship 
[and] mutual perceptions and interactions in an asymmetry relationship will be 
fundamentally shaped by the different situation of opportunity and vulnerability that 
each side confronts.” At the same time, Womack suggests that “given that the basic 
disparity of capacities between the two is unlikely to change, and the stronger power 
is unlikely to be able to eliminate the weaker power”, asymmetry relations tend to be 
robust as “both sides manage their affairs with the confidence that the power of the 
larger side will not be challenged and the autonomy of the smaller side will not be 
threatened.”439  
 Notwithstanding this fundamental asymmetrical character of the relationship, 
Vietnamese scholars I spoke to expressed determination to ensure that Vietnamese 
national interests, particularly territorial ones, were not being compromised in the 
course of bilateral relations. At a roundtable in Singapore, responding to a question by 
a Chinese IR scholar on “what your country fears most about China”, a senior 
Vietnamese scholar provided the feisty answer “Vietnam does not fear China”, before 
adding that Vietnam hopes to “find ways to live harmoniously with China.”440 This need 
to live with China (as a big brother) is intrinsically etched into the mindset of 
Vietnamese I spoke to as they acknowledged both the benefits that a prosperous 
                                                   
439 Womack, China and Vietnam : The Politics of Asymmetry,  pp.17-18.  
440 “Contesting Visions of Regional Order in East Asia.” Roundtable organized by the 
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, October 11, 2017, Singapore.   
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China would bring to Vietnam while being cautious, and at times, suspicious towards 
Beijing’s long-term intentions. Given this ambivalence, I will examine how the three 
images of the Chinese Dream, China’s peaceful and progressive rise, and China being 
a moral example in the international system are being thought of and understood by 
the Vietnamese. 
 
I)The Chinese Dream:  
On how the Chinese Dream was being understood in Vietnam, one scholar 
from the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam perceives it as a “long term and strategic 
goal of China to become a world power.”441 To some extent, this desire for China to 
become a strong and prosperous nation was seen to be a legitimate desire, and to 
which the Vietnamese see no reason to deny, particularly given the close 
interconnectedness of their respective economies. Another view understands the 
Chinese Dream within China’s own domestic conditions, particularly as an endeavor 
to foster a strong sense of nationalism which could result in a “zero-sum” outcome in 
terms of the pursuit of national interests.442 In addition, the Chinese dream was also 
seen as a project towards national rejuvenation whereby President Xi attempts to “look 
                                                   
441 Interview with scholar from the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV), 
September 19,  2017, Hanoi, Vietnam.  
442 Interview with senior official from the Ministry of Planning and Investment of 
Vietnam, September 18, 2017, Hanoi, Vietnam; Interview with professor from the 
Institute of Chinese Studies, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, Hanoi, Vietnam, 
September 29, 2017.  
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backwards in history in terms of thinking” with which to fan the flames of nationalism.443 
One scholar also highlighted the notion of “Han nationalism” (dahan minzuzhuyi大汉
民族主义) which could create additional problems between itself and citizens from 
regions such as Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan who do not see themselves as 
Chinese nationals, notwithstanding China’s jurisdiction over their territories.444 (This 
will be further discussed in the next chapter on the Chinese-ness and Chinese 
exceptionalism). 
 From this vantage point, I argue that what unites Vietnamese scholars in their 
views is the keen, and sometimes cynical, perception that the Chinese Dream was 
conceived ultimately with China’s interests in mind, and that the national interests of 
other countries remain periphery or coincidental if they are taken into account at all. 
This pursuit of the Chinese Dream is also fuelled by rising nationalism which, 
according to one Vietnamese professor, could result in China “abdicating its socialist 
responsibilities” thus further resulting in conflict between China and socialist 
Vietnam.445 Indeed, such an observation suggests a qualified, if not limited, allegiance 
by Chinese leaders towards ideological motifs and that national interests come to the 
forefront in the course of China’s international relations. While Vietnamese scholars 
perceive the Chinese Dream as a slogan of sorts for President Xi Jinping, which was 
                                                   
443 Interview with senior policy maker from the DAV, October 11, 2017, Singapore.  
444 Interview with professor from the Institute of Chinese Studies, Vietnam Academy 
of Social Sciences, Hanoi, Vietnam, September 29, 2017. 
445 Interview with professor from the Institute of Chinese Studies, September 29, 
2017.  
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not unlike those articulated by his predecessors,446it was also observed that President 
Xi was viewed to be “relating with the world from a position of strength” and thus the 
Chinese Dream reflects a much more confident Chinese self-ability to effect changes 
in the world.   
 As such, a number of scholars have described “hedging” to be the favored 
strategy Vietnam adopts towards China.447 According to one definition, hedging is “an 
insurance-seeking behavior under high-stakes and high-uncertainty situations, where 
a sovereign actor pursues a bundle of opposite and deliberately ambiguous policies 
vis-à-vis competing powers to prepare a fallback position should circumstances 
change.”448 To this end, the United States, and to some extent, the Association of 
Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) are seen as important players in Hanoi’s hedging 
strategy. Despite the Vietnam war, Vietnamese policy-makers view the presence of 
the United States in the region as an important stabilizing factor towards ensuring the 
                                                   
446 For instance, former president Hu Jintao was credited with the slogan of 
“harmonious society” (和谐社会) while the slogan of “Three Represents” (三个代表
was attributed to his predecessor Jiang Zemin.   
447 Hiep, Le Hong. "Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization."; 
Hoang, Thi Tuan Oanh. The Evolving Hedging Strategy of Vietnam towards China; 
Do, Thuy T. "Firm in Principles, Flexible in Strategy and Tactics." Asian Journal of 
Comparative Politics 2, no. 1 (2017): 24-39. 
448 Kuik, Cheng-Chwee. "How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking ASEAN States’ 
Alignment Behavior towards China." Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 100 
(2016): 500-14, see 504.  
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present configuration of power, which is geared to best serve Vietnam’s national 
interests. 449  This suggests that despite the best efforts by Chinese leaders and 
diplomats to convince Southeast Asia countries that China will not be a hegemonic 
power, the Vietnamese I spoke to remain cautious of Chinese intentions – given 
ongoing territorial disputes.  
 
II) China’s peaceful and progressive rise 
 Virtually none of the Vietnamese interviewees I spoke to expressed the belief 
that China’s rise would be inherently peaceful. One Vietnamese Army officer sums up 
the general view among Vietnamese towards China as follows: 
“China has always been crystal clear that there are limits to its peaceful 
intentions: China will not rule out the use of force or coercion where matters of 
its territorial integrity are at stake. The most obvious example is Taiwan, but 
China also includes its maritime territories in the East and South China Sea in 
this category. To the Chinese mind, there is no contradiction between Beijing’s 
peaceful inclinations and a strong defense of its own territory.”450 
Scholars like Barry Buzan have previously raised questions concerning 
whether Chinese leaders’ pronouncements of peaceful rise/development represent a 
means to an end (China’s global dominance) or whether it represents a desirable end 
                                                   
449 Interview with senior officials from Vietnam’s Ministry of Defence, September 26, 
2017, and October 3, 2017.  
450 Email interview dated October 28, 2016.  
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in and of itself.451 From the above response, it would seem that Chinese claims that 
its rise would be peaceful is not unconditional, and is premised upon the preservation 
of its own territory. Unlike countries which purport to state their peaceful intentions but 
subsequently become hostile when they are being threatened or invaded, given that 
China’s vision of territoriality is expanding, Beijing is able to attack other countries 
while still saying it's peaceful (on the pretext of claiming the need to safeguard its 
territorial interests). 
Indeed, one senior military officer I spoke to observed that China presently 
faces the dilemma of trying to “pursue stability and protecting its own rise.”452  This 
was because Chinese national interests were seen as a “zero-sum game” which run 
contrary to the “win-win” rhetoric that Chinese leaders frequently talk about.453 This 
point was most vividly observed during the Haiyang Shiyou 981 incident between May 
to August 2014 in which a Chinese oil rig conducted drilling activities within 
Vietnamese-claimed exclusive economic zone. The actions of the Chinese, as 
                                                   
451 Buzan, Barry. "The Logic and Contradictions of 'Peaceful Rise/Development' as 
China's Grand Strategy." The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no. 4 
(2014): 381-420. See also Guo, Sujian. China's 'peaceful Rise' in the 21st Century : 
Domestic and International Conditions. Aldershot ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006; 
Yee, Herbert S. China's Rise : Threat or Opportunity? London: Routledge, 2011. 
452 Interview with a senior officer from the Institute of Defence and International 
Relations, Ministry of Defence of Vietnam, Hanoi, September 26, 2017.  
453 Interview with DAV scholar, September 15, 2017, Hanoi, Vietnam; Interview with 
a director-general of the DAV, October 11, 2017, Singapore.  
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observed, demonstrated the intractable nature of territorial issues, and the difficulty of 
compromising given national pride at stake. Furthermore, as noted, “China generally 
frames its ‘peaceful rise’ as an overt comparison to the legacy of colonialism and 
imperialism. By promising a ‘peaceful rise’, China is, in effect, promising not to use 
force to expand its territory - but this promise has no bearing on the areas China 
already claims. Thus China’s peaceful rise should not be read as a promise to 
compromise on issues such as the South China Sea.”454 From this perspective, one 
might argue that the terms ‘peaceful rise’ are irrelevant to Vietnam; instead, peaceful 
rise is perceived to be only of relevance when China seeks to differentiate itself from 
the West (which it frequently criticizes as being hegemonic). From Vietnam’s view, 
what was more important is whether these territorial disputes would be peacefully 
resolved or not.  
One impediment to China’s peaceful rise, it was pointed out, also lies in the 
tendency for Chinese leaders to project problems internally to its external 
environment. In other words, it is China’s domestic environment, more so than its 
external conditions, which “sets the rhythm” for how its foreign policy is to be 
constructed.455 Such a view posits that the biggest obstacle to China’s project its 
                                                   
454 Interview with a senior officer from the Institute of Defence and International 
Relations, September 26, 2017. 
455 Interview with professor from the Institute of Chinese Studies, Vietnam Academy 
of Social Sciences, Hanoi, Vietnam, September 29, 2017. For in depth studies into 
the nexus between China’s domestic and foreign policies, see Nathan, Andrew J. 
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global influence lies in the presence of strong interests groups (lijituan利集团) within 
the Chinese political system, and to which President Xi is attempting to wage an 
internal struggle with. For instance, Chinese observers have highlighted the crucial 
role of the People’s Liberation Army in the foreign policy decisions of Beijing’s decision 
makers, in particular those pertaining to its territorial claims.456 It was also pointed out 
to me by a source who works in a Chinese construction company that the Belt Road 
Initiative (BRI) proffered Chinese businesses the opportunity to “park” their money in 
overseas assets given the perceived slowing down of the Chinese economy and the 
strict capital controls enforced by the Chinese government of late.457 Seen this way, 
the future contours of Chinese foreign policy, and whether it will be peaceful or 
                                                   
(2016): 179-91; Bhalla, Madhu. "Domestic Roots of China's Foreign and Security 
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otherwise, is dependent on the outcome of Xi’s power contest within his domestic 
constitutents. As of writing, President Xi is said to have cemented his influence within 
the CCP rivaling that of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping;458 hence, China’s foreign 
policy in the coming years – assuming Xi’s power is not challenged within the party – 
will reflect the vicissitudes of domestic politics as they are played out in the foreign 
arena.  
 
III) China as a moral example in international politics 
 According to Vietnamese interviewees I spoke with, the biggest problem seen 
in Chinese international relations is the disparity between word and deed, or as one 
respondent puts it, “[Chinese] words are usually not in line with their acts.”459 Another 
scholar in response to whether China’s rise would be peaceful commented that one 
should examine “what China does, not what it says” (kantazenyangzuo 
bushizenyangshuo看它怎样做，不是怎样说).460 One scholar also described Chinese 
foreign policy as being inconsistent and that Chinese leaders were “only concerned 
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with China’s own national interests with little regard for international norms.” 461 
Furthermore, it was observed that China was amenable to changing the rules of the 
international order to suit its own interests, thus reinforcing the perception of a “self-
centered and selfish nation.”462 When asked how this was different from how countries 
in general acted (i.e. in line with their own national interests), the approach of China 
to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was being 
contrasted to the U.S.:  
“China is party to UNCLOS, the U.S. is not. In the East Sea disputes between 
Japan, China uses UNCLOS to support its claim but refuse to acknowledge 
UNCLOS guidelines in their South China Sea disputes with ASEAN countries. 
If China signs up to UNCLOS then it is obliged to abide by the rules, it cannot 
just pick and choose what is convenient.”463 
 
Another scholar from the DAV expressed the view that “how China does things” 
was “not noble.”464 When asked to clarify what this meant, it was said that unlike the 
U.S. which was more “straight-forward” with its demands in its bilateral relations, the 
Chinese “tend not to be transparent” in their  diplomatic actions and preferring utilizing 
“under-table methods” to achieve their goals. For instance, it was shared that Chinese 
companies involved in the ongoing construction of the Hanoi metro trainline had 
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understated the costs of the project during the bidding process and that there were 
additional hidden costs that only surfaced in subsequent years.465 One respondent 
also pointed out that following the Permanent Court of Arbitration tribunal’s ruling over 
the South China Sea in July 2016, Chinese leaders had increased the frequency of 
high level visits to Southeast Asia countries in order to “put pressure on their leaders 
to keep quiet.”466 
Seen this way, China’s claim to being a moral example in international politics 
is also limited by the perceived inferior quality of its ideas. Despite Vietnam and China 
having similar party structures, it was shared that many Vietnamese – including its 
leaders – preferred to look to the West (especially the United States) and its 
institutional systems in their work of governance. When asked the reason for doing so, 
the reply was that “Vietnam is so much like China, there is nothing to learn from them. 
If we want to learn, we need to learn ideas from the West.”467 Beyond just ideas, some 
Vietnamese respondents also highlighted the inferior quality of Chinese manufacturing 
products and goods that were being sold in Vietnam which consequently affected the 
trust towards China. In addition, the issue of Chinese companies bringing in their own 
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workers, thus alienating the local population, was also a frequent gripe among those I 
spoke with.468 To this end, officials from the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense shared 
the view that China needs to “be more responsible for the region” if its influence is to 
be perceived positively.469    
As to whether China was prepared to provide a form of alternative global 
leadership from that of the United States, Vietnamese respondents cited the lack of 
China’s “soft power” influence and its “values deficit” as presenting formidable 
obstacles. When queried as to what this meant, interviewees cited day-to-day 
encounters such as the “low quality goods of China to export to Vietnam” and “Chinese 
tourists bad behavior when visiting Vietnam” as problems peculiar to experiences with 
the Chinese.470  One respondent also cited “socialization issues” and that Chinese 
tourists were not “civilized” (buwenming 不文明) as issues that affect Vietnamese 
perceptions towards China. Furthermore, China’s growing relations with other 
Southeast Asia countries such as Malaysia was described as “the exportation of 
corruption” (chukoufubai出口腐败) as Chinese entrepreneurs and businessmen were 
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seen to be lacking transparency in their business relations, unlike their Japanese 
counterparts who were perceived to be more upfront and honest in cutting deals. 
Given these experiences, it was said that China is presently not suited to be a model 
for the developing world as it did not possess the level of transparency (toumingdu透
明度) that would allow other countries to trust it. In addition, its development model 
was not considered as sufficiently attractive and that it presently was not prepared to 
provide a greater share of global public goods. 471  More crucially, as a senior defense 
official observes, aggressive Chinese behavior in its territorial dispute with Vietnam 
had affected the stability of the Southeast Asia region and also undermined the efforts 
to forge regional unity among the different countries.472 
Notwithstanding the above criticisms, Vietnamese respondents did highlight 
China’s economic initiatives as a positive model for emulation, particularly its ability to 
modernize much of its economy in such a short span of time. One respondent also 
pointed out that China’s claim to international leadership in the future would not be 
based on indicators such as human rights and democracy, but on how it fares in 
environmental matters. This was especially so in its relations with developing countries 
like Vietnam in which issues like human rights and freedom of speech were not as 
heavily emphasized compared to the West, instead matters pertaining to livelihood 
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and subsistence were seen as more immediate and relevant concerns.473 Another 
respondent acknowledged the ongoing tension in China between its growing 
modernization and the associated set of ideas that come with it (earlier discussed in 
Chapter 3) versus the “old thinking” that dominate China’s political culture which could 
be potentially problematic for the future of China.474  
 
 From the above evidence, it can be surmised that China’s growing influence 
has generally not been perceived positively by Vietnam and that territorial disputes 
have further exacerbated the hostility among Vietnamese towards the Chinese. In a 
sense, this is not unexpected given the long history of Sino-Vietnam conflict, and in 
particular the period between 1979 and 1990 where relations between both countries 
were overtly hostile.475 Indeed Womack’s observation of “systemic misperception” 
between both countries remain valid for today. As put, “Vietnam’s oversensitivity to 
China’s actions and China’s insensitivity to Vietnam’s security concerns led to a 
vicious cycle of Vietnamese escalation and Chinese bullying, culminating in the border 
war.”476 In addition, many Vietnamese in their day to day relations with the Chinese 
continue to harbor negative views of China. While this in some sense can be attributed 
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to a lack of cultural awareness and misperception, particularly if they involve ordinary 
Chinese citizens; at the same time, Chinese foreign policy is seen to be assertive, 
even condescending towards smaller countries like Vietnam and which reflects the 
thinking and priorities of Chinese elites. Nevertheless, the similar governing ideologies 
between the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and the CCP means that the 
legitimacy of the CPV, in some respects, is intricately tied to the fortunes of the CCP. 
As observed by one Vietnamese scholar, Vietnam’s behavior towards China since 
1991 have been influenced more by domestic variables whereby “different political 
calculations and the interplays of interests among various actors within the 
Vietnamese domestic politics.”477   
 
 
China and Indonesia: Whither regional influence and domestic politics 
 While Indonesia’s relations with China are less encumbered by the memory of 
historical conflict, and Jakarta’s geographical position affords it some element of 
distance from Beijing’s geopolitical orbit, Indonesia’s perceptions of China are no less 
relevant, not least because of Indonesia’s important role as a key player in the 
geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific, but also because of its economic relations with China, 
and ongoing racial matters in its domestic politics which involve ethnic Chinese 
Indonesian. According to one observation, despite the palpable development of Sino-
Indonesia relations since the post-Suharto era, which also coincided with China’s 
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growing influence in Southeast Asia, academic materials related to China and 
Indonesia-China bilateral engagements remain relatively nascent. 478  The growing 
interest among Indonesians towards China since the 2000s, according to Indonesian 
analysts, however, can be attributed to Jakarta’s growing recognition that China is now 
“the biggest game in town” that deserves greater attention while forcing Indonesian 
policy makers to reinterpret and reapply its “free and active foreign policy.”479 To this 
end, it was noted that Indonesia-China relations had improved substantially during the 
ten years of the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)’s presidency between 2004 and 
2014 which witnessed the signing of the 2005 Joint Declaration on Strategic 
Partnership and the subsequent elevation to the level of a Comprehensive Strategic 
Partnership including a visit by President Xi in October 2013.480 In general, it was said 
that Indonesians had regarded the Chinese government as the “strong and unified 
one…able to mobilize domestic support [in order] to execute its policy effectively and 
sustainably.”481 Notwithstanding the fact that China seen as a “undemocratic state 
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ruled by a communist regime that limited significantly the people’s freedom”, the 
Chinese government was not being perceived as having “evil intentions, unlike when 
China was perceived as Indonesia’s enemy during the Suharto regime.”482 China was 
instead described as a “pragmatic government, whose ultimate goal was providing 
welfare for its people” and had adroitly done so through the fusion of an illiberal political 
system and a semi-liberal market economy. More than that, “maintaining domestic 
stability and national unity were perceived as even more necessary in order to 
concentrate more on the country’s national economic development.”483 One recent 
large-scale study conducted on 1,620 adult Indonesians also show that more than 
three-quarters of those polled admire China and view Beijing as an important country 
for Indonesia, although this was still lower than other major countries such as the 
United States, Japan and Australia.484   
Given this backdrop, and following my interviewees with Indonesian scholars, I 
argue that two key themes feature prominently in the analysis of Indonesia’s 
perceptions towards China. One, the issue of regional/international norms and the 
extent to which China is attempting to contest these norms for influence, and two, 
domestic politics that had substantially framed the manner in which ordinary 
Indonesians perceive China. Hence, the earlier themes of the China Dream, China’s 
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peaceful rise and China’s moral example were alluded to insofar as they correspond 
with the above two themes. For instance, Indonesians scholars - unlike Vietnamese – 
generally perceive the China dream as mostly targeted at a Chinese domestic 
audience so as to generate a stronger sense of nationalism and thus they do not worry 
that such a dream would come at the direct expense of Indonesia’s own national 
interests.485 Indeed, as noted by Dewi Anwar Fortuna, who is the deputy secretary for 
political affairs, a strong China was what Indonesia hoped to engage, although such a 
relationship cannot be divorced from “the baggage of history” (this will be further 
discussed below).486 It was also observed that China – as a great power – would 
naturally also want to play a bigger role in international affairs as witnessed by 
economic projects like the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB). 487  Unlike Sino-Vietnam relations whereby the similar 
Communist party structures generated ideological motifs, Indonesia’s relations with 
China were said to motivated by economic opportunities that Beijing proffered, 
particularly given Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s emphasis on the country’s 
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economic growth. 488 At the same time, China’s growing influence in the region, and 
its territorial differences with Indonesia over the Natuna islands continue to weigh 
heavily in the minds of Indonesian Chinese watchers as the interpret China’s foreign 
policy actions in and around Southeast Asia. 489 In the following, I will examine how 
China’s national image, which is interwoven with Beijing’s contestation of 
regional/international norms as well as domestic politics within Indonesia, have 
resulted in considerable ambiguity towards the overall impression that Indonesian 
scholars have towards China.  
 
I)   A contestation over regional order and norms 
To be certain, Indonesian scholars I spoke to do not think that China would 
engage in open conflict as such an outcome would be disastrous for China. At the 
same time, they do nonetheless express caution in taking Chinese pronouncements 
concerning its goodwill and benign intentions at face value. According to Riefqi Muna, 
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a Chinese specialist at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, China’s rapid rise to global 
prominence has resulted in difficulties in Beijing coming to grips in relation to global 
norms and values. This is seen most vividly in China’s South China Sea disputes 
whereby it was said that “China does not care about international law” given its highly 
controversial utilization of the nine-dashed-line to demarcate its SCS territorial 
rights.490  As Muna further puts it, “If China wants to show the world that it is a 
responsible power that can be trusted, then it needs to follow and play by international 
law. China must prove to the world that its rise is peaceful, otherwise this notion of 
peaceful rise is problematic and will create fear among its neighbors. How China 
communicates and interacts with countries around them will be a test.”491 
Likewise, A. Ibrahim Almuttaqi, who heads the ASEAN Studies Programme at 
the Habibie Centre, the notion of China’s peaceful rise is not inherently self-evident in 
the years since President Xi took office: 
“We do not hear of many Chinese scholars and leaders talking about peaceful 
rise these days. This is because China has already risen. It talks about peaceful 
rise because it needs to reassure the region. Do we believe it? We want to 
believe that what China says is true, but Indonesia cannot construct a foreign 
policy simply on this belief alone. We need to have as many friends as 
possible.”492 
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From the above views, Indonesia scholars perceive China’s diplomatic moves 
as being fundamentally at odds with the norms and practices of Southeast Asia 
countries. While this does not mean the inevitability of conflict, it does suggest that 
China’s actions are interpreted as representing a challenge to the long term stability 
of the region.  For instance, it is argued that ASEAN member states, in their various 
intramural dealings, prefer an approach which is consensus-seeking and where 
possible, non-confrontational.493 Whatever the limitations and problems in such an 
approach, Indonesian scholars perceive China as mounting a challenge towards the 
security architecture of the region, on evidence of Beijing’s growing initiatives that 
parallel existing regional arrangements in which Western countries play substantial 
role.494 According to Iis Gindarsah, a military analyst at the Centre of Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) pointed out that Chinese initiatives – in the long run – 
were conceptualized with the goal of “entrenching Chinese centrality.” 495 
Notwithstanding the fact that every country has a vision of regional order, Indonesia’s 
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preference, it was shared, is to preserve ASEAN centrality and the maintenance of the 
U.S. “hub-and-spokes” system.496 In this respect, China’s vision of its desired regional 
order was seen to be fundamentally at odds with Indonesia’s vision, which was said 
to be “all inclusive” unlike Beijing’s, which excludes the United States.497 To this end, 
China’s stalling on the discussions over the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea 
disputes was also seen as a means of “buying time until its influence is such that these 
disputes would no longer be relevant.”498 
Another scholar Rene Pattiradjawane captures the situation more starkly by 
describing China as a “lonely superpower” and argued that Beijing’s actions had 
“created problems everywhere.”499 In his view, China was acting like the West (which 
it frequently criticizes) and that in the territorial disputes, it had attempted to “Balkanize 
ASEAN” through challenging the “comradeship” among ASEAN member states. 
Furthermore, China’s dogmatic insistence on being a “non-aligned superpower” had 
also limited Beijing’s ability to make friends with smaller countries and to provide 
genuine global leadership. As put, “no superpower can solve all the world problems 
on their own. To be a superpower means that you need allies all over the world. If 
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China insists on being non-aligned, then it would not be able to lay claim to global 
leadership.”500  
To be certain, the issue of what a Chinese vision of world order portends for 
the conduct of international relations has been the subject of intense debate in both 
academic scholarship and public discourse.501 As I had earlier alluded to in chapter 
two, the notion of Tianxia represents one possible way of thinking about Chinese world 
order and its relationship with international and regional norms. Yet, as highlighted by 
Pattiradjawane, China’s biggest problem lies in the inherent inability for its rules to be 
universalized, and consequently, it was unable to obtain the necessary “buy-in” from 
other countries in terms of following its lead. Furthermore, as argued by some 
scholars, there exists in China’s worldview an “unspoken Sinocentrism in the guise of 
critiquing Euro-American-centrism. The struggle over which version of universalism is 
more productive is a familiar story of postcolonial resentment.” 502  Nevertheless, 
through my interviews with Indonesian scholars, on present evidence, Chinese 
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alternatives are perceived to be highly problematic. For instance, Ibrahim Almuttaqi 
expressed doubt towards the Chinese model of global leadership, despite the fact that 
the Chinese were more “flexible” in their working style: 
“In terms for investments, the Chinese are quite flexible compared to the 
Japanese and Americans. It is easier to initiate projects with the Chinese, for 
instance, the Jakarta-Bandung high speed railway…however at the end of the 
day, we will have to face the reality of business interests. The Chinese promise 
a lot, but can they deliver?”503  
To this end, the inherent problems behind Chinese attempts to be a global 
leader were begrudged, but at the same time, due to the perceived “mess” in U.S. 
domestic politics, countries would have “not much of an option” but to acknowledge a 
larger Chinese role in international affairs.504 At the same time, it was said that there 
was great uncertainty about how Chinese leadership and influence would transpire in 
the region given that it was seen to be previously trying to divide ASEAN member 
states. Echoing Vietnamese views, it was also mentioned that while “China says a lot 
of good things, it needs more actions to back up its words.”505  
 
II)   Domestic Politics and the ethnic Chinese factor 
 The issue of the ethnic Chinese factor has presented a recurring problem for 
Indonesia, given the history of tensions between Indonesian Chinese and the majority 
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Muslim population in the country.506 This was most vividly seen during the final days 
of the Suharto in the late 90s whereby anti-Chinese riots resulted in violent clashes 
between indigenous Indonesians and Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent. Similar 
racial tensions were revived more recently when the ethnic Chinese governor of 
Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (who is also a Christian) was forced to step down 
and was also subsequently imprisoned as a result of him being accused of making a 
blasphemous speech against Islam in September 2016. 507  In the words of Leo 
Suryadinata, a scholar of diaspora Chinese studies, the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia 
represents “an unresolved dilemma” that has complicated the theatre of Indonesian 
domestic politics. Reflecting on the B.J.Habibie’s administration between 1998 and 
1999 after the fall of Suharto, Suryadinata observes: 
“[Habibie] is under pressure to improve the Indonesian economy and he needs 
the full-cooperation of the ethnic Chinese. Besides the economic importance of 
this community, he must also take into account pressure from indigenous 
Indonesians in human rights abuses against the Chinese. However, once the 
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situation has stabilized, he will face growing pressure from pribumi [native 
Indonesians] for a larger economic stake. His ability to address both issues will 
be an important determinant of whether or not he can control Indonesia’s 
politics in the lead-up to new general elections.”508 
Two decades on, racial dynamics between ethnic Chinese and native 
Indonesians continue to exert a not insignificant force in Indonesia-China relations, 
and have been particularly salient in the realm of domestic politics. Part of this, as 
Rene Pattiradjawane notes, was due to the economic disparity between the ethnic 
Chinese and native Indonesians, in which the former was perceived to be wealthier 
and benefitting at the expense of the latter.509 According to Rizal Sukma, who is the 
Indonesian ambassador to the United Kingdom, “there is still lingering worry that the 
Indonesian Chinese are loyal to the mainland and that the ethnic Chinese are 
supportive of China.”510 Tobias Basuki, who has previously conducted research into 
Indonesian ‘Millennials’511 (those born in the mid-90s to early 2000s) told me that 
                                                   
508 Suryadinata, Leo. Chinese and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia. Singapore: 
Marshall Cavendish, 2004, p.141. 
509 Interview on November 20, 2017, Jakarta, Indonesia. According to one study, of 
the top 100 top private enterprises in Indonesia in 1995, only 23 were owned by 
indigenous Indonesians, and the 8 largest companies were all solely owned by 
ethnic Chinese. “100 Konglomerat Terkaya Indonesia” [100 Richest Conglomerates 
in Indonesia]. Eksekutif no. 194, August (1995), pp.36-37.  
510 Personal interview, February 28, 2017, London, United Kingdom.  
511 “Ada Apa dengan Milenial? Orientasi Sosial, Ekonomi dan Politik” [What is with 
	   250	  
Islamist groups in Indonesia had a tendency to vilify China as the problem and that 
the Chinese were frequently used as a “bogeyman” for purposes of domestic politics. 
For instance, the photograph of tourism minister Mari Elka Pangestu (who is an ethnic 
Chinese) posing in a Huawei business venture in Indonesia had led to speculation that 
10 million illegal Chinese workers would be brought into Jakarta, thus highlighting the 
ongoing debate whether such Chinese fears were being manufactured or reflected the 
realities on the ground.512 Furthermore, it was also observed that Indonesians working 
in infrastructure building had a more negative disposition towards China, given the 
accusation among opposition politicians that President Jokowi pro-business approach 
were resulting in the “selling of Indonesia’s assets to China.”513 Also Iis Gindarsah 
from the CSIS highlighted the view that the presence of the ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia meant that international issues would be inevitably framed in domestic 
terms. “If China becomes assertive in the South China Sea, that will affect the 
perception of native Indonesians towards the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Whenever 
we talk about China in Indonesia, it is somehow being associated with communism 
and the ethnic Chinese.”514  
                                                   
the Millennial? Social, Economic and Political Orientation]. Rilis dan Konferensi Pers 
“Survei Nasional CSIS 2017” [Release and Press Conference “National Survey CSIS 
2017]. Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2017. 
512 Interview on November 16, 2017, Jakarta, Indonesia.  
513 Ibid. 
514 Interview on November 17, 2017, Jakarta, Indonesia.  
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Notwithstanding the above, all of the respondents I spoke with shared the view 
that the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia identified themselves primarily as Indonesian 
citizens and not with China.515 At the same time, Chinese economic investments in 
Indonesia has also resulted in Beijing being unwittingly drawn into the orbit of 
Indonesia’s domestic politics – even if it does not want to. According to Dewi Anwar 
Fortuna, while Indonesia does not view China as being a colonial power (unlike the 
Dutch, British or the United States), Beijing nevertheless was perceived as being able 
to intervene in local politics if it needed to. This was because many Chinese 
companies working in Indonesia preferred to bring in their own workers instead of 
hiring from the local population thus creating mistrust and jealousy among the local 
population. In this respect, Indonesia’s economic vulnerability was perceived as a 
potential area whereby the Chinese could exploit in extending its influence within the 
domestic sphere.516  
Although it was pointed out that China’s anti-corruption had received 
considerable admiration among Indonesian leaders, overall Indonesian scholars I 
spoke to had reservations about Chinese global leadership, and the extent to which 
its leadership was perceived as being beneficial to the wider world. Rizal Sukma 
shares the view that being a major power, China would have to assume a heavier 
                                                   
515 As an illustration, it was shared that during the 1998 economic crisis, many 
wealthy Indonesian Chinese preferred to deposit their money in Singapore, rather 
than in China. This lack of cultural affinity towards China, despite ethnic similarities 
will be further discussed in the next chapter.   
516 Interview on October 9, 2017. Singapore. 
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responsibility, but it was unlikely to do so, except in an incremental way, for instance 
in peace-keeping operations and in climate change. This was unlike the United States 
following the second World War in which it assumed “a much heavier burden of the 
reconstruction of the world.”517 Furthermore, it was also perceived that China was 
highly sensitive to external criticism, thus rendering international cooperation difficult 
and further augmenting the view that Beijing was prepared to work with the 
international community only on its own terms. For instance, it was recounted that 
“when working with Chinese academia, the Chinese would insist that negative stuff 
written about them being taken out. This is different from the United States which is 
more willing to accept negative views written about it. The Chinese are more 
dominating and micro-managing thus compromising academic freedom.”518 When I 
pointed out that the United States could also resort to “double standards” especially 
when its own national interests are concerned, the reply was that “the U.S. sets high 
standards and has low achievements, but China sets low standards, and has even 
lower achievements...how do you expect us to follow its lead?”519   
Last but not least, it was also highlighted that China’s so-called non-
interference into domestic politics of the countries, particularly in the developing world, 
which it renders economic assistance to is not entirely consistent with what is 
                                                   
517 Personal interview, February 28, 2017, London, United Kingdom 
518 Interview with Tobias Basuki, CSIS researcher, November 16, 2017, Jakarta, 
Indonesia 
519 Ibid. 
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happening.520 Riefqi Muna observes that “China has other conditions which it does not 
spell out in its economic relations” which include the right to “[exploit] these countries 
for natural resources.” In this respect, Muna expressed the view that “we would have 
to wait and see what happens in the long run” to ascertain the results behind such a 
strategy. Also, Muna shared the view that despite China’s insistence that it would be 
inclusive and respectful to other countries, it was Beijing – and not smaller countries 
– that would write the “rules of engagement”, and consequently, possessed the 
authority with which to push its preferences concerning the norms of international 
order.521 
 From the above evidence, I argue that notwithstanding Indonesia’s strong 
economic imperative to cultivate good relations with China, there exists deeper 
feelings of animosity and suspicion behind Beijing’s long-term objectives towards the 
Southeast Asia region. Indeed, Jakarta’s preoccupation with the overall balance of 
                                                   
520 For studies into China’s relations with countries in the global South, see Alden, 
Chris, and Daniel Large. "China's Exceptionalism and the Challenges of Delivering 
Difference in Africa." Journal of Contemporary China 20, no. 68 (2011): 21-38; 
Alden, Chris, and Christopher R Hughes. "Harmony and Discord in China's Africa 
Strategy: Some Implications for Foreign Policy." The China Quarterly 199, no. 199 
(2009): 563-84. For a discussion of China’s non-interference approach, see Pan, 
Zhongqi, and Ping Du. "The Logic of Contingency in China’s Insistence on the Non-
interference Principle." Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 8, no. 
4 (2015): 597-615. 
521 Interview on November 20, 2017, Jakarta, Indonesia.  
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power within the region (given its disposition in seeing itself as a leader-of-sorts in 
ASEAN) means that it sees China’s growing influence as a catalyst for future conflict. 
Furthermore, ethnic issues would also further complicate Sino-Indonesian ties, 
particularly if Beijing seeks to impose some form of cultural hegemony over ethnic 
Chinese Indonesians. Relating to Chinese exceptionalism, Indonesians do not see 
China as all that different from others, particular in geopolitical matters. To this end, 
Beijing’s claims to uniqueness stem less from what it stands for than what it stands 
against. Speaking to Indonesian respondents, it would seem that while many of them 
perceive China’s rise as mitigating Western hegemony in the region, at the same time, 
Jakarta’s fundamental insistence that its foreign policy be “free and active” (bebas-
aktif) means that it sees any attempts by bigger countries to constrain its decision-
making as being inherently bad.522  
 
 
Conclusion 
 From the above study, China – on present evidence – has been unable to 
translate its regional influence and political worldview into achieving a favorable image 
among two of its most important Southeast Asia neighbors. According to my study, 
China was also seen to be attempting to modify – though not entirely revise – the rules 
of Asian politics to suit its needs without taking sufficiently into account specific 
                                                   
522 Sukma, Rizal. "The Evolution of Indonesia's Foreign Policy: An Indonesian 
View." Asian Survey 35, no. 3 (1995): 304-15. 
 
	   255	  
national interests of other ASEAN states. To this end, all my respondents observed 
that it would not be in China’s interests to be a revisionist power as by doing so, it 
would undercut China’s own national interests. At the same time, Beijing is perceived 
to be seeking to make changes to the rules of the regional, even international order 
so as to further its political influence. Furthermore, its assertive rhetoric at international 
and multilateral forums have resulted in a negative impression concerning the type of 
leadership it purports to undertake. Indeed, the South China Sea tensions have led 
both Vietnam and Indonesia to strengthen their own militaries in anticipation of further 
Chinese aggression and the need to rely on the United States to limit China’s territorial 
appetite. While ASEAN states have, for the most part, are prepared to accept China’s 
criticism of the West for interfering in regional issues (which were seen to be mostly 
for domestic consumption), they are not prepared to bandwagon along with China in 
propagating an “Asia for Asians” sphere in limiting the role of the United States and 
other Western allies.  
The need to maintain regional stability also features prominently in the priorities 
of both Indonesia and Vietnam. Hence, diplomatic maneuvers by China to influence 
ASEAN’s decision-making processes, vis-à-vis countries like Laos and Cambodia, 
were seen as unduly infringing on ASEAN’s political prerogatives and driving a wedge 
between ASEAN states. Moreover, such actions were seen as antithetical to the 
promotion of Chinese interests in Asia, as they reflected Chinese impatience and the 
lack of respect towards the national interests of smaller ASEAN states. As observed 
by Goh, ASEAN states are not simply passive recipients of the foreign policy decisions 
of major powers; through the practice of “omni-enmeshment” and via a complex 
balance of influence, they have actively tried to influence the shape of the regional 
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order in order to arrive at  an “interim power distribution outcome”, which is a 
hierarchical regional order that retains the United States' dominant superpower 
position while incorporating China in a regional great power position just below that of 
the United States.523 
 Finally, Indonesian and Vietnamese respondents expressed considerable 
ambivalence towards the notion of Chinese exceptionalism, and whether China’s 
claims of being “good” and “different” from the West was indeed possible, in practice. 
Notwithstanding China’s claims to cultural affinity with Asian states and the promotion 
of its claimed unique approach to international relations, the actions of China in the 
South China Sea have dimmed the credibility of Chinese rhetoric, particularly when 
core national interests are at stake. Its political worldview was also seen to be highly 
problematic as it lacked broader appeal. From this we can say that China has not be 
successful in persuading other countries, be it that it is inherently peaceful or that its 
claim to leadership would be beneficial to the region. In this respect, China was seen 
as “not being any different” from other powerful nations and that it would necessarily 
want to extend its sphere of influence in East Asia, while primarily through economic 
means but not ruling out the possibility of military might when it territorial matters were 
concerned. To this end, ASEAN states welcome the former but reject the latter. An 
uneasy relationship with China remains the likely outcome in the foreseeable future.  
  
                                                   
523 Goh, Evelyn. "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing 
Regional Security Strategies." International Security 32, no. 3 (2008): 113-57.  
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Chapter 7 
Deciphering the Dragon: Singapore’s relations and response to the rise of China 
 
In my earlier chapters, I attempted to provide a sketch of how Chinese political 
worldview and conceptions of Chinese uniqueness and exceptionalism were being 
fleshed out in its international relations theories (Chapter 2), in the articulation of 
national identity (Chapter 3) as well as the construction of its national image as being 
different from the West (Chapter 4). In Chapter 5, I looked at the discourse surrounding 
the Belt and Road Initiative and identified some key themes salient to China’s view of 
global order while in chapter 6, I examined how China’s national image is in turn being 
perceived by its neighbors (Vietnam and Indonesia) and analyzed the extent to which 
China’s professed interests are shared by those countries. Building from these ideas, 
I will attempt to examine in this chapter the extent to which a Chinese worldview 
concerning domestic governance and international order is being shared by the 
overseas Chinese and the exceptionalism discourse surrounding it. More specifically, 
I will look at the case of Singapore, a city-state whose majority population is ethnic 
Chinese, and whose approach to governance has been closely studied by Chinese 
leaders in the past.524 Unlike Hong Kong and Macau which comes under Beijing’s rule, 
                                                   
524 The Singapore government broadly divides its population into four main ethnic 
categories: Chinese, Malay, Indian and Others. According to the 2017 population 
statistics, 74.3 per cent of residents in Singapore are Chinese. 
http://www.singstat.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-
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and Taiwan which China claim sovereignty over, Singapore’s sovereignty as a nation 
state – since its independence from Malaysia in 1965 – has never been questioned by 
Beijing (at least publicly) despite the substantial presence of ethnic Chinese 
community. In recent times however, Singapore’s relations with China have 
undergone some turbulence, given its strong support for American presence in the 
region and its support of the use of international law to resolve territorial disputes, both 
of which run against Beijing’s preferences.525  This was most vividly magnified in 
November 2016 when nine Singapore military vehicles were being impounded in Hong 
Kong enroute to Singapore following overseas training in Taiwan.526 According to 
                                                   
library/publications/publications_and_papers/population_and_population_structure/p
opulation2017.pdf (retrieved Jan 3, 2018).  
For a more detailed exposition of Singapore-China relations following Beijing’s 
opening up, see Ho, Benjamin. "Learning from Lee: Lessons in Governance for the 
Middle Kingdom from the Little Red Dot." East Asia : An International Quarterly 33, 
no. 2 (2016): 133-56. 
525 Tai, Michael. Singapore’s China Conundrum. The Diplomat, December 13, 2016. 
https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/singapores-china-conundrum/ (retrieved Jan 3, 
2018); For a backdrop of Singapore’s foreign policy vis-à-vis China, see Tan, See 
Seng. "Faced with the Dragon: Perils and Prospects in Singapore’s Ambivalent 
Relationship with China." Chinese Journal of International Politics 5, no. 3 (2012): 
245-65.  
526 See Boey, David. “China has always kept mum on Singapore’s defence ties with 
Taipei, so why is it complaining now?” South China Morning Post, November 28, 
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some observers, the conditions that underpinned the relationship both countries have 
changed substantially over the past decade (given China’s rise) and that Beijing’s view 
on key security and strategic issues remain fundamentally at odds with Singapore’s 
position.527 At the same time, the fact that Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien 
Loong had made two visits to China within a short period of time (September 2017 
and April 2018), including meeting President Xi on both instances also suggest that 
relations between both countries have improved since late 2016, and that Singapore 
had made strategic changes in its foreign policy position to accommodate China’s 
preferences.528 
                                                   
2016, http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2049803/china-has-always-
kept-mum-singapores-defence-ties-taipei-so (retrieved Jan 3, 2018).  
527 Interviews with Chinese scholars in Beijing and Guangzhou, 2017 and 2018; for a 
recent analysis of China’s perceptions of Singapore, see Zhang, Feng. “Assessing 
China’s attitudes towards Singapore.” China: An International Journal 15 (3), August 
2017: 1-25.   
528 Wang, Xiangwei. “China’s welcome for Singapore PM may signal a new approach 
to smaller states.” South China Morning Post, September 23, 2017, 
http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2112468/chinas-welcome-singapore-
pm-may-signal-new-approach-smaller-states (retrieved April 12, 2018); Chan, Irene. 
“Singapore-China relations and the art of communication.” Channelnewsasia, 27 
September 2017, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/commentary-
singapore-china-relations-and-the-art-of-9254194 (retrieved April 12, 2018).  
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In this chapter, I will examine Singapore’s perspective towards China and how 
China’s international relations’ behavior is being understood and interpreted by 
Singaporean observers and the ongoing debates that characterize Singapore’s 
perspectives towards China. 529  This is important to our study of Chinese 
exceptionalism for the following reasons. Firstly if a Chinese global order is said to be 
good and different (from the West), then one would expect this to be reflected in 
Singapore’s perspective towards China, particularly if Beijing is being associated with 
a benevolent form of global leadership. As a city-state whose national interests are 
closely intertwined with those of the global community, Singapore is acutely sensitive 
(and vulnerable) to international geopolitical moods and shifts in the balance of power. 
530 Indeed, its founding leader Lee Kuan Yew was seen as an expert observer of 
                                                   
529 It must be said that the bulk of these scholarly observations are framed not at 
China per se, but insofar as what China’s rise portends for the world, and more 
specifically what it means for Singapore. Nevertheless as my subsequent analysis 
will show, these ruminations and writings provide us with clues as to how Chinese 
exceptionalism is being understood and the existence of a spectrum of views 
towards China as being good and different compared to the West.  
530 For an indepth discussion of Singapore’s foreign policy, see, Leifer, 
Michael. Singapore's Foreign Policy : Coping with Vulnerability. London: Routledge, 
2000; Ganesan, N. Realism and Interdependence in Singapore's Foreign Policy. 
New York: Routledge, 2005. 
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China, and his views were frequently sought after by many American leaders.531 From 
this, we might say that despite Singapore’s small size, its reading of international 
politics remain accurate especially given national interests are at stake.    
Secondly, given Singapore’s racial Chinese majority composition, coupled with 
Chinese leaders frequent utilization of racial nationalism themes to muster support for 
its political objectives532, the city-state would represent the ideal platform with which 
to assess the extent of Chinese exceptionalism claims, particularly to which identifies 
with the Chinese state and its purported worldview. For instance, when Chinese 
defence minister General Chang Wanquan visited Singapore in February 2018, he 
had commented that coming to Singapore, is not like going away, but visiting good 
friends in the same town (italics mine).”533  Likewise, Shanghai Party chief Li Qiang 
during a visit by Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in April 2018 said in an 
interview that “the Chinese community accounts for about 70 per cent of the total 
                                                   
531 See, Allison, Graham T, Blackwill, Robert D, and Wyne, Ali. Lee Kuan Yew : The 
Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and the World. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2012. 
532 For a recent study of how this is played out, see Carrico, Kevin. The Great Han 
Race: Race, Nationalism and Tradition in China Today. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2017.  
533 “Singapore and China armies to step up cooperation.” Channelnewsasia, 
February 5, 2018, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/singapore-
and-china-armies-to-step-up-defence-cooperation-9929100 (retrieved April 16, 
2018);  
	   262	  
population of Singapore…we must appeal to the emotional affinity among the 
people.”534 These statements suggest that in the minds of Chinese leaders, Singapore 
–by virtue of its demographic make-up – ought to be favorably predisposed to China 
in its foreign relations and playing a role as a bridge between China and other 
countries (particularly those in the West).535  
 Thirdly, given that Singapore’s model to domestic governance has frequently 
been touted as an inspiration for China’s own governance, we might argue that China’s 
ability to pattern itself after Singapore in its governance – both domestically and 
internationally – would be an indicator of its global influence, or lack of thereof.536 
                                                   
534 Sim, Fann. “Singapore can help Shanghai companies expand as part of Belt and 
Road Initiative, says PM Lee.” Channelnewsasia, April 2018, 
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/singapore-can-help-shanghai-
companies-expand-as-part-of-belt-and-10128378 (retrieved April 16, 2018).  
535 The shared race/ethnicity/civilization narrative is frequently being touted in Sino-
Singapore relations. The Chinese state and its relations with the overseas diaspora 
is an increasing area of concern among many Western countries, including 
Singapore. This is however beyond the scope of the chapter to analyze. For a more 
comprehensive study, see, To, James Jiann Hua. Qiaowu: Extra-territorial Policies 
for the Overseas Chinese. Leiden: Brill, 2014.  
536 For studies into China’s learning from Singapore, see Ortmann, Stephan, and 
Mark R. Thompson. "China's Obsession with Singapore: Learning Authoritarian 
Modernity." The Pacific Review 27, no. 3(2014):433-455 ; Ho, Benjamin. "Learning 
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Given this historical backdrop of Singapore’s contribution to China’s development, we 
can say that Singapore represents a rich repository of perspectives towards China, 
and that a number of its top minds and influential institutions are keen observers of  
China’s political developments and its international relations.537  
 In the following, I will examine the discourse surrounding Singapore’s 
perspective and its response to China’s global influence, in particular regarding 
Beijing’s geopolitical actions within the Asia-Pacific region, in which Singapore is 
considerably attuned towards. To do so, I look at the ideas promulgated by three 
Singaporean thought leaders, whose reading and appraisal of China’s international 
relations represent existing elite views in Singapore towards Beijing. They are namely, 
Bilahari Kausikan, Kishore Mahbubani and Wang Gungwu. Both Kausikan and 
Mahbubani have had long careers in the Singapore foreign service and following their 
retirements, have continued to actively contribute their views to aspects of Singapore’s 
foreign policy, including their thoughts on Singapore’s political relations with Beijing. 
Similarly, Wang Gungwu – a trained historian – had led the Singapore-based East 
Asia Institute between 2007 and 2018 which specializes in the study of contemporary 
China and East Asia. These views will also be supplemented by interview responses 
of members in a “Singapore China Studies Group” (which I am part of), which comprise 
of Singaporean academics and business leaders who are involved in various fields of 
                                                   
from Lee: Lessons in Governance for the Middle Kingdom from the Little Red 
Dot." East Asia : An International Quarterly 33, no. 2 (2016): 133-56.  
537 The author’s own China Programme at the Institute of Defense and Strategic 
Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies is a case in point.  
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China-related studies as well as observations obtained from senior policy-makers, 
including several government leaders that I had spoken with.  
The rest of the chapter will proceed as follows. I will first provide a brief overview 
of Singapore’s political relationship with China following the commencement of 
diplomatic relations in 1990, focusing particularly on key economic and security 
initiatives that have been undertaken by the Singapore government in the fostering of 
bilateral relations with Beijing. I will then go on to analyze in turn the ideas put forth by 
Kausikan, Mahbubani and Wang, whose ideas I contend represent the existing 
political discourse and perspectives in Singapore towards China. In this respect, I 
propose that Singapore’s position(s) towards China can be broadly divided into three 
schools, paralleling the theories of mainstream international relations.  One, the realist 
position (represented by Kausikan) which sees the global ascension of China as a 
challenge to existing international system and its associated norms; two, the economic 
institutionalism view (as Mahbubani advocates) which perceive a present shift of 
global power away from the West to the East, and one in which Chinese economic 
institutions are providing Beijing with greater say and share of international political 
influence; and three, the constructivist-ideational view (as proposed by Wang) which 
privilege the contribution of ideas brought about by history, culture and social patterns 
which consequently contribute to how states perceive their national identities and 
international relations. I will argue that at the crux of Singapore’s perspective(s) 
towards China is a contestation over these three schools of thought as well as the 
extent to which Singapore perceives China as being exceptional, that is, being 
different and good. While the realist position sees China as undifferentiated and a 
negative influence to the world, the economic institutionalism position is highly 
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persuaded by China’s economic might and is more optimistic towards Beijing’s 
ambitions to be a global power. The constructivist-ideational position however, while 
seeking to celebrate the uniqueness of China as a global power, is agnostic about 
whether China represents a force for global good and utilizes a comparative 
perspective in attempting to flesh out the differences between China and the West. 
Taken together, I contend that each of these three schools in their appraisal of whether 
China is exceptional or otherwise, have different conclusions and each of these 
conclusions reflect an ongoing debate within Singapore about how best to engage with 
China (see table 1). I conclude by arguing that Singapore’s perceptions of China and 
China’s role in the world is highly ambiguous, paralleling historical relations between 
both countries and across their leadership administrations. A more basic problem, I 
suggest, is due to China’s political system and the lack of trust it generates among 
Singapore’s leaders towards Beijing. 
  
 
 Is China Unique? Is China Good? 
Realist School NO         NO 
Economic 
institutionalism 
YES         YES 
Constructivist-
ideational 
            YES         DEPENDS 
(TABLE 1)  
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Engaging China: the security dimension  
 While official relations between Singapore and China only began in 1990, 
unofficial interactions between both countries in fact go back more than a decade since 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s maiden trip to China in May 1976 and subsequently 
Deng Xiaoping visit to Singapore in November 1978. Nevertheless, the geopolitics, 
Singapore’s dominant Chinese population and the prevailing Cold War environment 
meant that Singapore in the 1980s remained careful in establishing diplomatic ties with 
China.538 Following the end of the Cold War, among Singapore’s strategic priorities 
was in managing China’s rise as a peaceful great power. Like other Asian nations, 
Singapore believed that the economic reforms brought about by Deng would make 
China to become the most important regional great power, and hence the challenge 
to ensure that Beijing would in turn prosper and stabilize – rather than threaten and 
disrupt – East Asia in the process.539  
Regionally, it strongly supported ASEAN’s engagement of China, first by 
inviting it to become a consultative partner in 1991, and consequently a full dialogue 
                                                   
538 For analysis of Sino-Singapore ties before the 1990s, see, Lee, Lai To, “China’s 
changing attitudes towards Singapore, 1965–75”, in Wu Teh-yao, ed., Political and 
Social Change in Singapore. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975, 
pp. 171–202; Lee, Lai To, ‘Sino–Singaporean relations in the 1970s’, in Lee Ngok 
and Leung Chi-keung, eds, China: Development and Challenge, Volume II. Hong 
Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1979, pp. 265–286.   
539 See Goh, Evelyn and Chua, Daniel. Singapore Chronicles: Diplomacy. 
Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2015, pp.49-51.  
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partner in 1996. Internationally, Singapore leaders attempted to influence the crucial 
debate about whether to engage or contain China. As observed, Singapore was 
ASEAN’s “most strenuous advocate of engagement” and its leaders argued that a 
containment policy towards China (as with the Soviet Union) would create a self-
fulfilling prophecy, that is, “to fuel Chinese paranoia and hostility and strengthen the 
hardliners among China’s leaders who believed that the West wanted to encircle and 
weaken China.”540 In this respect, Singapore leaders believed that as China prospered 
and its stake in the global economy grew, its interests in upholding the norms of 
international practices would also increase. As its then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong 
puts it, “by giving China space and time, the world will accelerate…China’s ability and 
willingness to play by global rules.”541 
 Nevertheless, given the pervasiveness of realist thinking among Singapore’s 
leaders (this will be further discussed later in the chapter), the possibility that China 
might well then choose to throw its weight around was also anticipated, particularly 
given sovereignty disputes in the region.542 That said, the United States’ ongoing 
                                                   
540 Ibid., pp.49-50.  
541 “Give China time to integrate – PM”, The Straits Times, 14 May 1995 [Factiva].  
542 Besides China’s South China Sea disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines, the 
Taiwan issue also loomed large back then. Between 1995 and 1996, China 
protested Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui visit to the US by conducting military 
exercises and test-firing missiles across the Taiwan Straits. The US responded by 
moving two aircraft carrier groups into the area, thus causing Singapore 
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presence in East Asia provided Singapore with the assurance and the ultimate 
deterrent to potential Chinese aggression, thus enabling Singapore leaders to 
continue to reiterate their support for engaging Beijing. Indeed, Lee Kuan Yew termed 
this line of reasoning the “fall-back position should China not play in accordance with 
the rules as a good global citizen.”543 At the same time, the need to diversify its 
sources of security assurance without depending solely on the US prompted 
Singapore to embark on building multilateral regional institutions, thus generating new 
conduits of diplomacy that would in turn promote multilateral and institutional 
cooperation between the great powers themselves, and consequently stabilizing their 
relationships with smaller countries in the region.544   
With the above objectives in mind, Singapore was instrumental in setting up the 
region’s first annual security dialogue, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, in 
                                                   
considerable anxiety as to whether it would be forced to choose between China or 
the US.  
543 Lee, Kuan Yew. “How the United States Should Engage Asia in the Post-Cold 
War period.” Acceptance speech on receiving the Architect of the New Century 
Award, Nixon Centre, Washington, DC, 13 November 1996.  
544 For discussions on ASEAN’s relations with major powers, see Ganesan, N. 
"ASEAN's Relations with Major External Powers." Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, 
no. 2 (2000): 258-78; Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka. "ASEAN and Evolving Power Relations 
in East Asia: Strategies and Constraints." Contemporary Politics 18, no. 4 (2012): 
400-15; Katsumata, Hiro. "What Explains ASEAN's Leadership in East Asian 
Community Building?" Pacific Affairs 87, no. 2 (2014): 247-64;  
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which the leadership and “centrality” of ASEAN was stressed in the overall 
conceptualization of the forum.545 In 1997, the ASEAN Plus Three dialogues and 
summit were launched which involved the Southeast Asian countries, China, Japan 
and South Korea for economic cooperation. Another leaders’ meeting, the East Asia 
Summit was also inaugurated in 2005 which involves ASEAN Plus Three members, 
the US, India, Australia, New Zealand and Russia in strategic dialogue and 
cooperation. From 2010, ASEAN also included these eight countries in a biennial 
defence dialogue, the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus.  
 According to Shunmugam Jayakumar, who was Singapore’s foreign minister 
between 1994 and 2004, these efforts in building regional security institutions were 
seen to help create “political discipline in the way regional countries conduct their 
relationships” and maintain a “predictable pattern of political relationships” by building 
                                                   
545 The ARF presently consists of 27 member countries, namely, the 10 ASEAN 
member states (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Burma, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), the 10 ASEAN dialogue partners (Australia, 
Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of 
Korea, Russia and the United States), one ASEAN observer (Papua New Guinea), 
as well as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, Timor-
Leste, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Information obtained from, 
http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/regional-architecture/Pages/asean-
regional-forum-arf.aspx (April 21, 2018).  
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confidence and trust especially among the major powers. 546  To this end, these 
regional multilateral institutions serve three functions. First, they help to maintain 
ASEAN’s voice in regional affairs by establishing the Association in the “driver’s seat” 
for wider regional cooperation. Second, they provide a means to “socialize” China into 
regional cooperation and rules, while keeping the US politically and economically 
engaged in the region. Third, by enmeshing the major powers within the region, 
ASEAN diversifies the sources of Southeast Asia’s strategic and economic stability. 
For instance, the strategic imperative for deeper engagement with India was both to 
“supplement China’s role…due to its growing economic and military strength” and also 
because “Singapore needed to find a counterbalance to regional heavyweights such 
as China and Japan” in case of a US drawdown.547 The above suggest that Singapore, 
notwithstanding its growing engagement of China, remain cautious about Beijing’s 
long term geopolitical intentions, and thus the need to diversify its security ties so as 
to protect and preserve its independence amidst the growing influence of China in Asia 
(this will be further discussed in the chapter).  
 
Engaging China: The economic dimension 
 As a nation that is highly dependent on trade for its economic well-being, 
Singapore used trade and and trade agreements intensively as strategic tools to 
develop regionalism and diversify relations with multiple economic powerhouses after 
                                                   
546 Jayakumar, S. Diplomacy: A Singapore Experience. Singapore: Straits Times 
Press, 2011, p.82,  
547 Ibid., p.90.  
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1990.548 In this respect, the opening up of Chinese markets to foreign investment was 
a boon to Singapore as it took advantage of the new economic opportunities proffered. 
In 1994, then Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew and Chinese Vice President Li Lanqing 
inked an agreement to develop an industrial park in Suzhou. Following the formation 
of a Joint Council of Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC) in 2003, which institutionalized ties 
between both countries at the highest levels of government, further projects were 
birthed, such as the Tianjin Eco-City in 2007, the Singapore Guangzhou Knowledge 
City in 2016 and the Chongqing Connectivity Initiative in 2017. Notwithstanding the 
mixed success of these initiatives (particularly the Suzhou Industrial Park), both 
countries have benefitted from economic cooperation. In 2015, Singapore was China’s 
largest foreign investor while Singapore was also China’s largest investment 
destination in Asia and one of the top destinations for Chinese companies investing 
abroad.549 But more than just economic cooperation, Singapore’s ability to somehow  
marry a semi-authoritarian, single-party dominance with economic prosperity presents  
China with a useful political template with which to reference its own political system 
after.550  
                                                   
548 Goh, Evelyn and Chua, Daniel. Singapore Chronicles: Diplomacy, p.53.  
549 Aggarwal, Narendra. S’pore is China’s largest investor. Business Times, 
November 6, 2015, http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/hub/business-china-
special/spore-is-chinas-largest-investor (retrieved April 25, 2018).  
550 You, Min. Xinjiapo daxuan: renmin xingdongdang weishenme zong nengying 
[Singapore’s general elections: Why does the PAP always win]. Beijing: 
Jingjiguanlichubanshe[Beijing: Economy and Management Publishing House], 2013; 
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 Seen this way, one might argue that what binds Singapore and China closely 
is their respective governments’ insistence that economic prosperity remains 
fundamental to how political legitimacy is being understood. This is somewhat unlike 
Western polities whereby other issues such as human rights and individual freedoms 
are enshrined and remain sacrosanct, and that economic growth is just one of many 
indicators in determining state success. Yet as we have pointed out, Singapore’s 
general preference of a Western-led rules-based international order remains 
fundamentally at odds with the Chinese worldview. The notion that Singapore looks to 
the United States and other Western allies for its security needs but relies on the 
Chinese market for its economic prosperity can be problematic, particularly if China 
seeks to extend its geopolitical influence through economic means. In the following, 
we will examine three major strands of thinking among Singapore public intellectuals 
on how Singapore ought to position itself vis-à-vis China’s growing influence. By doing 
so, I hope to capture the key dynamics and considerations behind Singapore’s 
international outlook and reading of China’s future both within the Asia-Pacific region, 
and beyond.  
 
 
 
                                                   
Lu, Yuanli, Liu, Yun, Liu, Yuhong and Zeng, Yuanli. Wenzheng Liguangyao: 
Xinjiaporuheyouxiaozhili? [Asking Lee Kuan Yew: Why does Singapore governs 
effectively?] Tianjin: Tianjinrenminchubanshe [Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing], 
2015.  
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The Realist position: Maintaining balance of power 
 Among Singaporean advocates of the need to maintain a balance of power – 
however precarious and difficult it might be – is Ambassador Bilahari Kausikan, a 
career diplomat with the Singapore’s foreign ministry, and who was its permanent 
secretary from 2001 to 2013. Following his retirement, Kausikan continued to write 
and give speeches in a personal capacity, many of them touching on Singapore’s 
foreign policy, and they have been compiled in a book which I have elected to focus 
on in my subsequent discussion.551 The author also had the opportunity to interview 
him twice, in 2015 and 2017, and his views can be said to be largely one which 
resonated with a realist reading of international relations, particularly on the 
importance of power, and thus the need for small states like Singapore to maximize 
their policy options by ensuring a balance of power is maintained in international 
politics.  
                                                   
551 See, Kausikan, Bilahari. Singapore is not an Island: Views on Singapore Foreign 
Policy. Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2017. Given his position with the government 
establishment, one might also argue that Kausikan’s views reflect the Singapore’s 
government position, albeit unofficial. This provides an alternative outlet for 
Singapore’s policy-making, particularly in sensitive areas, such as its bilateral 
relations with China.  
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  In Kausikan’s view, China’s size and population creates a “fundamental 
asymmetry” of the relationship between itself and smaller countries in Southeast Asia, 
including Singapore:552 
“This asymmetry of size and thus of power is an empirical fact that cannot be 
wished away. Big countries are always going to provoke a degree of anxiety in 
smaller countries on their periphery. This has nothing to do with the intentions 
of the big country; it is a reality faced by all big countries in every region 
throughout history. Big countries have a duty to reassure, a duty that China has 
only partially fulfilled. Small countries look at the world very differently from big 
countries.”553 
Embedded in the above statement, I argue, is a deep and pervasive belief that 
structure trumps agency in matters of international politics. Regardless of the best 
intentions of Chinese leaders, its very size and growing strength means that its actions 
would be read by other countries in a manner that is threat-evoking, unless proven 
otherwise. Moreover, in Kausikan’s mind, Chinese leaders were unable to perceive 
how smaller states view China. As he puts it, “[t]hroughout my diplomatic career, I 
have failed to get Chinese friends to understand [how small countries think]; they may 
intellectually grasp the difference but do not emotionally empathise with small 
countries. This is probably true of all big countries everywhere. But it may well be 
particularly difficult for China to empathise because of justifiable pride in its 
                                                   
552 Kausikan, Bilahari. Singapore is not an Island: Views on Singapore Foreign 
Policy, p.93.  
553 Ibid., pp.93-94.  
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achievements, the growing role of nationalism in the Chinese body politic, and, above 
all, Chinese sense of destiny in reclaiming its historical place in East Asia and the 
world after a hundred years of humiliation.”554  
Kausikan’s realist persuasion is further evidenced by his observation that 
China’s claims in the South China Sea or its military modernization programme is 
“nothing unusual” given the need to preserve one’s sovereignty. 555 In this respect 
China is well within its rights to protect what it sees as its legitimate territory. At the 
same time, Kausikan expresses the view that “claims of sovereignty [ought to] be 
pursued within common framework of norms, including procedures to change norms 
considered obsolete or unjust” instead of resorting to “unilateral actions based on 
superior force.”556 In addition, Kausikan sees China’s increasing reliance on history as 
problematic as maritime claims are not being covered by such historical arguments; 
furthermore, such arguments “arouse anxieties among claimants and non-claimants 
alike.”557 Furthermore, it is noted, “history is always subject to multiple interpretations, 
and interpretations are constantly being revised as new facts come to light and 
interests change. There is therefore a danger that our own historical narratives will 
lead us in directions that we do not intend to take.”558 
                                                   
554 Ibid, p.94.  
555 Ibid., p.97.  
556 Ibid., pp.97-98.  
557 Ibid. 
558 Ibid. 
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In light of the above, Kausikan cautions against taking China’s rise as a given, 
and for countries to adjust their national interests in acquiescing to Chinese demands, 
whatever they may be: 
“The essential complication confronting all of us as we decide how to position 
ourselves vis-à-vis the US and China is that neither Washington nor Beijing  
themselves know what they really want…the US has not yet decided how much 
help to ask for to maintain order in East Asia, in what areas to ask for help. And 
what price to pay for help. Beijing has neither strong reason nor the capability 
to kick over the table even as it seeks arrangements that will better reflect its 
new status. And so, China on its part does not yet know whether to offer help 
to maintain order, in which areas to offer help, and what price to ask for its 
help.”559 
Given this uncertainty, Kausikan suggests that Singapore’s interests are best 
served in encouraging both the US and China to utilize multilateral forums like ASEAN-
led institutions as much as possible as “this gives us and other lesser beings a 
modicum of influence and helps mitigate the trials and tribulations that inevitably arise 
when strategic adjustments of this scale are underway between major powers.”560 In 
this respect, Kausikan argues for the need to maintain balance “conceived of as an 
omnidirectional state of equilibrium that will enable Asean to maintain the best possible 
relations with all the major powers and thus preserve autonomy.”561  
                                                   
559 Ibid., pp.166-167.  
560 Ibid., p.168. 
561 Ibid. 
	   277	  
The above arguments put forth by Kausikan is evidently reflective of a realist 
thinking in guiding Singapore’s foreign policy towards China. Indeed, Leifer’s 
suggestion that Singapore’s fundamental approach to its foreign policy that 
necessitates her in “coping with vulnerability”562 means that China’s rise is viewed with 
suspicion, particularly if it results in the challenging of the existing global order and the 
primacy of US influence within the Asia-Pacific. According to one study of Sino-
Singapore relations, the “practical and paradoxical quality of Singapore’s foreign 
policy” meant that no amount of insistence by Chinese leaders over its peaceful 
development is likely to assure Singapore about Chinese intentions, especially when 
China’s growth might (or, for some, has already) come at the rest of Asia’s expense.563 
In 2017, Kausikan and his contemporary Kishore Mahbubani (who was then Dean of 
the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, and whose views we will examine in detail 
below), were involved in a protracted public debate on how Singapore ought to position 
itself internationally given China’s renewed strength and rising influence. Kausikan’s 
view was that Singapore should not accept subordination “as a norm of relationship” 
and that its leaders ought to “stand up for their ideals and principles when they had to” 
instead of “being meekly compliant to the major powers.”564 From this perspective, the 
                                                   
562 Leifer, Michael. Singapore's Foreign Policy : Coping with Vulnerability, 2000.   
563 Tan, See Seng. "Faced with the Dragon: Perils and Prospects in Singapore’s 
Ambivalent Relationship with China”, 2012.  
564 Kausikan, Bilahari. Facebook post dated July 1, 2017, 
https://www.facebook.com/bilahari.kausikan/posts/1948237095433710 (retrieved 
April 28, 2018).  
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realist position can be stated as such: The rise of China represents a challenge to 
regional stability and consequently posing problems to Singapore’s national interests 
which historically is tied to a Western-led order, hence concerns over a Chinese-
dominated international order that is seen as attempting to revise the accepted rules 
of international conduct and thus are fundamentally inimical to Singapore’s approach 
to international relations.  
Not surprising, the above paradigm eschews any mention of Chinese 
exceptionalism, and takes the stance that China – like all rising powers – would 
necessarily want to challenge the existing status quo and in doing so, modify the rules 
and norms of international order to best suit its priorities and preferences. Interestingly, 
Kausikan perceives China’s attempts to procure political influence internationally as 
unlike the practices and behaviors of other major powers in three ways.  Firstly, China 
explicitly rejects the norm of not interfering in another state’s domestic affairs and 
believes its interests should be promoted wherever they may be. Second, China uses 
a range of tactics, from legitimate diplomacy to more covert and often illegal 
deployment of agents of influence and operations to sway decision makers or public 
opinion leaders. Third, the aim of China’s influence operations is not just to direct 
behavior, but to condition behavior.  As observed, “China doesn’t want you to comply 
with its wishes, it wants you to…do what it wants without being told.”565 From this, we 
might say that while China’s ultimate goal is un-exceptional (as it is behaving as all 
                                                   
565 Yong, Charissa. S’poreans should be aware of China’s influence ops: Bilahari. 
The Straits Times, June 28, 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/sporeans-
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major powers are wont to do), the strategies and tactics that it employs to achieve its 
objectives are exceptional, in the sense that it does not seek to play by the rules of the 
international system but instead attempt to subvert existing practices to achieve its 
goals. For instance, while many Western countries seek to distinguish between 
political and commercial objectives, however difficult it might be, the Chinese 
government perceive commercial relations as ultimately an extension of political 
objectives, and interferes when it perceives these commercial relations as posing 
challenges to its political rule.566 Such a brand of exceptionalism however is seen as 
lacking in moral quality and runs counter-intuitively to China’s goal of being seen as 
an exceptional power, that is being different and good.  
 
The economic institutionalism position: New rules for changing times 
 The second position I argue, is that proposed by Kishore Mahbubani, which 
argues for the need to reconceptualize and rethink what Singapore’s fundamental 
national interests might be so as to best adapt to the changing configuration of power 
(evidenced by China’s rise) and to take advantage of China’s global prominence.  In 
an essay entitled “Qatar: Big Lessons From a Small Country” that was published by 
Singapore’s flagship newspaper The Straits Times, Mahbubani alluded to the example 
                                                   
566 One recent example is the detaining of Canadian citizens in China following the 
arrest of Huawei’s chief finance officer Meng Wanzhou in Canada. As proof that 
Chinese commercial enterprises are not free of political objectives, the Chinese 
ambassador to Canada warned of repercusssions if Ottawa blocked Huawei from 
supplying equipment to Canada’s 5G networks.  
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of several Gulf states’ decision to break off ties with Qatar to illustrate instructional 
principles for the conduct of international relations, and more specifically, that “small 
states must always behave like small states.”567  According to Mahbubani, Qatar had 
made the mistake of thinking that because “it sits on mounds of money…that it could 
act as a middle power and interfere in affairs beyond its borders.”568 Referring to 
Singapore, Mahbubani suggested that it should be “very restrained in commenting on 
matters involving great powers.” This was in reference to Singapore’s views in the 
aftermath of the judgment of the international tribunal on the arbitration between the 
Philippines and China involving the South China Sea disputes. Observing that 
Singapore diplomatic representatives had insisted that it should take a “consistent and 
principled” stand on geopolitical issues, Mahbubani criticized such an approach, 
saying that being consistent and principled cannot be the only traits that defines 
Singapore’s diplomacy, and that it would be better for Singapore not to speak up when 
big powers are in disagreement. As a small state, Mahbubani elaborated, there was 
the need to be “Machiavellian” in international affairs: 
“Being ethical and principled are important in diplomacy. We should be 
viewed as credible and trustworthy negotiators. But it is an undeniable "hard 
                                                   
567 Mahbubani, Kishore. “Qatar: Big Lessons From a Small State”, The Straits Times, 
July 1, 2017, https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/qatar-big-lessons-from-a-small-
country (retrieved April 29, 2018).  
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truth" of geopolitics that sometimes, principle and ethics must take a back 
seat to the pragmatic path of prudence.”569 
 
 Following this, Mahbubani was roundly criticized by senior members of 
Singapore’s foreign policy establishment, notably Singapore’s Law and Home Affairs 
minister K Shanmugam who commented that the piece was “questionable, 
intellectually” and that Singapore had “to be clear about our interests, and go about it 
smartly. But not on bended knees and by kowtowing to others.”570 While the minister 
did not mention which country Singapore was compelled to kowtow to, it was generally 
believed that it referred to China, given Beijing’s influence and other circumstantial 
evidence at that time.571  
To be certain, the above instance should not be viewed in isolation, but within 
a broader worldview that Mahbubani holds, one which perceives a shift in power 
                                                   
569 Ibid. 
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dynamics from the West to the East, and consequently, a far more influential role for 
countries like China and India in global leadership and the determination of 
international affairs.572 Indeed, Mahbubani had also explicitly made known his belief 
the era of Western domination (led by the U.S.) was coming to an end, and that the 
world was moving from a “mono-civilization” led by the West to a “multi-civilizational” 
world. 573  In one sense, we might argue that Mahbubani is highly “realist” in his 
ideological disposition in that Singapore ought to align itself with China, given the 
certainty of Beijing’s future prosperity. At the same time, such a view also purports to 
present the East (and China) as the future of a pan-global society whereby the West 
is being replaced by an idealized East and where the entire world will witness a “great 
convergence” akin to globalization except that it is led by the East. 574  Such an 
exposition and interpretation is similar to Zhao Tingyang’s Tianxia system (if we recall 
in Chapter 2) whereby the establishment of a global society under norms derived from 
the East will ultimately render conflict obsolete, thus ushering in an age of prosperity 
and political goodwill. This optimism, I argue, lies at the crux of Mahbubani’s 
worldview, as he perceives the West in decline and thus rise of the East (and China) 
                                                   
572 Mahbubani, Kishore. The New Asian Hemisphere : The Irresistible Shift of Global 
Power to the East. New York: PublicAffairs, 2008.  
573 Mahbubani, Kishore. "It's A Problem That America Is Still Unable To Admit It Will 
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as an undisputed global reality.575 Moreover, China is generally viewed as a non-threat 
as its fundamental goal is the protection and prosperity of its domestic market. Such 
a view is also shared by Singapore’s former foreign minister George Yeo who said 
that “China’s ambition is not to surpass the United States but to look after its own 
people.”576 From this vantage point, the economic institutionalism position is as such: 
The rise of China is seen as an opportunity to relook the rules of the international 
system and consequently the need to reexamine Singapore’s national interests to 
ensure they cohere with a new reality whereby Western power is diminished and the 
East (as represented by China) is in ascendance, particularly in the economic sphere. 
From this, I argue that China is seen both as an exceptional power (whose time 
has come) and that its methods of procuring political influence as largely legitimate as 
it is mostly for domestic requirements. In other words, China’s international behavior 
is seen as largely unproblematic for its actions are seen as mostly at achieving 
domestic objectives and are not meant to challenge existing international rules and 
norms. Even if it does, such a perspective would argue that the global system is 
fundamentally flawed to begin with (as it is mostly designed to serve Western needs) 
and that the ascendancy of China would serve as a remedy to the global problems 
caused by Western rules and practices. Unlike the realist position which sees the rise 
of China as posing a fundamental challenge to the existing international order given 
                                                   
575 For an extended discussion of Mahbubani’s ideas, see his interview with Zhang 
Weiwei during his sabbatical in Fudan University, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4RDDL4pNHHA (retrieved January 21, 2019).  
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the very different political ideologies that both the West and China are founded 
upon577, the economic institutionalism position – I argue - posits economic indicators 
as the ultimate building blocks of political order. Such a logic thus perceives Chinese 
economic contribution vis-à-vis its growing share of participation in international 
institutions (particularly economic ones) to the world in a largely positive light, and that 
its political behavior is not in violation of any sacrosanct tenets of international 
diplomatic practices. Furthermore, given that China’s ultimate goal was the 
preservation of its own domestic interests, Beijing is not seen as harboring hegemonic 
designs towards other countries, except to safeguard and secure what was seen as 
rightfully belonging to them.578 Relating to Chinese exceptionalism, such a perspective 
is largely optimistic towards China as being good and different and is generally 
sanguine towards Beijing’s global influence, especially in China’s ability to contribute 
to countries’ economic fortunes.579 Indeed, in the 2019 Davos meeting, Singapore’s 
finance minister Heng Swee Keat (who is also widely tipped to be the country’s next 
                                                   
577 For an updated discussion on this debate, see Mearsheimer, John J. The Great 
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University Press, 2018. 
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caution against the use of force and to seek a peaceful resolution. Interestingly such 
an approach is taken by the Singapore’s foreign ministry in various South China Sea 
discussions as Singaporean leaders do not – at least in public – state their 
responses on which countries have a more legitimate claim to these territories.  
 
	   285	  
prime minister) praised China’s Belt and Road Initiative and expressed confidence that 
countries would enjoy the benefits of the BRI in time to come. 580 Given that much of 
Singapore’s economic success is contingent on trade networks, the institutionalist 
position would view such initiatives like the BRI as an unmitigated good, contributing 
overall to the wealth and prosperity of countries by facilitating further opportunities for 
trade ties and economic development.  
 
 
The constructivist position: a view from history 
 A third position which is articulated by the renowned historian Wang Gungwu 
maintains that what is needed in perceiving the rise of China is an appreciation of its 
history and culture. 581  Unlike Kausikan and Mahbubani whose views are largely 
                                                   
580 Tan, Dawn Wei. WEF panel upbeat on benefits of China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative. The Straits Times, January 23, 2019, 
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Ooi with Wang. Chapter four of the book, “China’s Struggle with the Western Edge” 
(pp.141-213) is particularly salient to my analysis. In addition, I will also draw on 
material obtained from a personal interview with Wang conducted in Singapore on 
January 5, 2018. Two other works by Wang, Renewal: The Chinese State and the 
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circumscribed by the importance on power and economic indicators, Wang – given his 
historian background – trains his focus on historical and ideational forces to 
understand modern Chinese political behavior. In an interview with the author, Wang 
points out that China’s history was intrinsic to its identity as a nation and that Chinese 
thinking concerning international relations and global order were fundamentally 
colored by its historical past.582 In an opinion piece written in 2013 at the height of 
Sino-Japan tensions over the East China Sea, Wang argues that “China’s history has 
warned of dangers when both internal unrest (or neiluan), or external turbulence 
(waihuan) are present.”583 Cognizant of these dangers, Chinese leaders (particularly 
Deng Xiaoping) had adroitly used the Western-led international system “to help 
China's economic reforms and this has ensured China's high level of dependence ever 
since.”584 At the same time, observed Wang, the Chinese – in relating to the present 
international order – “are now discovering that full membership of the system exacts 
a high price” and yet “Chinese leaders realize they do not have an alternative system 
                                                   
New Global History. HK: Chinese University Press, 2013, and Ideas Won’t Keep: 
The Struggle for China’s Future. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003, will 
also be consulted to provide a sketch of Wang’s thinking insofar as they relate to his 
understanding and analysis of China’s international relations and political worldview.  
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to sustain future development.”585 Elsewhere, Wang also shared the view that China 
was not entirely out to revise the rules of the international system, but were attempting 
to “interpreting them, or hiding behind them, using them in flexible ways to fit different 
situations…[The Chinese] don’t want to take the initiative because they don’t want to 
be seen to be challenging the rules or even questioning them.”586 According to Wang, 
one key difference between China and the West lies in how the law is being perceived:  
“The West probably has a much more pious attitude towards the law. I call it 
piety because it also involves a lot of hypocrisy; piety in the sense that you pay 
tremendous reverence to something and you treat it as sacred. The Chinese 
don’t have that kind of piety. They don’t treat the law as sacred. Law is just one 
of the instruments of the state, of society, of any group of people where you 
need rules. Law is an extension of rules. It’s a higher order of rule-making 
perhaps, but it’s no more than a set of rules.”587 
 The above analysis by Wang suggests a deeper, more fundamental cleavage 
between Western conceptions and Chinese conceptions of international order. Indeed 
Wang observes that the West and China have “two very different starting points” in 
terms of how rules are being conceived and adhered. The lack of a transcendental 
starting point in Chinese culture means that “it’s not part of their tradition to say that 
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there’s something over and above that determines a universal or natural law, and from 
which you cannot deviate.” From this, Wang suggests that “for the Chinese, there are 
no fundamentals, while the West argues as if there are such things.”588  
 From the above, I argue Wang’s reading of international politics takes its 
starting point as that of a culturally and historically conditioned one. This means that 
political concepts that are used today are not perceived equally in the same way in 
China as in the West, in particular the idea of a nation-state. According to Wang’s the 
idea of a modern nation-state is problematic to the Chinese mind, as it “exposed 
[China] to a plethora of concepts, like citizens, nationals, nationalities, ethnicities and 
minorities.”589  Furthering, Wang noted that “every country’s history has deep roots 
that cannot be easily ignored. No country can really begin only with the modern. China 
has its own heritage that serves as valuable social capital. Its people are still attached 
to their own history. Its historians also know that no narrative is final. Each country’s 
past experiences remained embedded in how its people think and act in the 
present.”590 In this respect, one might say that the historical and cultural conditions 
experienced by China has resulted in a sense of Chinese exceptionalism (we are 
Chinese and we are different) among the Chinese people.  
When posed the question as to whether such a line of argument was an attempt 
to “essentialize” the differences, Wang responded saying that there are evident 
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differences between Western and Chinese cultures that one cannot avoid 
differentiating them. As he puts it: “when the social scientists criticize people for 
essentializing, they want to get rid of it altogether, they think there is no justification at 
all, that I am not sure. I think there is justification, but whether it extends to the present, 
that is another question”, adding that the peoples of the West and East “originated in 
ways that have no connections with each other.”591  In this respect, I argue that in 
Wang’s mind, there exists a more foundational chasm between the belief-systems of 
the West and that of the Chinese, thus rendering their worldviews – at a basic level – 
fundamentally at odds with each other. This incongruence, as Wang relates, is seen 
most vividly in the study of international relations whereby the discipline itself is 
inherently framed by an Anglo-American worldview (given the pervasiveness of the 
English as the language medium), and together with its associated assumptions. 
Citing the ideas of Yan Xuetong (whom we have discussed in Chapter 2) as an 
example of trying to fit Western paradigms within a Chinese worldview, Wang 
observes that “[Yan] himself realized after a while…what he said just didn’t match what 
the Chinese were doing and thinking. He fought for a while to persuade them to 
understand what he was trying to say, but soon realized that it was not a question of 
them not understanding him. It was because it didn’t fit their understanding of how 
things were, and because his ideas were based on Western historical experience.”592  
                                                   
591 Personal interview, Jan 5, 2018, Singapore.  
592 Ooi, Kee Beng. The Eurasian Core and its Edges: Dialogues with Wang Gungwu 
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Indeed, it is China’s encounter with modernity, and to some extent 
Westernization that Wang perceives as being problematic to the Chinese today. In his 
discussion of China’s coming to terms with modernity, Wang argues that three main 
forces have deeply influenced the modern Chinese mind: 
“The first is the strong desire to build the future on the best of the traditional 
national essence (国粹 guocui). The second is to be open-minded and select 
from the new ideas that come from the liberal and pluralist world outside. The 
third is the view that the CCP itself favors: that all ideas and values from past 
and present be placed within the framework of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics.”593 
While Wang does not clearly state his view as to which of the three main forces 
would eventually prevail, the second option seems to be Wang’s preferred option. 
Observing that “the Chinese people will want their modern civilization to be 
represented by a much wider spectrum of the most talented, creative and adventurous 
people that the country can produce…future generations of Chinese leaders will 
recognize that a new Chinese civilization will not depend on China remaining a party-
state or becoming a nation-state. A broad and inclusive Zhongguo will need to go 
further to establish a civilization that its people all agree will be modern and 
admirable.”594  
Relating the above to Singapore’s perspective of China, I argue that Wang’s 
insights represents a middle ground between Kausikan and Mahbubani in which 
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China’s rise is viewed primarily within a comparative framework vis-à-vis the West in 
which both challenges and opportunities exist as a result of deeper, more foundational 
differences that exist between Chinese and Western society. In this respect, China is 
seen as exceptional as compared to the West as a result of the conditions of its own 
history, but unlike Kausikan and Mahbubani whose views emphasize the role of power 
and economics in international affairs, Wang perceives China through an ideational 
prism that is conditioned by Beijing’s own history and cultural traditions. As to whether 
China’s rise would be a force for good, Wang is largely agnostic in his assessment 
(both in his writings and in the interview) as this was contingent upon ongoing political 
dynamics within China. Such a vantage point, I contend, likewise places Singapore’s 
perspective towards China in a highly fluid framework whereby the need to understand 
China as it were, becomes paramount. In this respect, cultural ties – not just 
geopolitical ones – are paramount to the direction of future Sino-Singapore relations.   
 
A contestation of spheres: Geopolitical, economic or cultural 
 From the above discussion, I argue that at the heart of Singapore’s 
perspective(s) towards China is a contestation over which spheres, namely 
geopolitical, economic or cultural, matter more in present Sino-Singapore relations as 
well as the extent to which Singapore perceives China as being exceptional, that is, 
being different and good. In addition, each of these paradigms also reflect an 
emphasis or preoccupation among Singaporean Chinese-observers about what 
Beijing stands for and how best to engage, or benefit as it were, from China’s rise and 
global prominence. If one would to emphasize the importance of geopolitical dynamics 
in Singapore’s relations with China, then issues like territorial sovereignty and Chinese 
	   292	  
maritime claims would naturally bring about anxiety and concern for Singapore. 
Conversely, if economic priorities are seen as fundamental to Singapore’s future 
prosperity, then Beijing recent slew of economic initiatives like the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiatives would be seen as sources of 
blessings and good news for Singapore, particularly if perceived Western decline 
compel Singapore to align its interests with those of Beijing’s. At the same time, what 
China’s long-term interests might be are open to question, raising the larger puzzle as 
to whether Chinese leaders would chose to play by existing global norms, or elect to 
challenge those norms. One fourth generation Singapore leader in an email interview 
shared the view that “due to China’s sheer size and pace of development, its influence 
will surely increase.  China is growing within the context of a global economic and 
governing architecture.  It is in its strong interest to continue to be an integral part of 
the global community, as the global community as a strong interest to see it 
succeed.”595 Such comments generally reflect the overall preference for Singapore’s 
leaders towards China’s international actions (in that Beijing continues to abide by the 
rules of the international system), whether Beijing perceive this to be in China’s 
interests is another question. Finally, if one chooses to emphasize the cultural sphere 
and the ideological composition behind China’s foreign policy practices and political 
beliefs (as Wang maintains), then such an approach, as it were, would fundamentally 
call into question the universality of Western beliefs concerning political order and 
organizing principles behind world politics. At the same time, this calling to question 
assumes a particular objective reality concerning what an ideal political order ought to 
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be, thus rendering the Chinese model – influenced by Chinese culture – to be in 
greater coherence with what is demanded (by the world) as opposed to what is 
presently provided (by the major powers). In this respect, Wang sees Chinese culture 
as being more flexible given its emphasis on “The Middle Way”, thus avoiding the 
extreme positions that a Western worldview might bring about.596 This flexibility is 
most saliently perceived in the issue of human rights practices whereby Singapore 
and other Southeast Asian neighbors have been historically antagonistic towards 
Western standards and expectations of what these rights ought to entail . For instance, 
Lee Kuan Yew was one of the proponents of “Asian values” in the 90s, choosing to 
emphasize the importance of collective responsibilities over individual rights.597 From 
this vantage point, Singapore – notwithstanding its Western orientation in its legal 
sphere – can be said to be traditionally conservative, and that its own political model 
presents striking parallels to the Chinese communist model.598 The above discussion 
also suggests that at present , Singapore leaders remain generally ambivalent towards 
Beijing’s overall brand of global leadership, preferring to adopt a wait-and-see position, 
                                                   
596 Ooi, Kee Beng. The Eurasian Core and its Edges: Dialogues with Wang Gungwu 
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particularly if it concerns national security issues. 599  The case for Chinese 
exceptionalism, as it were, remains a divided issue with some like Kausikan highly 
unpersuaded by Beijing’s political actions and electing to resist it; others like 
Mahbubani, in perceiving a golden moment in global history whereby the East – led 
by China, and to some extent India – will surpass the West, express exuberance over 
China’s growing involvement in international institutions. Others like Wang – while are 
more reserved (or agnostic) about China’s ultimate geopolitical objectives – would 
reiterate on the need to take into account ideas gleaned from Chinese culture and 
history in order to understand and best engage with China.  
 
Sino-Singapore international relations and the differences that matter  
 Returning to the field of international relations, how then does Singapore’s 
understanding of its place in the world relate to China’s own analysis of its global 
position? In this respect, I argue that there exists a deep cleavage in the fundamental 
aspects of how Singapore perceives its own national interests vis-à-vis China. In the 
case of Singapore, I argue that an innate sense of vulnerability has consistently 
shaped the manner as to how its leaders thought about Singapore’s place in the world 
and consequently, how they applied the tools of foreign policy to achieve Singapore’s 
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national interests. 600 In the case of China, I argue it is a sense of victimhood  which 
pervades the thinking of Chinese leaders thus shaping the manner of its foreign policy 
and the conduct of its international relations.601 This foundational difference behind 
national self-identity is reflected in their respective approaches towards diplomacy. In 
Singapore’s case, the argument is often advanced that as a small state, it needs “to 
be friends with everyone” and that it supports “a rule-based global community” 
whereby the rights and sovereignty of states are being upheld regardless of their 
size.602  In Beijing’s case, I argue that what is maintained is an acknowledgement of 
                                                   
600 For a detailed exposition, see Leifer, Michael. Singapore's Foreign Policy: Coping 
with Vulnerability, 2000. 
601 See for instance, Callahan, William A. "National Insecurities: Humiliation, 
Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism." Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 29, no. 2 
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602 Cheong, Danson. “As a small country, Singapore has to be friends with everyone, 
but at times it needs to advance its own interests”, The Straits Times, July 17, 2017, 
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the inherent inequality that exists among states and that the practice of international 
politics is but a reflection of that disparity.603 Such a line of thinking is most vividly 
illustrated during a international meeting among Southeast Asian countries and China 
in 2010 in which its then foreign minister Yang Jiechi was reported to have said (in 
response to Southeast Asia’s countries’ concerns over Beijing’s South China Sea 
claims) that, “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s 
just a fact.”604 Furthermore Singapore, being a small state, sees itself as a “pricetaker” 
in international affairs, and that it has to take the world as it is, not as it wishes the 
world to be.605 This is not the case of China whereby the existing international system 
                                                   
603 See for instance, Kang, David C. "Hierarchy and Legitimacy in International 
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Yongnian, and Wen Xin Lim. "The Changing Geopolitical Landscape, China and the 
World Order in the 21st Century." China: An International Journal 15, no. 1 (2017): 4-
23.  
604 Pomfret, John. “U.S. takes a tougher tone with China.” Washington Post, July 30, 
2010,  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/29/AR2010072906416.html (Retrieved March 12, 2018).  
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is seen to be fundamentally antagonistic to Chinese interests and thus the need for 
change in the rules governing global order to better reflect China’s preferences.606 In 
this respect, one could make the case that Singapore’s claim to exceptionalism – in 
the dominant narrative – is due to its ability to turn its limited resources into strength, 
in which the roots of Singapore’s foreign policy was established not from a position of 
power but from a position of weakness. Given that its statehood could not be taken for 
granted following its separation with Malaysia in 1965, its subsequent success was 
due to the ingenuity of Lee Kuan Yew and first generation leaders to nurture and 
sustain it.607 In China’s instance however, the claim to exceptionalism – as I earlier 
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alluded – is premised on the view that China is presently powerful, and thus is entitled 
to a greater share, and say, to the rules of the international system. Hence, one might 
argue that China sees itself as a “price-setter” and is attempting to negotiate from a 
position of strength whereby its interests and rights are being respected by others.  In 
this way, Singapore’s vision of global order can be said to be significantly very different 
from that envisaged by Beijing. While Singapore perceives its interests to be best 
aligned with the present US-led international system (problems notwithstanding), 
China sees the problems in the international system as evidence that such an order is 
indeed unravelling, thus presenting it with an opportunity to shape the rules of the 
game, particularly through economic means (as we shall see in the next chapter on 
the Belt and Road Initiative).   
  
Conclusion:  
 As the chapter has shown, Singapore’s perceptions of China, and 
consequently, China’s role in the world is highly ambiguous, paralleling historical 
relations between both countries and across their leadership administrations. In terms 
of their international relations, both countries also differ significantly, with Singapore 
being much more embracing of Western norms and practices which China continues 
to harbor strong suspicions towards. A more fundamental problem, especially in 
China-Singapore relations, is due to China’s political system and consequently, the 
lack of trust it generates among Singapore’s leaders towards Beijing. Indeed, Lee 
Kuan Yew’s anti-communist stance in the early days of Singapore’s statehood left a 
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deep and lasting impact among subsequent Singaporean leaders and provided the 
ideological lens which framed Singapore’s foreign policy dispositions.To be certain, 
official Sino-Singapore relations – following the commencement of diplomatic relations 
in 1990 – have been generally positive, with both countries sharing strong economic 
relations. At the same time, strong economic interdependence cannot ameliorate the 
existence of deeper concerns towards Beijing’s long-term territorial ambitions in the 
Asia-Pacific region, similar to what Vietnam and Indonesia share (as discussed in 
Chapter 6).  
 Given Singapore’s majority Chinese demographic composition, the ethnic-
cultural dimension of its relations with China cannot be ruled out, and indeed, would 
continue to be a key factor in framing Sino-Singapore relations. For instance, the 
Business China initiative launched by Lee Kuan Yew in 2007 speaks of its mission as 
to “nurture an inclusive bilingual and bicultural group of Singaporeans through 
extensive use of the Chinese language as the medium of communication, so as to 
sustain our multi-cultural heritage, and to develop a cultural and economic bridge 
linking the world and China.”608 Indeed, Lee himself exhorted Singaporeans on the 
need to possess traits such as “fluency in the Chinese language, knowledge of China’s 
traditional culture and an understanding of the on-going changes in the social, 
economic and political conditions [of China]” as essential in conducting business in 
China, thus suggesting the ongoing relevance of cultural linkages in Singapore’s 
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relations with Beijing.609 To this end, recent attempts by the Chinese state in trying to 
cultivate influence among the overseas Chinese community to promote its 
international influence might render Singapore highly susceptible to China’s actions, 
notwithstanding its leaders frequent characterization of its multicultural, multilingual 
national identity.610 In this respect, Callahan suggests for the need to question and 
problematize the notion of civilization in our understanding to political questions and 
consequently to “resist the temptation of coherent and singular definitions of 
civilization as a substance [and instead] to suggest that civilization and barbarism are 
best understood as a contingent relation: each continually produces the other.”611 With 
this in mind, I argue that Singapore’s relations with China can be then seen as a 
complex relationship whereby leaders of both countries attempt to simultaneously 
“attract and resist” one another in order to meet their political objectives. Nevertheless, 
given Singapore’s historical alignment with the West, particularly in the area of meeting 
its security needs, it is difficult to foresee its leaders altering their worldviews to 
accommodate, let alone embrace, Chinese preferences. In this respect, a number of 
Chinese scholars have also expressed pessimism towards long-term Sino-Singapore 
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relations as they perceive Singapore’s fundamental reading and preferences of the 
international system to be at odds with Beijing’s national interests.612 
 Finally, Singapore’s perspective of China is instructional to our understanding 
of broader China relations with the world. The three perspectives I offer, which are 
premised on the contestation of geopolitical, economic and cultural spheres, and the 
degree to which of these spheres matter, likewise provide a useful lens to examine 
other countries’ relations with China, especially those in East Asia in which Chinese 
influence can be most keenly felt. More crucially, I argue that such an approach would 
necessarily problematize the notion of how national interests are defined, and also 
highlight how the influence of China is not necessarily a one-way-street in spite of 
Beijing’s might: national leaders also make use of international ties with China to serve 
their own political agendas, and in some cases, to strengthen their domestic legitimacy 
through tapping on China’s economic wealth. 613 To this end, I argue that at the heart 
of China’s quest for global influence is the goal to “proselytize” other countries in 
accepting and acknowledging its way of seeing the world, and where possible, to seek 
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common ground (particularly through economic initiatives) with those countries it 
seeks to “convert” to its camp. Nevertheless as my study has shown, there exists some 
resistance to Chinese’s attempts to propagate its worldview outside of China, even to 
countries which share ethnic similarities with Beijing. As the responses of Singapore’s 
public intellectuals indicate, China’s political worldview and its claims to 
exceptionalism are being understood in ways that can run counter to China’s own 
claims and preferences of global order. While countries within Beijing’s geopolitical 
orbit will continue to be particularly susceptible to China’s attempts to project its 
political influences, the outcome of these political interactions may not always be that 
which Beijing desires.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion: From Chinese exceptionalism to Chinese universality 
 
The central claim of this thesis is that China’s political worldview is deeply influenced 
by a sense of exceptionalism, that is, China sees itself as being good and different, 
and that such a perception is fundamental to shaping the way it sees the world and 
consequently influencing its approach to the practice of international politics. While 
exceptionalism is by no means the only way to consider China’s international relations 
and foreign policy, nevertheless, it represents a vital lens with which to look through 
in order to make sense of the Chinese political worldview. Such exceptionalism 
dynamics – I argue – provide us with a better understanding and a more 
comprehensive interpretation to China’s international relations as compared to 
mainstream IR theories. By taking seriously material, ideational and structural factors, 
this thesis seeks to locate the key driver behind China’s international politics as the 
sense of exceptionalism within the Chinese Communist Party – led by President Xi 
Jinping – while simultaneously perceiving the existing international order as ripe for 
change, with China playing a more influential role whilst having its interests 
acknowledged by others.  
This chapter concludes the study of Chinese exceptionalism as a framework 
for examining the Chinese worldview to international relations. It proceeds as follows. 
First I summarize my main arguments and findings. Second, I go on to discuss the 
implications of Chinese exceptionalism and the extent to which such thinking 
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represents a Chinese claim to universal validity. Finally, I identify some areas for future 
research. 
 
Main findings 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, all countries – big or small – are wont to perceive 
themselves in ways that are exceptional so as to distinguish themselves from others 
and to also provide a means of social and cultural identity, so as to facilitate the work 
of political governance. In this respect, China is no different. What makes Chinese 
exceptionalism the subject of my sustained enquiry lies in the fact that China is a global 
power, and the sense that it seeks to pursue its international objectives outside or at 
the very least, apart from the existing norms and rules of the international system. 
Unlike small or even medium size states whose exceptionalist claims (if any) may be 
said to be of limited significance and relevance to the wider world, Chinese 
exceptionalism– as a result of China’s size and magnitude of its global reach – is far 
more consequential, impacting many countries that Beijing comes into relations with. 
Indeed I argue that ever since Xi Jinping came into power in 2012, China’s 
international mindset is such that it not only seeks global parity with the West (and the 
United States), but it also seeks to surpass the West. Through Chinese exceptionalism 
discourse, Chinese leaders are able to articulate a sense of difference (“we are unlike 
the West”) while also accentuate its claim to superiority (“we are better than the West”). 
Through a study of various themes germane to China’s international relations, this 
thesis has examined the pervasiveness of Chinese exceptionalism prevalent in 
various themes germane to Chinese international relations. 
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 In Chapter 2, I looked at how China’s political worldview and sense of 
exceptionalism was being fleshed out in the study of the discipline of international 
relations. I examined the ideas promulgated by four Chinese IR scholars in recent 
years and how they attempt to engage the analysis of international relations through 
the use of Chinese indigenous ideas. These ideas at their core seek to relate the 
practice of international politics with Chinese self-identity while simultaneously 
challenge the universal validity of Western social and cultural systems. Seen this way, 
mainstream international relations theories such as realism, constructivism and liberal 
institutionalism are all subjected to a Sinicization process whereby Chinese scholars 
translate their insights within a Chinese identity framework in the hope of uncovering 
certain unique traits that lend themselves better within Chinese social and political life. 
The ensuing analysis however suggests that Chinese IR theories contain little 
universal traction and are mostly used to lend legitimacy to Chinese political actions, 
both internally and externally. More than that, Chinese IR theories also purport to 
relativize the universal insights claimed by Western IR paradigms and while attempting 
to accentuate, even universalize the insights proffered by Chinese IR ideas. Hence, 
we might say that Chinese political thought is heavily infused with Occidentalism in 
which the West is perceived as the wholly Other and is often blamed for the ills 
plaguing Chinese society. I also argue that Chinese IR scholarship remains largely 
Sino-centric, anti-Western, they assume benevolence in Chinese leaders as well as 
premised on a simplistic and essentialised view of the East and West that is linked to 
a deeper identity dilemma present in Chinese society.  
 Chapter 3 elaborates further on this identity issue and the contradictions that 
have arose as a result of China’s opening up and coming to terms with modernity and 
	   306	  
globalization. In this chapter, I focused mostly at the domestic aspect of 
exceptionalism and how the CCP uses Chinese exceptionalism to provide a “unified 
identity” so as to legitimize its authority to govern China. I also argued that the question 
of identity represents a key starting point with which to understand the Chinese 
worldview. Using the concept of liquid modernity, I argued that Chinese national 
identity – under the conditions of liquid modernity – is vulnerable to heightened stress. 
The deep cleavage between what is formally demanded by the state and what is being 
practiced by Chinese citizens in their private lives has generated incongruities that 
could challenge the fragility of the social contract between the Chinese state and its 
citizens. To preserve the stability of the country, the Chinese government has chosen 
to promote a unified sense of Chinese identity through the idea of Chinese-ness, it 
has also utilized nationalism to foster cohesiveness among its citizens, and projected 
the idea of the goodness of the Chinese state while vilifying the outside world 
(especially the West) so as to generate mistrust and suspicion from the Chinese 
people. To illustrate further the political narratives that China intends to convey to the 
world, I also looked at the high-profile Beijing Olympics in 2008, and in particular the 
theme song associated with the event. I argued that notwithstanding the all-out-efforts 
made by the Chinese government to promote itself to the global community, there 
remained concerns as to the degree to which the outside world was being persuaded 
by Beijing’s outreach and gestures of goodwill. Likewise, the Chinese state’s attempt 
to generate feelings of patriotism and nationalism may not always result in the 
intended outcomes due to how individual citizens have appropriated nationalism for 
their own respective ends. Finally, I discuss how the act of scapegoating of the West 
provides a conduit for the Communist Party to transfer blame to others so as to 
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maintain its claim to infallible truth as well as ultimately preserve its moral standing 
among the people. Taken together, I argue China faces social and political dilemma 
which is accentuated given its closed political system. While it seeks to be exceptional 
from the West in its international politics, at the same time it faces problems 
domestically that sharply mitigates against these exceptionalist claims. Put simply, can 
the Chinese government and its political institutions survive the challenge of 
modernity? 
 Chapters 4 and 5 shift the focus of the study of Chinese exceptionalism from 
the domestic to the theatre of international politics, particularly on the issue of Chinese 
national image and its claim to global leadership. In Chapter 4, I establish the link 
between a country’s national image and its claim to exceptionalism. I argue that for a 
country to be seen as exceptional, a positive national image is necessary. To see how 
the Chinese government seeks to project a favorable image of itself, I look at the 
speeches made by Xi Jinping – which are helpfully compiled in two volumes 
comprising more than 150 speeches made in his first term in office (Nov 2012 – Oct 
2017). In my analysis, I found three themes which constitute key narratives in China’s 
image promotion efforts, namely, the Chinese Dream and the image of China as a 
flourishing civilization, an image of a peaceful and progressive nation, and China as a 
moral example for international emulation. Notwithstanding the glowing rhetoric in 
which Xi has painted China to be like, all three images suffer from deeper and 
fundamental flaws. The need to preserve party centrality and control at all costs 
sharply limits the ability of the Chinese government to respond to the deeper moral 
and existential aspects of the Chinese dream. Similarly institutional reforms (gaige 改
革) are often conceptualized to strengthen government rule, thus being limited in their 
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scope and contingent upon broader political exigencies. The emphasis by Chinese 
leaders on its peaceful rise have not been matched by actions on the ground, 
particularly in East Asia where territorial disputes with its neighbors have placed a dent 
on Chinese national image. Consequently, the heavy use of moral undertones in policy 
making – I argue – remains largely for symbolic purpose for the Party to utilize in order 
to claim credit for its success in ruling China. In sum, one might surmise that efforts 
by Chinese leaders to improve its national image remains at present unconvincing, 
not least because its actions – both domestically and internationally – do not match 
up to the lofty promises it claims to promote. Ironically, its insistence on its uniqueness 
(or Chinese characteristics) mean that such peculiarities governing its behavior are 
less likely to be emulated by other countries who do not share similar set of 
sociocultural assumptions and political values. In other words, a less Sino-centric way 
of seeing the world might be necessary if China is to achieve its goal of improving its 
national image and to be considered by others as being exceptional, that is good and 
different.  
In Chapter 5, I continue my study of China’s political worldview and its claim to 
exceptionalism by analyzing the discourse surrounding the high profile Belt and Road 
Initiative. I contend that the Belt and Road Initiative – notwithstanding its emphasis on 
fostering economic linkages between China and other countries – represents a grand 
strategy through economic means whereby economic tools are used primarily to 
generate soft power and to bring target countries into the orbit of Beijing’s geopolitical 
influence. Through analyzing the existing body of work by Chinese IR scholars on the 
Belt and Road Initiative, I argue that three key themes stand out: one, challenging the 
rules of the international system, two, competing with the United States for regional 
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influence, and three, China’s domestic environment and the need to generate 
economic growth to legitimize the Chinese Communist Party rule. Taken together, 
these three areas provide the key impetus for how the Belt and Road Initiative is being 
conceptualized and talked about by Chinese scholars. While the Belt and Road 
Initiative does confer China with opportunities to highlight its political model and project 
its influence to the rest of the world, I argue that whether such influence can be 
translated into the Chinese model being seen as truly good and different from that of 
the West remains highly suspect. Likewise, the notion that countries would necessarily 
buy in into Beijing’s global vision – as a result of economic cooperation - is overly 
deterministic: economic power alone does not constitute sufficient grounds for 
generating political affinity. Last but not least, Chinese economic resources are not 
infinite and the possibility of China suffering an economic slowdown or even a crisis 
cannot be ruled out. More crucially, this would call into question the legitimacy of the 
Communist Party to rule China domestically as well as the ability of the Chinese 
government to meet its international obligations.   
 In Chapter 6 and 7, I go on to investigate how China’s international image, its 
political worldview and its claim to exceptionalism is being understood by three of its 
Southeast Asian neighbors, namely Vietnam, Indonesia and Singapore. In chapter 6, 
I undertook fieldwork in Vietnam and Indonesia, two Southeast Asia countries that 
have possessed long and ambivalent political relationships with China. By asking 
scholars and a number of senior policy makers in both countries on their perceptions 
of China, I was able to obtained a highly contextualized and textured picture of how 
Chinese diplomatic actions and international behavior was being interpreted by 
regional interlocutors. While territorial disputes feature substantially in the overall 
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perception my interviewees had towards China, domestic politics remain equally at 
the forefront of their respective countries’ relations with Beijing. In the case of Vietnam, 
maintaining domestic and party stability was crucial and Vietnamese policy makers 
were careful about ensuring that their ambivalent relationship with China do not 
threaten its legitimacy to rule domestically. On the other hand, Indonesia – given its 
ambitions to be a regional leader – was more concerned with how China’s growing 
geopolitical might change the configuration of power in the Asia-Pacific theater. In 
addition, the issue of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia has also generated considerable 
ambivalence concerning how Jakarta perceives Chinese influence – via the overseas 
Chinese – within its own shores.  From this chapter, I argue that Chinese national 
image promotion is met with considerable suspicion, thus mitigating the extent of its 
claim to exceptionalism, particularly as to whether it would be a force for greater good.  
 This issue of Chinese overseas influence and the pursuit of global leadership 
was being further discussed in Chapter 7 in which I examined how Singapore – a city-
state with a majority ethnic Chinese population – perceived China’s global ambitions. 
By analyzing the thinking of three prominent Singaporean public intellectuals, I 
uncover contending discourses surrounding Singapore’s reading of China’s 
international relations, and consequently the manner prescribing how Singapore ought 
to relate with Beijing. Through the conduct of primary interviews and analyzing 
secondary sources of Singapore’s discourse towards China, I propose that 
Singapore’s position towards China can be broadly divided into three main schools, 
paralleling mainstream IR theoretical frameworks, and having varying perceptions of 
whether China is exceptional. The realist position sees the global ascension of China 
as a fundamental challenge to the rules and norms of global order. It also views China 
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as being unexceptional and its political influence as being problematic for other 
countries. The economic institutionalist view interprets China’s global prominence and 
its growing economic footprints as prima facie case of a shift of global power from 
West to East. Hence, it advocates the need to reexamine foundational national 
interests as well as greater participation in Chinese global institutions. More 
importantly, it sees China as an exceptional power and celebrates Chinese global 
influence as a good thing. Finally, the constructivist approach – with its emphasis on 
ideas brought about by history and culture – seeks to interpret Chinese political 
behavior on Chinese terms and to take seriously the ideational roots behind China’s 
political worldview. By comparing and contrasting ideas gleaned from Western and 
Asian traditions, the constructivist school is less concerned with universal explanations, 
but instead emphasize particularities insofar as they exist within those traditions and 
to find ways to negotiate those differences.  As of writing, there remains an ongoing 
and lively debate over how Singapore ought to posture itself vis-à-vis Beijing in order 
to best secure its own national interests. Relating to the broader study of Chinese 
exceptionalism, I argue that such debates are reflective of more foundational 
differences between Singapore and China – in their respective political ideologies – 
that mitigate against the extent to which common ground can be found between both 
countries. From this, I adduce claims to Chinese exceptionalism and benevolent global 
leadership do not find sympathetic ground among Singaporean observers. Instead the 
city-state remained more closely aligned with global leadership norms associated with 
the West (and the United States).  
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From Chinese exceptionalism to the quest for universality 
 As my study has demonstrated, much of what China says and does 
internationally in past decade following its rise to global prominence is with the goal of 
articulating its political worldview and its claim to be exceptional, in that it is both 
different and good compared to the West. From the manner it seeks to differentiate its 
international relations practices, the management of its national image and the 
promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative, all these are done with the objective of telling 
the world the story of a confident nation, or in Mao’s words, that “the Chinese people 
have stood up.” Yet as observed, this narrative of a powerful and wealthy nation is not 
without its own blind spots, particularly in light of China’s own domestic challenges as 
well as international anxiety, even suspicion over Beijing’s long term intentions. The 
crux of the problem I argue lies in the Chinese political system: the need to preserve 
Communist Party rule at all costs means that any challenge to the longevity and 
perpetuity of party interests is seen as a betrayal of the Chinese nation. In short, the 
well-being of the party precedes the well-being of the nation. For China to succeed, 
the Party must be in charge. Ironically, this is where claims of Chinese exceptionalism 
fall short. To be truly exceptional is to have attributes that possess universal validity; 
in China’s case, these exceptionalist claims are made mostly in reference to China 
and with the priorities of the Communist Party in mind. In other words, Chinese 
exceptionalism is fundamentally self-serving, rather than other-centered. To the 
degree that the needs and interests of other countries are respected and given due 
account, this is made primarily with China’s (and the Party’s) own interests in mind.  
 But might this not be said of all countries without exception, and should we not 
expect states to engage in international diplomacy without some level of concern for 
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their own domestic political priorities? Perhaps, but what makes the Chinese case 
particularly problematic is the lack of institutional oversight or what is more commonly 
called “checks and balance” to political power such as the rule of law, open elections 
and an independent media. Without these, it is difficult to ascertain the extent of one’s 
political legitimacy and the extent to which “the will of the masses” are being respected 
and taken sufficiently into account. To this end, the issue of human rights remains 
China’s Achilles Heel: a country that does not take sufficiently into account the needs 
of its citizens (which it governs directly) is less likely to respect the rights and interests 
of the citizens of other countries which it comes into contact with (indirectly). Moreover, 
if China’s global influence is said to be for the better good, then it raises the question 
as to how such a “global good” is to be defined. Unless Beijing is able to convince the 
international community that it is prepare to act sacrificially (sometimes at a cost to its 
domestic prerogatives) in defending the interests of others, suspicions that it is free-
riding on Western initiatives would continue to persist and limit the extent of its claim 
to be a force for good.614 With the above in mind, I argue that for China to be seen by 
                                                   
614 One current line that some Chinese scholars take is that Confucian ideology is a 
self-limiting force which seeks harmony rather than conquest. This of course, is 
highly debatable. For further studies, see Kang, David C. East Asia before the West : 
Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010; 
Kelly, Robert E. "A ‘Confucian Long Peace’ in Pre-Western East Asia?" European 
Journal of International Relations 18, no. 3 (2012): 407-30; Phillips, Andrew. 
"Contesting the Confucian Peace: Civilization, Barbarism and International Hierarchy 
in East Asia." European Journal of International Relations 24, no. 4 (2018): 740-64.  
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the rest of the world as a force for universal good, it needs to go beyond vague policy 
slogans (such as the China model) to delivering actual results on the ground, and 
benefitting the common good. While China’s growing involvement in peace-keeping 
operations and infrastructure building in third-world countries have provided some 
measure of legitimacy concerning its global responsibilities, Beijing’s intentions and 
long-term commitments to these activities remain debatable. 615  Moreover, how 
different is China’s solutions to global problems different from existing initiatives 
proposed by the West? While China’s policy makers often criticize Western countries 
for interference into other countries domestic affairs, Beijing is equally culpable as 
evidenced by its growing extraterritorial activities in many Western societies. 
Furthermore, as my study of the Belt and Road Initiative (in chapter 7) show, there is 
a lively debate within China as to the extent of China’s overseas involvement (given 
domestic needs) not unlike what countries in the West face. All these developments 
suggest that Beijing’s quest for universality would not be easy and given its ideological 
commitments, more complicated than what its leaders might admit.  
Last but not least, it must be said that unlike many Western countries whose 
political systems are premised on certain claimed universal ideals (i.e. democracy, 
free trade, human rights) which can then be used to analyze these countries. In China, 
these universals are not available for the Chinese or others to evaluate. Indeed, this 
basic difference has profound consequences for the conduct of politics. It can be 
                                                   
615 See Hoo, Tiang Boon. China’s Global Identity: Considering the Global 
Responsibilities of Great Power. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 
2018.  
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argued that the very sustainability of Western political model lies in the fact that it 
possesses certain built-in mechanisms – that are premised on universal standards – 
which can subsequently be used to call individuals or institutions to account for their 
actions and political behavior thus providing the roots of its own renewal and vitality.616 
On the contrary, the Marxist-Leninist system of Communist rule is designed to 
maximize the party’s grip on power. To this end, universal ideals do not stand apart 
from political objectives (i.e. speaking truth to power), but are used to support political 
prerogatives where they may already exist. As a case in point, the practice of religion 
in China (which is typically concerned with ultimate beliefs and loyalties) is being 
subjected to increasing CCP control. As such, we might say that the quest for ever-
greater power means that the party is ultimately accountable only to itself. Indeed, 
President Xi Jinping’s decision to remove term limits for his presidency reflects a 
deeper political mindset at work: the party – and its leader – is utterly indispensable to 
China’s future.617   
 Relating to Chinese exceptionalism, it would seem that China’s pursuit to global 
greatness rests on highly fragile foundations. To this end, I argue that the Chinese 
                                                   
616 See Fukuyama, Francis. The Origins of Political Order from Prehuman times to 
the French Revolution. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011. For a critique of 
how such a political model is unraveling in the West, see Guinness, Os. A Free 
People’s Suicide: Sustainable Freedom and the American Future. Downers Grove, 
IL: InterVarsity Press, 2012.  
617 Zhao, Suisheng. "Xi Jinping’s Maoist Revival.” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 3 
(2016): 83-97. 
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political worldview reflects a narrow vision of what international political order ought to 
be like and is largely developed with mostly China’s national interests in mind. While 
Chinese-led initiatives such as the BRI does provide China with opportunities to 
contribute internationally, a closer reading of the Chinese discourse suggests a more 
limited, and less generous vision of what global order entails. Indeed, one common 
theme that runs through my study of China’s political worldview and its claims to 
exceptionalism is that it is largely couched in anti-Western discourse and is geared to 
present all that China does as good and all the West done as bad. This binary 
worldview is problematic for it absolves China (and its government) of any blame while 
attributing all that is wrong with the world to the actions of the West (particularly the 
United States and its allies). 
 Furthermore, as my dissertation has highlighted, the more China proclaims its 
exceptionalism, that it is different and good, the more it would have to live up to these 
claims – both in its international and domestic actions – which could then pose 
challenges to the Chinese government legitimacy to rule. To the extent that it is able 
to fulfill these claims, it would have to revisit the roots of its political model including 
the possibility of forging a new social contract with its people, one that is not premised 
on a monolithic narrative that is party-centric (be it the Chinese dream, socialism with 
Chinese characteristics, a new type of major power relations et cetera.), but rather a 
plurality of narratives which take into account the aspirations and ambitions of its 
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citizens – which are not defined solely by the political concerns of the party.618 As such, 
these ongoing tensions would likely underscore the bulk of social and political 
discourse about China’s present and future place in the world, this dissertation seeks 
to unravel what Chinese exceptionalism entails, and how it frames Beijing’s worldview 
towards international politics.  
 
 
Areas for further study  
 There are three areas relating to this dissertation that can be further studied. 
First, it would be worthwhile to examine in greater detail the extent to which other non-
material factors continue to play a part in the Chinese political worldview. Indeed there 
is a growing corpus of scholarly literature suggesting that non-material factors such as 
prestige, pride, status and identity all play significant roles in the conceptualization of 
China’s political behavior. 619  In some ways, my utilization of an exceptionalist 
framework does not negate some of these non-material factors (for instance, the study 
of China’s national image in Chapter 3 is closely related to Chinese pride and prestige 
                                                   
618 For a popular account of what some of these narratives might be, see Osnos, 
Evan. Age of Ambition : Chasing Fortune, Truth, and Faith in the New China. New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014.  
619 See for instance, Pu, Xiaoyu. Rebranding China: Contested Status Signalling in 
the Changing Global Order. California: Stanford University Press, 2019; Hoo, Tiang 
Boon. China’s Global Identity: Considering the Responsibilities of Great Power. 
Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2018.  
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while Chapter 6 deals with Chinese ethnic identity), but it would be interesting to see 
the extent to which these factors become more pronounced as China’s international 
status grows.  
 Second, the relationship between Chinese political behavior and leadership 
personality should be analyzed in closer detail.620 This is especially so given President 
Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power which suggests that much of what portends as 
Chinese foreign policy since 2013 can be traced to Xi’s own worldview and political 
priorities. In this respect, I argue that Xi’s speeches - as analyzed in Chapter 3 – can 
be seen providing some basic clues to Xi’s vision of China’s future. At the same time, 
further work can be done to mine in greater depth the extent to which Xi’s personality 
traits - as well as those of his closest advisors, for instance Wang Qishan – are being 
reflected in China’s international practices. Questions such as Xi’s own personal 
ideology, his level of affiliation with Maoist ideas, his view towards the United States 
as well as his sense of security within the Party should be further posed within the field 
of Chinese international relations studies.  
 Third, the issue of Chinese information operations and its modes of political 
influence is worth studying. Given the sensitivity of this area of research, and the 
relative paucity of scholarly research conducted in English into this topic, scholars in 
the West are thus unable to conduct a sustained enquiry into the deeper 
considerations behind Chinese political thought including obtaining more multi-faceted 
                                                   
620 See, Brown, Kerry. The New Emperors: Power and the Princelings in China. 
London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2014.  
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insights into China’s decision-making process. 621 Indeed, if we maintain – as I do – 
that Chinese exceptionalism is fundamental to how Chinese political elites perceive 
China, then the question of how Chinese exceptionalism is being used, not just as a 
rhetorical device, but also as a political tool to generate political interference abroad is 
of crucial importance. Indeed, it has been observed by To that China’s information 
operations – through United Front tactics – have intensified over the years, particularly 
among target countries with which to cultivate more positive impressions of China with 
the aim of ultimately effecting policy choices made.622  To this end, several questions 
are worth asking: how have Chinese political elites – through information operations – 
seek to frame the argument concerning China’s rise and thus seek to gain legitimacy 
in the global arena of public opinion? To what extent has Chinese information 
                                                   
621 Some existing studies include, Eftimiades, Nicholas. Chinese Intelligence 
Operations. Ilford, Essex: Frank Cass, 1994; To, James Jiann Hua. Qiaowu: Extra-
Territorial Policies for the Overseas Chinese. Leiden: Brill, 2014; Schoenhals, 
Michael. Spying for the People : Mao's Secret Agents, 1949-1967. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013; Brady, Anne-Marie. "New Zealand and the 
CCP’S ‘Magic Weapons.’" Journal of Democracy 29, no. 2 (2018): 68-75. 
622 To, James Jiann Hua. Qiaowu: Extra-Territorial Policies for the Overseas 
Chinese, see pp.48-52, 65-68. This point was also made emphatically by 
Singapore’s former top diplomat Bilahari Kausikan. See Yong, Charissa. S’poreans 
should be aware of China’s influence ops: Bilahari. The Straits Times, June 28, 
2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/sporeans-should-be-aware-of-chinas-
influence-ops-bilahari (retrieved January 21, 2019).   
	   320	  
operations sought to discredit the West and how has it done so? While I have tried to 
provide some answers to these questions in my dissertation, further scrutiny into this 
topic will be of great importance in the coming years, particularly if one believes that 
China’s global influence will continue to grow.  
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